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 Over the past decade the alt-right has grown in prominence, yet scholarly research on the 
movement remains scanty. This ethnography of an alt-right group in Montreal aims to help fill the 
gap in the scholarship. I examine the unique ethical and methodological challenges involved in 
studying the movement and map the alt-right in relation to the far right more generally, using the 
political ecosystem of Quebec to illustrate far-right sub-groupings. I build on ethnographic data to 
theorize about masculinities within the movement with a particular focus on gendered hierarchy-
building among movement adherents. I explore the connections between the alt-right and online 
male-supremacism, concluding that male-supremacism constitutes one path into the alt-right. 
Internal divisions within the alt-right are mapped and theorized as two broad camps in dialogic 
tension. These camps are understood to be split between more liberal and more fascist 
perspectives. Ethnographic data is used to illustrate these tensions as they played out in the 
Montreal group. The liberal/fascist split is explored with reference to different class positions 
among informants, and each camp is examined in historical and geographic context. I conclude 
with a reflexive exploration of the motivations of alt-right adherents and a series of 
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Over the past decade the movement calling itself the alt-right has gone from an internet 
fringe phenomenon to a major topic of news coverage. Many first heard about the movement 
through the figure of Steve Bannon, an advisor to Donald Trump at the time of his election and 
co-founder of Breitbart, a news site Bannon billed as “the platform for the alt-right” (Posner 2016). 
The ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville in 2017, at which a counter-protestor was murdered 
by an alt-right adherent, shocked many people and sparked a flurry of reporting on the alt-right. 
Video footage from Charlottesville of hundreds of well-groomed young white men identically 
dressed in white polos and khakis, clutching torches and shouting “Jews will not replace us,” 
seemed to confirm fears of a new type of white identity politics emerging among Millennials. 
Clean-cut and lacking the tattooed boots-and-braces look of neo-Nazi skinheads, or the beards and 
Confederate trucker hats associated with rural working-class racism, the alt-right marchers hinted 
at a better-organized, more image-conscious brand of far-right activism. A spate of terrorist attacks 
committed by young men enthused with the movement complicated this sense of a more suave and 
palatable white supremacism but cemented the alt-right’s place in the public’s consciousness. 
The dissimilarities between the alt-right and older forms of white-supremacist activism 
proved to involve a steep learning curve for journalists trying to cover the issue. Obsessed with in-
jokes originating on niche forums like 4chan, the rank-and-file of the alt-right did not make it easy 
for outsiders to understand them. The more strategically-minded figures in the movement often 
practiced various kinds of prevarication with journalists in order to further their own propaganda 
aims. One stunt involved whipping up a fake controversy about the pop singer Taylor Swift being 
a secret Nazi, and then claiming to journalists that she was the alt-right’s favourite artist. The 
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bizarre character of the story ensured that news outlets ran with it, fulfilling the propagandists’ 
goals of spreading awareness about the existence of the alt-right and making the mainstream media 
appear foolish and out of touch. More recently, the terrorist who murdered dozens of worshippers 
at a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, included in his manifesto that he considered Candace 
Owens to be an inspiration to him. Owens, who is a Black conservative known for controversial 
statements about Hitler, may be a target of ire for the left but is certainly no inspiration to any 
white supremacist. Major newspapers reported the story incessantly. The shooter’s manifesto was 
thereby successfully publicized, and his desire to mock both the media and the leftists who have 
called Owens a Nazi was satisfied. Journalists seem to have been hypnotized by the movement’s 
idiosyncrasies – its use of a cartoon frog, Pepe, as a mascot, for example – and at times have 
struggled to get a handle on what the alt-right is about. 
 With my work, I have tried to shed light on the movement. Gingrich and Banks (2006) note 
that the unique contribution of anthropologists to the study of neo-nationalism is that we 
“[combine] an ability to see the world as neo-nationalists see it  (while never seeking to endorse 
those perspectives) with scepticism towards their view of the world” (1). This is equally true of 
the study of other far-right movements. Anthropologists’ conceptual training predisposes us to 
balanced perspectives which take into account both structural and individual factors (Gingrich and 
Banks 2006). Methodologically, the use of ethnography permits anthropologists a depth of study 
rarely available to journalists, and avoids the pitfalls of relying solely on textual sources such as 
propaganda (Blee 2003). By spending time participating personally in events with our informants, 
and getting to know them as people, we are able to generate valuable data which other researchers 
may miss. My fieldwork, I hope, goes some way toward accomplishing these and other goals with 
regard to the alt-right. 
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 Of course, this does not mean that studying the alt-right ethnographically is without its 
complications. In Chapter 2 I discuss the important ethical and methodological questions involved 
in this work. Anthropological codes of conduct advocating that we support our informants in their 
political struggles are unsuited to situations in which doing so would itself be unethical; 
researchers must, in such situations, conduct their own power analysis and determine for 
themselves the correct ethical stance to take. Far-right informants may attempt to use 
anthropological work as a platform for their ideas. They may also have an incentive to deceive the 
researcher for propaganda purposes. The researcher’s safety can also be at stake due to elements 
within the far right known to commit politically motivated violence.  Accordingly, extra 
precautions may be necessary for researchers studying the far right. There are questions about 
whether studying the far right is itself even ethical or useful, or if it needlessly gives these groups 
undeserved attention or is otherwise dangerous. I address these questions and argue that the 
benefits of such research outweigh potential harm. 
 Chapter 3 provides the terminological framework for this work, defining important terms 
and exploring the literature on far-right politics. Definitions provided by scholars of the far right 
are explained with reference to the political situation in Québec. Theoretical issues involving the 
utility of ‘extremism’ models are addressed. The picture emerging in the recent literature of far-
right groups which share ground with centrist liberalism is explored. My terminological choices 
are explained. I then offer an overview of the alt-right, building on the framework provided by the 
first part of the chapter. The alt-right is presented as a social movement, part of the far right, and 
only intelligible through its organizing principles of white- and male-supremacism. Links between 
the alt-right and online secular male-supremacist subcultures are established. A preliminary sketch 
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of the major ideological split within the alt-right, between more liberal and more fascist factions, 
is drawn. 
 The lens of gender is used to explore the alt-right in Chapter 4. Beginning with an extended 
fieldwork account, Chapter 4 proceeds into a discussion of the gendered interpersonal dynamics 
of an alt-right meet-up, examined with reference to the notion of masculinity as homosocially 
enacted. That is, much of the gendered behaviour of alt-right adherents can be understood as being 
performed primarily for the benefit of other men. The hierarchical character of masculinity in the 
alt-right is addressed in three sections concerning different types of boundary-making and 
exclusion behaviour practiced by alt-right adherents.  
 The first details the ‘alpha/beta’ distinction borrowed from online masculinist subcultures 
such as the Red Pill, having been distilled in turn from the field of evolutionary psychology. The 
alpha/beta distinction functions to divide men into a masculine elite and an insufficiently 
masculine subordinate group, implicitly constructing women as a third group excluded from this 
hierarchy. The second looks at signaling theory, a theoretical model borrowed by the alt-right from 
behavioural economics. I also apply signaling theory in an exploratory way to the behaviour of alt-
right adherents. The third section deals with a distinction, drawn by many alt-right adherents, 
between ‘high-‘ and ‘low-quality’ men, a distinction based on criteria which differ from informant 
to informant. Altogether these tools for establishing hierarchies among alt-right men are shown to 
be part of a struggle within the movement over which masculinities are to be considered 
acceptable. 
 Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the connections between online male-supremacist 
subcultures and the alt-right. A discussion of these subcultures’ ideological bases, and the way 
these overlap with the alt-right’s, is followed by an exploration of how these subcultures function 
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as recruiting grounds for the alt-right. Men who join these subcultures are exposed to ideas similar 
to the alt-right’s ideas but without as explicit a racial element. They self-select as men who are 
able and willing to support hierarchist and supremacist ideology. Once involved, a relatively 
straight-forward path to far-right extremism presents itself. 
 The sixth chapter delves into the dynamics of the deep ideological, strategic, and aesthetic 
splits within the alt-right. An ethnographic interlude is followed by an explanation of some of these 
splits. The tensions between them are characterized as ‘dialogic’ in character, that is, opposing 
viewpoints within the alt-right remain in close dialogue with one another, sometimes achieving 
synthesis but usually not, all the while being influenced by one another. I delineate two main 
camps, with the first being a more liberal faction interested in respectability and pragmatism and 
the second being a more fascist faction interested in active opposition and ideological purity. Two 
alt-right documents are examined. The first is a call to conceal the movement’s true goals and 
proceed with the struggle for white supremacy by covert means. The second is the leaked style 
guide of a major alt-right online publication, the Daily Stormer, which calls for overt, indeed over-
the-top, propaganda. The two documents are analyzed with reference to the two camps. The issue 
of prevarication by alt-right adherents, brought up by the first document, is addressed with 
reference to the positions of one of the alt-right group’s members most affiliated with the liberal 
camp. The chapter closes with a series of predictions regarding the future of the movement and 
the impact the ideological splits will have on it. 
 Chapter 7 examines the interplay of class, race and capitalism in the alt-right group. The 
confused and sometimes contradictory attitude toward capitalism on the far right is explored. The 
incompatibility of classical fascism and liberal capitalism is addressed through the lens of class 
identification. The historical context of the development of liberal capitalism in Europe is 
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juxtaposed with the development of racist thought to illustrate the roots of racism in aristocratic 
resistance to modernity. This aristocratic anti-modernism is further explored through the writing 
of Julius Evola, a prominent Italian esoteric fascist who advocated aristocratic elitism and ‘spiritual 
racism’. Interviews with informants are used to highlight the different ways in which racist views 
have been taken up in the alt-right, and the relationship between these racisms and different class 
identifications. I argue that the fascist wing is interested in non- or pre-capitalist class relations, in 
keeping with the aristocratic roots of racist thought and the subsequent prominence of Evola’s 
elitist anti-modernist thought in the fascist milieu, while the liberal wing is beholden to bourgeois 
class values. These two class identifications, I argue, also largely correspond to esoteric versus 
secular worldviews. 
 In Chapter 8, I challenge common assumptions about the racist right being insane, 
meaningless, based on irrational ‘hate’, or otherwise pathological. Instead, I argue, the racist right 
draws its ideas from sentiments which are common in the mainstream and are intimately related 
to the foundational values of states like Canada. I examine the rise of ‘ethnocratic liberalism’ in 
Europe, a form of far-right thought which seeks to retain liberal governance while redefining the 
country along narrow ethnic lines, and I identify the Canadian equivalent, naming it leukocratic or 
white supremacist liberalism, which seeks to (re)define the country along racial lines instead. I 
note that the high proportion of immigrants and direct descendants of immigrants among the 
members of the alt-right group render a totally anti-immigrant stance nonsensical, pointing to their 
potential embrace of a classic Canadian stance, a whites-only pro-immigration position. I argue 
that the capacity for racists to hold dual positions – supporting immigration for whites but not for 
others, for example – is understated in the literature and underlies the leukocratic liberal position. 
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 Chapter 9 is a reflexive examination of moments of empathy shared with informants. I 
argue that rather than extremist thought being rooted in economic downturns or pathological 
causes, it is a logical result of the normal functioning of liberal capitalism, which strips meaning 
from people’s experiences of the world and generates alienation, precarity and ecological disaster 
as a matter of course. I argue that extremist thought is a rebellion against liberal capitalism and 
that rebellion against liberal capitalism is rational and understandable. I offer an interpretation of 
far-right extremist thought as a desire for a kind of ‘time travel’, with the goal of anti-liberal far-
right programs being to arrive in an imagined pre-liberal past. I conclude with an ethical injunction 
to resist the project of the alt-right, as it entails brutality on a massive scale. I also note that the 
likely result of far-right movements gaining popularity is not a fascist anti-liberal revolution but 
rather their appropriation by factions of the existing ruling class, which, far from dismantling 
existing class relations, will use these movements to consolidate power. 
  











2.Ethics and Methods 
 The alt-right is a far-right movement. In 2018, every single extremist murder in the United 
States was committed by someone with ties to far-right extremism, according to the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL 2019). Over 300 terrorist attacks linked to far-right extremists have 
occurred since 2011 (Cai and Landon 2019). People affiliated with the alt-right have published the 
personal information of many journalists worldwide and have coordinated campaigns of 
harassment involving death threats (Wilson 2018). In Québec, members of the far-right group 
Atalante were arrested after bursting into the Montreal office of Vice in a bid to intimidate its 
journalists after they published an article about the group (De L’Église 2018). A white supremacist 
attacker murdered six people at a mosque in Québec City in 2017. Far-right groups have ballooned 
in size and number in recent years, with groups like La Meute and Soldiers of Odin organizing 
sizeable demonstrations in the streets of major Québec cities and at the US border. Accordingly, 
conducting research with an alt-right group is dangerous and raises important ethical questions.  
 Anthropologists are enjoined by our professional ethics to protect our informants and 
support their political struggles. However, some anthropologists have noted that such a blanket 
stance precludes a detailed power analysis of the situations we find ourselves in – what if 
supporting the struggles of our informants is itself unethical? Further, even when broadly in 
agreement with our informants, our critical analyses can be experienced by them as unfair attacks. 
It is not always clear what can or should be done about this. Scholars engaged in ethically difficult 
research have advocated for forming one’s own ethical position, and following insufficient 
professional ethics guidelines only to the degree that they are necessary to carry out the work.  
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 Working specifically with the far right has its own unique pitfalls. It can be difficult to 
cultivate empathy with informants whose views are hostile toward oneself or one’s friends and 
family. Far-right activists are sometimes eager to use anthropologists’ work as a platform for their 
ideas and may be disappointed if this is not successful. As I have noted, an additional safety risk 
is involved, as the far-right is associated with politically motivated violence and reprisals and there 
is a strong tendency for far-right activists to be hostile to journalists, academics and other members 
of what is perceived as a traitor establishment. This hostility can be amplified when the target’s 
political perspective is leftist. 
  
 
The Ethics of ‘Studying Up’ 
Anthropologists have long recommended that we promote the welfare of our informants 
and their communities. Even in the classically colonial era in which “[t]he anthropologist, like the 
other Europeans in a colony, occupied a position of economic, political, and psychological 
superiority vis-a-vis the subject people” (Lewis 1973, 582), anthropologists tended to at least partly 
side with the communities they studied and “try to protect them against the worst forms of imperial 
exploitation” (Gough 1968, 403). However, these colonial researchers “rarely questioned the basic 
relationship of privilege” in which they found themselves, nor did they often question their own 
biases (Lewis 1973, 583). Often, a putatively anti-racist stance and a commitment to ‘preserving’ 
a culture were marred by a seeming indifference to the self-professed interests of actual informants.  
 As a result of feminist and post-colonial interventions, anthropology has moved away from 
methods now broadly seen as colonialist (Speed 2008, 213), and today it is generally accepted that 
as ethnographers we should treat the people we study with as much respect as possible. An overly 
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‘objective’ detachment from the fate of informants is now usually considered unethical. The 
subtext – that our engagement with informants should be supportive of them – is made explicit in 
calls to cultivate “fieldwork solidarity” with them (Heyman 2010, 289) and is borne out in the 
ethical statements of the major professional associations. As Heyman notes, the American 
Anthropological Association considers responsibility to informants, and respect for their dignity, 
to be “paramount” (Heyman 2010, 288). The Society for Applied Anthropology uses similar 
wording, stating that “[t]o the peoples we study we owe disclosure of our research goals, methods, 
and sponsorship […] To the communities ultimately affected by our activities we owe respect for 
their dignity, integrity, and worth” (SFAA n.d.). 
 However, as Heyman (2010) points out, ultimately an ethical stance formulated along these 
lines “does not offer a power analysis of the people and situations we study, and also the kinds of 
politics in which we might become involved. It seems to cover all cases equally; not all cases are 
equal” (289). For one, it presupposes quite explicitly that we are studying those who have less 
power and privilege than us. As Nader (1972) argues, it behooves us to ask “whether the entirety 
of fieldwork does not depend upon a certain power relationship in favour of the anthropologist, 
and whether indeed such dominant-subordinate relationships may not be affecting the kinds of 
theories that we are weaving” (5). If we take seriously the injunction to cultivate solidarity with 
our informants, we have effectively prohibited ourselves from studying the powerful and the 
oppressive – that is, those with whom it would be unethical to cultivate solidarity – ‘studying up’, 
as Nader (1972) puts it. If one is studying not the wretched but the privileged, not the downtrodden 
but the jackbooted, then the call to respect one’s informants and support their political struggles 
against those who oppose them becomes at best an ethically suspect gentlemen’s agreement at best 
and, at worst, collusion with brutality and abuse. This ethical stance also presupposes that the 
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people we study constitute relatively unified groups towards whom ‘respect’ can be an 
uncomplicated blanket position. This ignores that outside of perfectly stable and perfectly 
egalitarian small-scale village societies – the real-world existence of which is contested and on 
which anthropology no longer focuses – all groups are riven by conflict which complicates the 
ethical positioning of any participant observer. 
 
Activist Ethnography 
 Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995) calls for a “new cadre of ‘barefoot anthropologists’ [who] 
must become alarmists and shock troopers – the producers of politically complicated and morally 
demanding texts and images capable of sinking through the layers of acceptance, complicity and 
bad faith that allow the suffering and the deaths to continue” (417). Taking aim both at postmodern 
moral relativism and overly-scientistic moral detachment, she argues for anthropology as a “site 
of resistance” (420) and a “tool […] for human liberation” (418). For her, this deep ethical 
engagement has often taken the form of intervening directly in events taking place among her 
interlocutors, for example by arguing for clemency on behalf of some thieves who were to be 
executed, or by participating in Socialist Workers’ Party campaigns in Brazil at the behest of her 
informants.  
 For Scheper-Hughes, it is not enough only to passively advocate for and ‘respect’ 
informants. An anthropologist must be actively engaged, and the academy must be sensitive to the 
fact that what historically marginalized people tend to want from anthropology, as she puts it, is 
not “deconstruction and the social imaginary but the anthropology of the really real” (417). It is 
no secret that the published findings of anthropologists tend to remain very obscure and of little 
direct use to informants; it is therefore unsurprising that informants should ask, as they did to 
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Scheper-Hughes, “What is this anthropology to us, anyway?” (411), and demand a more concrete 
contribution than an impenetrable monograph written in a foreign language. In response, Scheper-
Hughes advocates becoming a “class traitor […] who colludes with the powerless to identify their 
needs against the interests of the bourgeois institution” (420). Here, then, there is no particular 
conflict with the injunction to cultivate fieldwork solidarity; if anything, Scheper-Hughes feels 
that if this solidarity is not combined with class treason, it is too timid.  
 Speed (2008) takes a broadly similar approach, making an additional criticism of scholars 
who, too afraid of inadvertently harming informants to act at all, limit themselves to critical theory 
and textual analysis at the expense of fieldwork. Heyman (2010), likewise, criticizes the fact that 
many researchers decline to engage actively with informants, instead making “a choice of 
quietism, that we should not be involved with power processes so as not to do harm” (289). He 
argues that embedding himself as a participant in activist networks is the best way to study the 
topic of engagement and thus “go[es] beyond justifying partisan engagement in public issues” 
(118). In this position, he follows along lines laid by Flacks (1983), who advocates studying 
activists as a method of understanding social responsibility and morality. 
 The common thrust for these anthropologists is that following the spirit of anthropological 
fieldwork ethics means actively supporting the political activities of one’s research subjects – 
perhaps above and beyond the degree of support stipulated by generic ethical guidelines. However, 
if one selects certain politically active people as subjects for research based on the fact that one 
sympathizes with them, one is in effect willfully ignoring the political activities of people one 
opposes. Conversely, if one selects as subjects for research those who one opposes, participating 
in their activities is potentially unethical.  
  
14 
Heyman (2010) argues that a politicized anthropology which takes as its ethical base the 
guidelines of the AAA will be unequipped for morally complicated scenarios. While studying 
border guards, he explains, he must prioritize the human rights and dignity of migrants in order to 
remain ethical – but this stance cannot be gleaned from the AAA guidelines, because they have a 
static power analysis which simply assumes researchers are studying down and reminds them that 
their main responsibility is to their informants, whoever these are. While we should probably avoid 
harming our informants because of our professional ethics, he writes, that does not mean that we 
should accept to cultivate solidarity with people who participate in repressive organizations. At 
the end of the day, for Heyman (2010), “the ethic of ethnographic solidarity is insufficient without 
an analysis of the historical power placement and fields surrounding our specific ethnographic 




David Mosse (2015) found himself in an odd intermediate position, working with 
international aid workers in India – people who were trying to do good and with whom he broadly 
agreed politically, but ultimately people working for a powerful organization with practices and 
policies which he proceeded to expose and criticize in his ethnography. This work generated a 
great deal of backlash, he writes, primarily revolving around the appropriateness of harming the 
reputations of informants, and the validity of his interpretations. The facts involved were not 
contested; rather, the conflict was about “how knowledge and meaning was [sic] constituted […] 
and how representations of a development project were to be authorized” (Mosse 2015, 129). In 
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other words, the main point of contention did not have to do with his actions in the field, but with 
the work he subsequently published. 
However, in terms of fieldwork, it is true that when one is embedded in an organization 
one broadly supports, it is not always immediately obvious to everyone involved that one’s 
ethnographic purposes may differ significantly from the goals of the organization, further 
contributing to potential feelings of betrayal upon publication. In such circumstances, “participant 
observation is to some degree an act of concealment” (Mosse 2015, 135). For Mosse, this fact 
leads to a set of questions concerning the nature of consent and full disclosure: 
 
To what extent should ethnographers be explicit about their (developing) analytic perspectives, or the fact that 
what is recorded from intersubjective experience is destined to be recontextualized within a broad analytic schema 
for a different audience (cf. Descola 2005; Mosse 2006)? Would explanation of this be necessary to make consent 
to participate in the research properly informed? Perhaps more commonly […] fieldworkers allow an ambiguity 
of perceived purpose so as to maintain relationships and forego critical engagement that might bring conflict or 
disruption. (Mosse 2015, 135) 
 
As with Heyman and his critique of professional quietism, here Mosse argues that 
researchers may largely be avoiding politically-charged issues while in the field, so as to not be 
forced to confront ethically ambiguous situations.  
 Mosse writes that a good number of ethnographies involving activists result in their 
subjects’ disappointment or anger, even if the researcher is sympathetic. This is because activists 
expect to see knowledge about them being framed in terms similar to how they understand 
themselves, and then feel betrayed when researchers focus on organizational elements – especially 
flaws – that activists may see as irrelevant or irreverent (Mosse, 2015, p. 132). Additionally, writes 
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Mosse, “the things that are of interest to anthropologists—the everyday, the contingent, the 
exceptional and the unintended, informal relational processes underlying official actions—may 
threaten the work of expertise, or of activism [and may be] awkwardly connected to discourses of 
failure—explained by contingent factors—and to the dividing dynamics of blame” (2015, 133). In 
other words, the really “juicy” parts of the anthropology of organizational cultures are rarely very 
flattering. Informants can feel disrespected by critical portrayals, even if the facts involved are all 
verifiable (2015, 133). Does this then mean that the ethnographer has failed to ‘respect’ the 
informants? 
 Mosse stresses the importance of maintaining a critical ethnographic stance towards 
activist organizations and NGOs, even if one sympathizes with them, and even if they may not like 
the results. But this position involves being ready to deal with significant backlash. Inevitably, 
thinks Mosse, as people become increasingly aware of the types of work that anthropologists are 
likely to produce, and as practices of collaborative writing and information-sharing with 
informants become more common, anthropology will be forced to confront new questions about 
consent. Specifically, anthropology will need to “respond to demands for consent to research 
findings or after-the-event withdrawal of consent, claimed on the grounds of [reputational] “harm” 
to research subjects […] How might this demand for interpretive consensus play out in different 









The oral historian Alessandro Portelli has engaged thoughtfully with the topic of doing 
fieldwork with those whom one not only seeks to criticize but actively opposes for one’s own 
political reasons. For Portelli,  
 
while we are bound to report as faithfully as we can what our interviewees actually said, our responsibility toward 
them does not extend to always agreeing with them. Sometimes our ethics as citizens, as individuals involved in 
the struggle for democracy, equality, freedom, and difference, may transcend the limited ethics of our profession 
in favour of a broader, human, and ultimately political ethics. In other words, an interview with someone who 
holds power over us or over others may not necessarily be subjected to the same set of ethical considerations as 
other interviews […] Sometimes, when we interview the rich, the mighty, the generals, it may be highly ethical to 
act as spies in the enemy camp.” (1997, 66) 
 
Portelli, like Heyman and Mosse, posits and explores an ethical position which exceeds the 
relatively inflexible and static posture adopted by professional ethics. Here, he takes a pro-
democratic stance to be an acceptably self-sufficient ethical position. That is to say, to act in the 
furtherance of democratic values is to require little other justification, even if one contravenes 
generic professional guidelines. 
Mosse’s observation that many researchers make use of a cultivated relational ambiguity 
in their fieldwork is borne out here, as Portelli in fact recommends such a tactic when dealing with 
informants one opposes: 
 
On the one hand, being open is always the best policy: [powerful informants] are often so proud, so perversely in 
good faith, that they will tell us anyway, and more than we even imagine. But sometimes, especially when they 
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have their own misgivings, they may be more wary; then, some ‘honest dissimulation’ may be in order. When I 
interviewed the parson of the neighbourhood where I grew up, he remembered me as a moderately church-going 
middle-class child, and assumed that my politics and his would be the same. He did not ask, and I did not volunteer 
to undeceive him. So he had no qualms about telling me how he used to filter all applications for jobs at the local 
factory, and make sure anyone suspected of leftist leanings had no chance of getting a job. (1997, 66).  
 
Sehgal, discussing the politics of secrecy in ethnography, proposes a “continuum from ‘full 
disclosure’ to ‘total nondisclosure’, with ‘partial disclosure’ and ‘partial secrecy’ falling 
somewhere between these two poles” (2009, 347). Portelli however skates around the question of 
what precisely it means to ‘act as spies in the enemy camp’, declining to outright advocate for 
conscious deception and total nondisclosure. Presumably, real spies tend to do more than engage 
in ‘honest dissimulation’. However, presenting ambiguously and encouraging informants to draw 
their own conclusions, with the aim of ensuring smooth working relationships with informants 
who would likely withdraw their participation if they were fully aware of one’s research program 
and political stance, is certainly at least mildly duplicitous. This being said, Portelli does not 
advocate this practice of ambiguity as a way to avoid confronting complicated ethical situations, 
as Mosse suggests some researchers do. Rather, it is a method of engaging in research once a 
complex ethical position has already been reached, one which requires the participation of 
informants who act or have acted in ways which are themselves ethically deeply questionable. 
 In advocating this method, Portelli is also playing an interesting game with professional 
ethics. Having shown that professional ethics are not suitable for all situations – sometimes a pro-
democracy ethic must supersede professionalism – he suggests we follow the letter, but not the 
spirit, of guidelines disallowing deception. For Portelli, one of the major failings of these 
guidelines, their bureaucratic legalism, can actually act to protect researchers more than 
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informants. In most cases that is a pitfall to be remedied with the conscientious application of 
good-will and common sense. But in cases of studying up, Portelli writes, “I myself realized that 
I take the most pains to secure written releases and approval of transcripts and quotes when I am 
in political opposition to my interviewees and might therefore use their material in ways they might 
not appreciate” (1997, 55-56). In other words, Portelli advocates strict adherence to ethical 
requirements not because it is moral but because it is useful. 
 Kathleen Blee, who spent decades studying the far right in the United States, writes about 
another contradiction that emerges when professional ethics are applied to those we oppose 
politically. Writing about neo-Nazi skinheads keen to use their interviews with her as a propaganda 
outlet, she notes that  
 
although discussions of confidentiality in social science research generally assume that respondents will want their 
information shielded from public scrutiny, these respondents clearly wanted at least certain information about 
themselves to be widely distributed. In this case, confidentiality was imposed to support the academic and political 
goals of the researcher, against the expressed interest and desires of the informants. (1999, 995) 
  
Blee has written extensively on the ethical and methodological complexities involved in 
studying racist activists. She notes the mismatch between feminist-inflected ethical ideals and the 
realities of doing research with people who may be oppressive and the bigoted, writing that 
“principles that serve well for studying sympathetic informants can prove immobilizing with 
members of hate groups. Would it be possible, to say nothing of desirable, to create an empathic 
environment when interviewing Klan members?” (1993, 604). Further, she writes, feminist 
principles require researchers to share their research with participants, “thereby leveling the 
inherent inequality between researcher and subject” (1993, 605). Speed sees this as a duty; Mosse 
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sees it as a possible hindrance to honest ethnography; Portelli sees it as a needless bureaucratization 
of a choice that ethical researchers should make for themselves. Blee, however, suggests that not 
only is this principle “based on romantic assumptions” (1993, 605), but also that it is doubtful that 
it “serve[s] any purpose” (606) in the context of studying her subjects, in this case the Ku Klux 
Klan. At the very least, principles such as these “assume a measure of ideological compatibility 
between scholar and those being studied” (1998, 388) which does not necessarily exist. 
 Like Sehgal and Portelli, in her work with the extremist right Blee has also grappled with 
the problem of disclosure. She notes that  
 
Rightist movements […] are difficult to access. Even moderate conservative activists often regard researchers with 
skepticism, fearing that their projects will be depicted unsympathetically. Extremists want to hide their identities 
and obscure the activities and goals of their movements, wary of arrest or of being attacked by antiracist activists. 
[…] Scholars of right-wing groups commonly wrestle with the limits of self-disclosure in field research. (Blee and 
Creasap 2010, 278-279). 
  
Ultimately, Blee herself refrained from actively lying to informants (1998), although other 
researchers in similar situations have (see for example Mitchell 1993). She was prepared to hate 
and fear her informants (Blee 1993), and before interviews she explicitly told her informants that 
she disagreed completely with their views (1998). She reasons that since her neo-Nazi subjects 
operate so far outside the normal range of acceptable political opinion, they are used to having 
nearly everyone disagree with them. Rather than seeing her as a potential convert, therefore, they 
saw her as an opportunity to satisfy a desire – their desire for “someone outside the small racist 






 My research consisted of ethnographic fieldwork carried out at a series of meet-ups 
organized by an alt-right group in Montreal. In addition to these meet-ups, I carried out interviews 
with seven activists from the group and one non-member who was peripheral to the movement. I 
was able to do follow-up interviews with four of the seven members. Altogether I was involved 
with members of the group from June through December 2017. Preliminary research included 
attending, at the invitation of one of the group’s leaders, a private speaking event he had organized 
in Montreal as a platform for one of the more prominent academics associated with the Canadian 
alt-right, Dr. Ricardo Duchesne1. At this event, not all other attendees had been informed of my 
presence, so I limited my note-taking to general observations about the atmosphere and about 
Duchesne’s speech, and did not speak to any of the attendees except the man who had invited me.  
 When I began my research, academic work on the alt-right was almost completely lacking. 
George Hawley (2017) published a scholarly book about the alt-right as I was finishing my 
fieldwork, and I have cited it in my work. However, almost all of my preliminary reading was by 
necessity about the far-right more generally. In this thesis I have also written about the links 
between the alt-right and a male-supremacist internet subculture called the Red Pill. Academic 
research on the Red Pill was also scarce at the time of writing. During the course of my research, 
some mainstream media began to pick up on the links between the Red Pill and the alt-right (e.g. 
Zuckerberg 2016; Tait 2017; Edraki and Fegan 2018) and a small number of scholarly articles on 
the Red Pill have been published (e.g. Ging 2017; Van Valkenburgh 2018; Mountford 2018; 
                                                 
1 Dr. Duchesne is a professor of sociology at the University of New Brunswick in St. John, NB. His writing on the 




Dignam and Rohlinger 2019). Many of my claims about the Red Pill are, however, based on my 
own original research. 
 In my interviews, I broadly followed a technique outlined by Busher (2016) in his work on 
the English Defence League (EDL). Busher uses an interview style, itself based on Wengraf’s 
(2001) Biographic Narrative Interpretive Method, which asks participants to tell the story of their 
journey into EDL activism, largely uninterrupted. In this model, the participant is asked not to 
justify their actions, which inevitably leads to both defensiveness and the reciting of slogans, but 
rather simply to describe their path in getting to where they are. The interviewer does not intervene 
often, instead letting the participant speak at length, and noting particular points of interest in the 
narrative. Subsequently, the participant is asked to expand on these points of interest in greater 
detail. This method produces less rigidly programmatic responses, and exposes the emotional 
states associated with various events in the participant’s life, providing valuable data. In addition, 
this method was useful for Busher in determining the various paths of entry to the EDL that his 
participants took; for example, some entered through their connections to soccer hooligan scenes, 
others through other far-right groups, still others as disenchanted leftists, and so forth.  
 I asked participants to tell me about their lives, starting at the beginning and ending with 
the present. In doing so, they also told me the stories of their recruitment into, or discovery of, the 
alt-right. Like Busher I then teased out important details. This interview style focused less on why 
informants joined the alt-right than on how they joined. Busher (2001) notes that someone’s 
decision to join a group is usually the result of many different decisions based on many different 
factors, each with separate motivations, which interviewees may not even be consciously aware 
of. Accordingly, I did not ask specifically why informants joined. However, many of them told me 
anyway. Although inevitably alt-right talking points were used – Blee (2003) notes that people 
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tend to interpret events in the past through the frame of their present beliefs – this method allowed 
me to gather important data exposing grave tensions and points of significant ideological confusion 
within the movement.  
 Impression management can be a problem for any anthropologist studying a political 
movement, as politicized informants are typically keen to present a specific, ideologically-
informed front (Busher 2016). But we cannot understand racist groups only by listening to their 
propaganda (Blee 2003). One way in which both Busher (2016) and Blee (2003) navigate this 
difficulty is by not focusing on groups’ leaders. Leaders have a much more vested interest in 
presenting the group a certain way, whereas individual members may have significant 
disagreements with the main leadership, or may not be well-versed in the group’s propaganda, or 
up to date on the group’s current strategy for talking to media or researchers. Accordingly, they 
can be much more open and less likely to simply regurgitate pre-approved lines. I spoke to leaders, 
but made sure to also work with members not in leadership positions as well as members who were 
critical of the leaders. 
 Prevarication is a particular problem in the alt-right, which is notorious for pranking 
journalists and being purposefully confusing in its written material. In addition, as I discuss in 
chapter 6, one wing of the alt-right is invested in a form of respectability politics predicated on 
appearing as moderate, bourgeois, and unthreatening as possible. I discuss a strategy 
recommendation written by an alt-right activist and subsequently shared by antifascist activists 
calling for the alt-right to retreat fully into crypto-racism and no longer be open about its real views 
and goals. Given such an atmosphere, it was necessary for me to treat everything my informants 
said with a high degree of skepticism. This compounded the pre-existing anthropological 
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understanding that there is often a “distinction between a people’s claims about their beliefs and 
their actual practices” (Gingrich and Banks 2006, 8).  
 In my fieldwork, I disclosed as little as possible about my personal life and political views, 
for my own safety. When pressed on my political views, I was vague; when asked directly whether 
I agreed with what my informants were saying, I did not lie. However, I tried to be careful not to 
detail my own positions. Following Portelli, I did not ‘volunteer to undeceive them’ as to their 
own assumptions. Following Blee (1998), I agreed with my informants whenever they said 
something that I thought made sense, and stayed neutral when they said things that I found 
objectionable. For example, if someone related the sentiment that politicians are crooks, I agreed; 
if they said that a conspiracy of pedophiles and Jews are attempting to wipe out the white race, I 
said “hmm” and let them continue. On some occasions I engaged with interviewees’ statements in 
order to more fully understand their views, up to and including challenging claims they made. 
However, I did this infrequently and mostly tried not to argue with my informants, in order to 
maintain an atmosphere in which they felt comfortable expressing themselves and in order to avoid 
falling into pre-packaged alt-right debating points. 
 Following the ethical obligations laid out by the University, I aimed not to deceive my 
informants actively. However, again following Portelli, I was able to ‘honestly dissimulate’ by 
carefully managing my own appearance in order to generate as much trust as possible and for my 
own safety. I tried to appear as much as possible like an unremarkable, conservative, heterosexual 
middle-class white man potentially amenable to alt-right viewpoints. I bought clothes chosen to 
indicate no countercultural leanings and which looked reasonably similar to what my informants 
typically wore without obviously mimicking them. These clothes also covered all of my tattoos. I 
took out or hid my piercings and cut my hair to resemble the current mainstream men’s fashion, 
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which was similar to the undercut favoured by many in the alt-right. As much as possible, I 
monitored my speech patterns to make them seem neutral or friendly. 
 Professional ethics dictate that we must protect the privacy of informants. I have, to the 
best of my ability, followed this directive to the letter. I use pseudonyms for all informants, do not 
identify leaders, and do not name locations. I have edited transcripts to remove identifying 
information and have modified descriptions of events in order to further protect the identity or 
locations of informants where appropriate. To the best of my knowledge, nothing that I have 
written can be used to definitively identify specific individuals. 
 When I attended alt-right meetings, I asked the group’s leadership to inform the members 
that I would be there and taking notes. When I spoke to anyone at these meetings beyond basic 
greetings, I identified myself as an anthropologist and briefly explained my research according to 
an oral consent script approved by Concordia University. I gave interviewees a copy of a more 
detailed consent document, also approved by the University, for which I asked their verbal 
indication of understanding. This document gave informants a date by which they could withdraw 
their participation, explained that all identifying information would be removed from any final 
published work, and explained that they could refuse to answer any question and end the interview 
at any time. It noted that they would not be paid and that they could decline to be recorded if they 
chose. I told informants that as far as I knew, upon acceptance my thesis would be public record 
if they wished to read it. I did not ask anyone to sign any documents in order to further protect 
their anonymity. 
 Standard anthropological ethics dictate that we should, whenever possible, support our 
informants in their political struggles. As discussed in the previous section, these ethics are 
insufficient to account for objects of study such as far-right extremism. I have instead pursued 
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what Portelli (1997) calls a ‘pro-democratic’ ethic, an anti-racist and feminist orientation opposed 
to the goals of the alt-right project. Even if I have written a piece involving a good deal of theory, 
I have worked to ground my theory thoroughly in fieldwork, as Speed (2008) suggests. I have tried 
to produce, following Scheper-Hughes (1995), an “anthropology of the really real”, research which 
will be useful for scholars and activists who wish to understand the alt-right in order to combat its 
influence. As with Blee (1999), I have to the best of my ability avoided producing content which 
could be useful to far-right activists for propaganda purposes. I have tried to use my SSHRC 
funding for a socially useful purpose, that is, lifting the veil from alt-right organizing, exposing 
the facts about the movement which its adherents seek to conceal, demystifying it, and providing 
readers with practical information to be used in the ongoing struggle for freedom, democracy and 
human dignity in this country. Busher (2016) notes that there is an ethical question involved in 
even deciding to study the far right at all; some anthropologists have avoided fieldwork with this 
type of group for the sake of “moral hygiene” (Gingrich and Banks 2006). Like Busher, I contend 
that the benefits of having accurate knowledge about these groups outweighs harms potentially 
caused by giving them a measure of attention and publicity. I follow Berlet in arguing that the task 
of anthropologists “is to explore the links between the ideological and the material practice [of 
these groups], not merely as an intellectual exercise that increases the subtlety of our analysis but 









3. The Far Right and the Place of the Alt-
Right Within It 
Nomenclature 
  
 There is no real consensus on what constitutes the so-called ‘far right’, or even which terms 
are appropriate to use to talk about it. Various permutations of the terms far, radical, hard and 
extreme are used by different scholars, often with qualifiers such as neo, organized or populist 
tacked on. Norwegian terrorism expert Tore Bjørgo (2009) ponders how to get youth to disengage 
from the extreme right and from right-wing extremist groups, while prominent right-wing studies 
scholar Cas Mudde (2010) refers to the populist radical right. Elsewhere Ambrose and Mudde 
(2015) propose far right as an umbrella term to encompass the distinct forms extreme right and 
radical right. Meanwhile, Berlet and Lyons (2000) split the far right between extreme and 
dissident. Elizabeth Carter (2017), in her mapping of these terms, recommends ‘extreme right’ as 
the most precise term, but notes that other terms are regularly used.  
 Sub-groupings have their own names as well, such as the New Right or, of course, the alt-
right. There are widely-known schools of thought such as fascism, neo-Nazism, or neo-
nationalism, and more obscure tendencies such as ‘esoteric Hitlerism’ or the so-called ‘National 
Bolshevism’ and  ‘national anarchism’2. Adherence to different tendencies frequently overlaps, 
                                                 
2 Esoteric Hitlerism is interested in the occult elements of National Socialism and typically treats Hitler as a deity, 
Messiah or spiritual leader. Branches of this school have connections to UFO and Hollow Earth theories while 
others have focused on the orientalist mysticism associated with some fascist thinkers. National Bolshevism is an 
attempt to merge fascism and communism ideologically and is relatively uncommon outside of Russia. National 
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sometimes in contradictory ways. Some social movements and organizations hover around the 
edges of the far right proper, with a mix of positions and an ambivalent relationship to liberal 
democracy making them difficult to categorize clearly.  
 The picture is further complicated by the fact that organized racism is deeply intertwined 
with the far right, bringing with it its own slew of terminology and terminological complications. 
The public often conflate terms like ‘white supremacist’ with ‘Nazi’ – and indeed, Nazi imagery 
like the swastika or totenkopf3 is sometimes taken up by racists who have little to do ideologically 
with 20th century German National Socialism. Scholars speak of organized racism, white 
supremacism, white power, ‘new racism’, or cultural racism. Racist activists themselves, 
meanwhile, often favour terms like ‘white nationalist’, ‘white separatist’, or ‘identitarian’, with 
those who study and comment on these activist groups sometimes accepting these self-identifiers 
as valid.  
 An additional stumbling block for the analysis of racists and racism is the stigma usually 
associated with open, overt racism in the mainstream in many places, including Canada. Some 
racist activists use coded language and deny being racists as part of a strategy to be more appealing 
to the public and to avoid the legal implications of some of their rhetoric. Racist groups may 
downplay or disavow the biological arguments and supremacist rhetoric of traditional organized 
racism. An alternative ‘ethnopluralist’ pitch, meant to be more palatable than calls for genocide or 
race war, emphasizes the equality of races, at least in terms of their right to an existence, while 
maintaining that ethnic groups should be clearly delineated and contained in monoracial territories 
(Gattinara and Pirro, 2018). Another, the ‘white genocide’ angle, presents whites as the endangered 
                                                 
anarchism is a form of racist thought that calls for racially or ethnically segregated communities to self-govern 
without states.  
3 Death’s-head in German, the iconic skull-and-crossbones symbol used by the SS. 
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victims of a conspiracy to wipe them out through such demographic weapons as non-white 
immigration and the legalization of abortion and non-heterosexual sexualities (Perry, 2004).  
 Whether or not their self-images are especially accurate or would be agreed upon by others, 
some people adhere to such narratives while sincerely believing themselves to be non- or even 
anti-racist. As with individuals whose politics can reasonably be seen as far-right, yet who reject 
this label, their rejections should be treated by scholars as a “social facts” even if we disagree with 
their claims, because these claims are “causally significant” (Busher 2016, 115). Claims to non-
racism by people who seem objectively to hold racist views, for example, can indicate a desire to 
avoid stigma associated with overt racism or could be interpreted as a strategic deception to throw 
off opponents. These claims can also indicate simply that the term ‘racist’ is contested, with people 
holding quite different ideas of what the word means; the definition involving structural power 
and privilege favoured by progressive academics tends to be at odds with the more popular 
conception involving individual, irrational hatred and hostility. Both are distinct from my own 
definition, the one I generally employ in this book: racism as an ideological stance, one which 
assumes that ‘race’ is a biologically and socially valid method of categorization; that group identity 
based on this categorization is desirable; that traits like the capacity to innovate or to live peacefully 
are heritable, and that this heritability is fixed, genetic, and determined by ‘race’; and finally that 
loyalty to one’s racial group should equal or surpass loyalty to a state, local community, or other 
identities. 
 For all these reasons, it is not always easy to disentangle the various strands of far-right 
and racist ideology. A wide diversity of thought characterizes both the scholarship on the far right 
and the groups and tendencies it studies – and often, as much diversity can be found within groups 
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as between them. Mapping out the place of the alt-right in all this, and even deciding whether to 
use the term alt-right at all, is a challenging endeavour.  
 Activists opposed to the spread of far-right ideas in North America have pointed out that 
by using the alt-right movement’s own name for itself, we may be helping it obscure its true goals 
and intentions. They argue, correctly in my view, that the alt-right is simply a type of far-right 
white supremacism. Why then should we refer to it as anything else? The only thing ‘alternative’ 
about this form of rightism, goes the argument, is its blatant racism; and even that is not very 
alternative, since the right-wing extreme of the political spectrum4 has been espousing racism since 
the concept of race was first developed (Kale 2010; Arendt 1979; Benedict 1942; Allen 2012). The 
argument goes that to call these activists ‘alt-right’, instead of just ‘racists’ or what have you, is to 
allow their project of repackaging neo-Nazism for public consumption to succeed.  
 I am sympathetic to this argument, and I believe that the term alt-right, as the Associated 
Press puts it, “may exist primarily as a public-relations device to make its supporters’ actual beliefs 
less clear and more acceptable to a broader audience” (Daniszewski 2016) – or at least that it once 
did. However, I choose to use the term on three grounds. The first follows George Hawley, who 
explains his choice by noting that:  
 
At this point, the racist nature of the Alt-Right is well known, and it will be evident to the reader that I am not 
using the term to downplay this element of the movement. Relying exclusively on the umbrella term “white 
supremacist” would furthermore mask the ways the Alt-Right differs from other manifestations of the racial right. 
(2017, 3) 
 
Unlike Hawley, I am not necessarily convinced that the average reader understands what the alt-
right is about. That being said, I do believe that following the events of the 2018 Charlottesville 
rallies in particular, the mainstream media has mostly become aware of this hidden-in-plain-sight 
                                                 
4 Not that right-wing extremism is the only historic site of racism. 
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fact, and the public is accordingly more familiar with this reality than before. My evaluation is that 
the term is understood by many to refer to a variety of white supremacist, but what exactly that 
means and how it should be interpreted is not always clear. Therefore, like Hawley, I am explicit 
about the fact that the movement in general, and the particular group with which I conducted 
fieldwork in particular, is deeply invested in racism, and indeed can only be understood through 
its racism, because racism is its organizing principle to which other considerations are subordinate. 
Also, like Hawley, I identify useful distinctions between the alt-right and other similar racist 
groupings. 
 The second reason I choose to use the term is that even if it was invented by straight-ahead 
white supremacists to mask their values, which appears to be the case to some degree, it has since 
taken on a life of its own. Any movement is more than just whatever its leaders say it is (Blee 
2003). This is especially so with movements which are as amorphous and decentralized as the alt-
right. One distinction of the alt-right as compared to older, more established versions of North 
American white supremacism has to do with its membership, particularly the low median age of 
its adherents and its heavily internet-based diffusion. Recruits brought with them some of their 
pre-existing ideas and subcultural tendencies, and generated a body of rhetoric, symbology, and 
habitus largely specific to what they were calling the alt-right. In other words, if the alt-right was 
created as a smokescreen, it has become a genuine phenomenon in its own right. 
 Finally, there is the simple reason that my informants belong to a group which calls itself 
an alt-right organization. Though not all of them self-identify comfortably with the alt-right – some 
are more comfortable calling themselves fascists – the majority use that descriptor for themselves, 
including amongst themselves, and it is the term preferred by the group’s founders and the term 
used in its online literature. As Busher (2016) argues, reflexive ethnography treats informants’ 
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realities as part of social reality, regardless of the content of those realities; while reserving the 
right to treat the claims of my informants with skepticism, in this work I nevertheless accept the 
term alt-right as a political identifier. 
   
 
What is the Far Right? 
 
 What is it that we are even talking about when we refer to the ‘far’, ‘hard’, or ‘extreme’ 
right? Are these simply relative terms, or do they refer to anything concrete? Are they pejoratives, 
or serious scholarly terms? Are they valid internationally? Cross-culturally? Trans-historically? 
Are there meaningful distinctions between them? Carter (2017) writes that “almost every scholar 
of right-wing extremism has pointed to the difficulties associated with defining the concept” (28), 
and I am no exception. In order to speak clearly about our subject of study, we need consistent 
terminology; unfortunately, while terminology abounds, consistency is lacking.  
 However, a number of classificatory schemes exist. Berlet and Lyons (2000) as well as 
Ambrose and Mudde (2015) provide robust and flexible definitions of the far right and its 
subdivisions in their work. Caiani et al. (2012) offer a list of characteristics of the extreme right to 
build up a generalizable definition, arguing that a definition anchored in specific characteristics is 
needed so as to avoid the ambiguity of political terms defined only by their positions relative to 
one another. Carter (2017) takes perhaps the most ambitious approach, developing a complex 
model along three axes, designed to cover all possible permutations of an ‘extreme right’ position. 
In the following sections, I will go through some of the existing systems of classification, ending 




The Dissident and Extreme Right in Québec 
 
 Berlet (2004) uses far right (or hard right) to include essentially all non-electoral right-
wing movements – that is, right-wing movements outside of mainstream conservative political 
parties. This section of the political landscape is made up of both the dissident right, which is 
generally reformist and may overlap with mainstream conservatism, and extreme right groups, 
which are more revolutionarily-minded and often deeply invested in racist politics.5 The dissident 
right and extreme right share “common styles, frames and narratives” (Berlet 2004, 23), 
particularly black-and-white thinking, millenarianism6, conspiracism, populist rhetoric, and 
authoritarianism (Berlet 2004, 24-25). The extreme right is distinguished as consisting of “militant 
insurgent groups that reject democracy, promote a conscious ideology of supremacy, and support 
policies that would negate basic human rights for members of a scapegoated group” (Berlet 2004, 
22). Groups of the dissident right may have similar or more moderate goals, but hope to achieve 
them through reform, while remaining unaffiliated with, or critical of, existing political parties.  
 Within the Québec context, the dissident right is represented by groups like La Meute, 
founded in 2015. La Meute, which is French for ‘the Wolfpack’, is a nationalist, anti-Muslim, anti-
immigration social movement in Québec very similar to the UK’s (now largely defunct) English 
Defense League (EDL). La Meute organizes demonstrations and rallies to protest multiculturalism 
and the ‘Islamification’ of the province (Howard 2019). Like the EDL before the exit of its former 
leader Tommy Robinson (Busher 2016), the group toes the line between the respectability politics 
                                                 
5 Elsewhere, Berlet swaps these terms around: in Right-Wing Populism in America (2000), what is here referred to as 
the ‘extreme right’ is called the ‘Far Right’, while the ‘Hard Right’ is used to refer to what is here called the ‘far 
right’. These differences aside, the relationships between the different gradations remain similar in the two works. 
6 Belief in the coming End Times, new era, or other world-changing shift. 
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of a conventional social movement and the aggressive posture of an insurgent group. Members, 
most of whom appear to be middle-class, middle-aged men and women from smaller towns, with 
little experience in political organizing, march with huge black banners emblazoned with their 
emblem, a wolf’s paw-print in white. The group’s leadership officially disavows overt racism, 
purports to accept immigrants who ‘integrate’, and rejects the far-right label. At the same time, its 
rhetoric is populist, nationalist, and xenophobic. Its literature stokes terror about the danger of 
Québec being turned into a “land of Islam” by radical Muslims, who want to implement in Québec 
“a misogynist, homophobic, pedophilic, barbaric and archaic system governed by Koranic 
tribunals” (La Meute n.d., translation mine). The federal Liberal Party is regarded with fury by La 
Meute for its relatively open stance on immigration. Media have consistently described the group 
as an inflammatory far-right organization. The picture of La Meute as a far-right group – and thus 
a group outside of mainstream party politics – is complicated, however, by the fact that their list 
of demands (see La Meute 2018) has almost in its entirety been adopted by, and was allegedly 
inspired by, the Coalition Avenir Québec (‘Coalition for Québec’s Future’; CAQ), the governing 
party in Québec at the time of writing (Robichaud 2018)7. There is, therefore, significant overlap 
between the politics of groups like La Meute and the measures which mainstream parties are 
prepared to take to garner votes. Far-right ideas are not cleanly separate from mainstream politics; 
they are thoroughly enmeshed and exist within the same political ‘ecosystem’. 
                                                 
7 As I am writing this, the CAQ has successfully pushed through a law, called the Loi 21, which denies a number of 
types of employment to anyone wearing a religious symbol and denies government services to anyone wearing a 
face veil. At the last minute, a clause was added establishing a body which would enforce this law by entering places 
of employment such as schools and hospitals and informing on teachers or doctors wearing religious symbols. The 
law is framed as guaranteeing the state’s laïcité, a French legal concept similar to ‘secularism’, and as protecting the 
rights of women who, it is argued, are oppressed by Muslim religious garb. Many commentators, however, 
understand this law to be based primarily in a desire to repress difference, and note that forcing women to uncover 
their hair is at least as oppressive as forcing them to cover it. La Meute’s manifesto (2018) calls for exactly such a 




 Meanwhile, the extreme right in Berlet’s (2004) model is represented in Québec by 
Atalante, an openly racist Québec ultranationalist group formed in 2016 which rejects immigration 
entirely. Atalante espouses far-right anti-capitalism summed up by their slogan, “action sociale, 
préférence nationale”, calling for social ‘justice’ prioritizing white Québécois. Members have 
attacked the offices of journalists (De L’Église 2018) and the group’s founder is the singer of a 
neo-Nazi skinhead band from Québec City called Légitime Violence (‘Legitimate Violence’). Its 
literature condemns liberal democracy as a whole. Far from taking their direction from the 
governing Coalition Avenir Québec, or endorsing its positions, Atalante mocks the party as la 
Coalition de la girouette, ‘the Coalition of the Weathervane’. The party is accused of 
opportunistically riding the wave of nationalist sentiment, being uncommitted to real xenophobia, 
and being as untrustworthy as the other major parties: 
 
So who will you vote for? The old, corrupt Liberal Party, as popular [as in ‘close to the people’] as a $75 grocery 
bill? Sovereigntists without sovereignty?8 The communist party of one single city?9 Maybe the Coalition of the 
Weathervane? Liberal democracy is not the power of the people! Liberal democracy is the power of finance and 
foreign interests! (Atalante 2018, my translation) 
 
                                                 
8 The centrist Parti Québécois, in favour of Québec nationalism and separation from Canada 




Figure 1. A screencapture from Atalante’s Facebook page showing the group’s statement on the 
recent provincial elections. 
 
These two groups differ significantly in tactics, goals, orientation toward democracy, and numbers 
(La Meute is an order of magnitude larger). However, a shared adherence to the qualities described 
by Berlet (2004) unite the two organizations under the auspices of the far right. Both think of the 
world in fairly apocalyptic terms. Atalante espouses the theory that white Québécois are being 
oppressed and displaced in their ‘own’ country, a view typical of extreme-right racist 
organizations, while La Meute worries about the takeover of Sharia law in a country where at last 
count, fewer than four people in a hundred were Muslim (Statistics Canada 2013). While Atalante 
disdains all mainstream political parties, both groups retain a special disgust and suspicion toward 
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the Liberal parties, both federal and provincial. This suspicion merges into a right-wing conspiracy 
theory holding that ‘liberal elites’ are attempting to displace native-born white settler populations 
in North America. This conspiracy theory is ubiquitous on many far-right websites; some versions 
hold that the politicians are dupes too stupid and craven to realize what is going on, while others 
see them as pawns for shadowy influences, often Jewish. Stances on authoritarianism differ 
between the two groups, but both display authoritarian tendencies, with Atalante favouring an 
ultranationalist program of ‘rémigration’ (forced repatriation) (Perron 2017), and La Meute 
proposing that its political adversaries be labelled terrorists: 
 
… any group (anarchist, student, religious or political) or person who is an apologist on social media for violence 
against the population or police; who commits vandalism against private or public property [in the context of a 
demonstration]; who uses intimidation and violence to infringe on the freedom of expression and on the right of 
citizens to peaceful assembly; who intimidates citizens because of their political convictions; or who participates 
in a demonstration while masked, should be considered domestic terrorists and treated as such (La Meute 2018, 7-
8, my translation) 
 
While a purported commitment to freedom of assembly clashes with an authoritarian orientation, 
La Meute is mainly an organization which organizes demonstrations; it relies on unimpeded 
freedom of assembly (at least for itself) in order to exist. Coupled with La Meute’s proposals that 
terrorism be considered “high treason”, and that “first-generation immigrants”10 be stripped of 
their citizenship and deported if found guilty of such (La Meute 2018, 7-8), this measure would 
harshly criminalize and disenfranchise the main form of active opposition to La Meute’s street 
presence, confrontational counterdemonstrations. 
                                                 
10 Implying, of course, that there is such a thing as ‘second-generation immigrants’. 
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 Berlet’s own work complicates this picture of the far right. Berlet and Lyons (2000) stresses 
that the distinction between ‘mainstream’ and ‘fringe’ right-wing political groupings should not 
be overemphasized. There are both major differences between different elements of the far right 
and direct links between ‘fringe’ and ‘mainstream’ right-wing groups. Perhaps most tellingly, 
conservative and dissident groups, and dissident and extremist groups, habitually recruit from one 
another (Berlet 2004).  
 Thus we might expect both hardcore, revolutionarily-oriented groups like Atalante and 
mainstream parties like the CAQ to share adherents with, or poach adherents from, an organization 
like La Meute. There is sufficient ideological overlap for this to be the case, and individual activists 
who feel more moderate or more radical than the party line of their group are susceptible to 
recruitment by another. Further, ideas held by both La Meute and Atalante are, to use Busher’s 
phrase, “routinely rebroadcast” (2016, 174) at them by mainstream Québec media. Yesterday, I 
read an op-ed in the Journal de Montréal entitled “Symbolically expelling the Québécois from 
their own home: We must not yield” (translation mine). The article, by widely known conservative 
writer Mathieu Bock-Côté (2019), argues that in Québec, it is “less that the majority rejects 
minorities than it is the inverse”, and that “Canada is using mass immigration to demographically 
submerge [the Québécois]”. Canada is being helped in its plot by  
 
a faction of [Québec] elites, accomplices to the federal regime, who have come to believe that it is only by adhering 
to the most extreme multiculturalism that we can purge ourselves of our supposed identitarian demons. In this, we 
see signs of the mental Canadianization of a part of our ruling class, and in particular, our academic, judicial and 
media elites  (Bock-Côté 2019, translation mine).  
 
Essentially, traitors are selling the Québécois out and helping Ottawa commit cultural genocide 
against them, because they are afraid of being called racist. This narrative is in virtually all respects 
identical to the ‘white genocide’ theory propounded by neo-Nazi and other far-right groups around 
the world. It simply switches ‘Canada’ for the Jews and declines to mention the word race while 
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strongly hinting at it. The gap between mainstream nationalist ideas and far right racist ones is not 
as wide as many might think. 
 At the same time, as organizations, Atalante, La Meute and the CAQ all officially disavow 
one another (with the exception of La Meute supporting the CAQ). This is not only for politically 
expedient reasons; genuine and important differences exist between these distinct types of 
grouping.  
 With regard to their hostility toward liberal capitalism, no mainstream party in Québec 
shares any common ground with Atalante, except perhaps for some of the most left-leaning 
activists in the social democratic party Québec Solidaire, who disagree with Atalante on everything 
else. Certainly the centre-right, pro-business party bosses of the CAQ or the Parti Québécois have 
no time for revolutionary far-right anti-capitalism. La Meute, meanwhile, is run by a leadership 
which claims to sincerely consider itself non-racist. While from a progressive perspective there 
are certainly valid reasons to be wary of La Meute’s positions, it is a fact that they are calling 
neither for genocide nor for mass ‘rémigration’ like Atalante. Nor are they particularly critical of 
democracy as such. They make repeated references to themselves as the “silent majority” (La 
Meute 2018) and feel betrayed or unrepresented by most of the political parties, but do not disavow 
the institution of liberal democracy itself. Rather, they position themselves as defenders of the 
liberal order against the illiberal forces of radical Islam and the perils of multiculturalism, which 
they avow “leads inevitably to social chaos” (La Meute 2018, 3).  
 A complex right-wing political ecosystem exists in Québec. Mainstream ruling-class 
nationalists run the governing party. They also control much of the francophone media. The 
Journal de Montreal is owned by Québecor Media, a large conglomerate whose CEO is Pierre 
Péladeau, a billionaire and former leader of the Parti Québécois (Forbes 2019). The activists 
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making up La Meute typically hold positions aligning with Berlet’s definition of the dissident far 
right, while currently enjoying considerable ideological consonance with the government. La 
Meute as well as mainstream writers like Bock-Côté strenuously deny being racist. At the same 
time, they echo conspiracy theories about multiculturalism which are in almost all particulars the 
same as the neo-Nazi ‘white genocide’ theory, or the similar Grand remplacement (Great 
Replacement) conspiracy theory popularized by French writer Renaud Camus (2011). Their 
opposition to multiculturalism is set up as a defense of liberalism and of a beleaguered Québécois 
nation. It is shared, meanwhile, by an extreme-right scene which rejects liberalism entirely and 
calls for revolutionary action to accomplish similar goals, coupling this with a critique of 
capitalism from the right. Together these right-wing positions make up a spectrum with constant 
movement back and forth of both ideas and individuals.  
 
Right-Wing Populism in Québec 
 
Berlet and Lyons suggest that right-wing populism is an important element in this web of far-right 
ideas. Populist movements combine appeals to ‘the people’ (defined inclusively or narrowly) with 
some form of anti-elitism, whether directed at real elites or the scapegoated or non-existent targets 
of conspiracy theories (Berlet and Lyons 2000, 5). Such movements typically represent the 
combined interests of  
 
1. Mid-level groups in the social hierarchy, notably middle- and working-class Whites, who have a stake in 
traditional social privilege but resent the power of upper-class elites over them, and 
2. “Outsider” factions of the elite itself, who sometimes use distorted forms of antielitism as part of their own bid 




Some populist movements are repressive. A repressive populist movement, according to the 
scheme provided by Berlet and Lyons, “combines antielite scapegoating […] with efforts to 
maintain or intensify systems of social privilege and power” (2000, 5).  
 Right-wing populist movements are classified by Berlet and Lyons as a sub-type of 
repressive populist movement. They are organized around a backlash against progressive reforms 
or gains made by the left (2000, 5). These movements combine their limited anti-elitism with, 
paradoxically, a “strongly hierarchical and elitist conception of society” (Caiani et al. 2012, 191) 
which excludes many individuals from ‘the people’. Typically, they advocate a producerist 
philosophy: an understanding of society which constructs and valorizes a ‘just right’ productive 
social class while demonizing elites above and lazy parasites below. In some cases, these may be 
articulated respectively as ‘liberal11 elites' and welfare recipients; in racist iterations, usually Jews 
and people of colour. This non-Marxist, racialized understanding of class obscures actually 
existing class relations and leaves some factions of the ruling class untouched (Berlet and Lyons 
2000). It requires that people’s grievances be “directed away from the real causes of a social 
problem onto a target group demonized as malevolent wrongdoers” (2000, 7). This process makes 
use of a conspiracist worldview which “assigns tiny cabals of evildoers a superhuman power to 
control events”; such cabals are the “major motor of history”, represent the forces of Evil, and 
have tentacles of influence in all areas of society (2000, 10). It must not be forgotten, however, 
that these conspiracy theories often contain a grain of truth. At the very least, the nexus of 
producerism, scapegoating and conspiracism typical of right-wing populism often reflects 
                                                 
11 In this case, usually understood to mean ‘progressive’ or ‘leftist’ rather than ‘pro-business centrists’.  
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“partially legitimate grievances” (2000, 14) about the concentration of wealth and the difficulty of 
meaningful political participation for ordinary people in a capitalist liberal democracy.  
 La Meute again provides us with a good example. While La Meute consists mainly of 
middle- and working-class white Québécois, its populist message serves the interests of the pro-
business nationalist faction of Québec City elites. This faction, represented electorally by the CAQ 
and the right wing of the sovereigntist Parti Québecois12, is able to mobilize nationalist sentiment 
and anxiety about Québécois identity in the context of Canadian multiculturalism to win elections 
against the Liberal Party. This is accomplished primarily by scapegoating Muslims. A tiny 
proportion of the population, and almost non-existent outside of major cities, Muslims are accused 
of constituting an existential threat to Québec society. Multiculturalism is presented as the vector 
for this threat. Multiculturalism is championed in Québec chiefly by the provincial Liberal Party, 
strong in Montreal. Thus, it becomes possible to depict the authors of disaster as consisting of 
these Montreal elites and their suspect immigrant allies.  
 In right-wing populism, producerists see themselves and their group as self-evidently 
productive, and elite and subordinate out-groups as parasitical, regardless of actual productive 
output. A ‘friendly’ faction of the ruling class is usually left untargeted. A version of this line of 
thinking is mobilized in relation to the issue of the integration of immigrants in Québec, with 
integration replacing production as the key criterion13. This line of thinking claims that the main 
problem facing Québec society is the non-integration of migrants, especially Muslim ones, as 
facilitated by Montreal liberals. In this version of the producerist tripartite distinction, ‘we’ are 
self-evidently ‘integrated’ either by virtue of being pure laine (that is, descendents of French 
                                                 
12 The leader of the CAQ, François Legault, is a right-wing defector from the PQ. 
13 This is not to say that regular producerism is not also in evidence, but it does not seem to be a major focus of 




settlers), or because ‘we’ descend from European immigrants deemed to have been satisfactorily 
assimilated. These new immigrants on the other hand, who are mostly people of colour, mostly fail 
to integrate. They are culturally parasitical, taking advantage of Québec society without giving 
back to it. Liberal Party politicians, associated with Canada, English-speakers, immigrant 
communities, Jews, and the multicultural metropolis of Montreal, are seen as foreign, corrupt, and 
out of touch, and profiting at the expense of regular folk. As with regular producerism, this version 
can take both overtly racist and non-racist forms. In Québec, mainstream and dissident groups 
typically avoid overt racism, while extreme-right groups mobilize it and claim that non-European 
immigrants are incapable of integrating for racial reasons. 
 
The Limits of the Centrist/Extremist Model 
 
 Many ideas leveraged by the populist right are shared by people who are not part of these 
movements. Many people would agree, for example, that ruling elites are interested primarily 
maintaining their power, or that anger toward them is justified. Producerist ideas positing 
exploitation from above reflect observable capitalist dynamics. Populist appeals to ‘the people’ are 
not discursively anomalous, as they make use of common patriotic and democratic themes found 
in constitutions, anthems, military propaganda, and other trappings of the nation-state. Because of 
this overlap of ideas, Berlet and Lyons (2000) caution against a reliance on what they call the 
‘centrist/extremist model’. This model implies that the far-right is occupied by a fringe of 
unbalanced people with insane ideas, while the centre is the purview of rational debate and 
reasonable policy. Berlet and Lyons (2000) note that “movements involving aggressive White 
supremacy, demagogic appeals, demonization, conspiracist scapegoating, antisemitism, hatred of 
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the Left, [and related themes] have repeatedly been at the center of [US] political conflicts, not at 
the fringe” (2000, 17). Further,  Berlet writes, “Right-wing hate groups do not cause prejudice […] 
– they exploit it” (2004, 19). The policies of mainstream, ‘respectable’ institutions and politicians 
can have disastrous consequences and can emanate from sites of deeply engrained prejudice. Once 
again, then, media which is freely available and operated by above-ground media corporations 
contributes to and often includes ideas and opinions which overlap with the far-right.14 
 Cas Mudde (2010) also cautions against viewing the non-mainstream right as a 
pathological or otherwise deeply abnormal phenomenon to be compared to a reasonable and 
moderate mainstream. In a manner similar to Berlet, Mudde defines the far right in terms of its 
rejection of liberal democracy (Ambrose and Mudde 2015). It is then subdivided into the ‘extreme’ 
and ‘radical’ right, largely corresponding to Berlet’s ‘extreme’ and ‘dissident’ categories. For 
Mudde and Ambrose, “the extreme right rejects democracy per se, that is, both popular sovereignty 
and majority rule, while the radical right accepts democracy but challenges liberal democracy, in 
particular pluralism and minority rights” (2015, 14). However, Mudde notes that many ideas 
common on the far right, such as authoritarianism, militarism, racism and sexism, and so on are 
very much a part of the mainstream and in fact can originate there (2010). If anything is 
pathological, for Mudde, it is the society as a whole more than it is far-right activists, who are in 
many ways simply taking mainstream ideas to their logical conclusions. 
 Carter (2017) details a pattern of ideological flow between different European right-wing 
parties, some of which fall closer to the center and some much further to the right. Carter (2017) 
defines right-wing parties through their “emphasis on the notion of inequality of individuals” and 
                                                 
14 For example, in Québec, a notorious network of right-wing talk radio shows based in Québec City have been 





insistence on “the necessity of institutionalised social and political inequality” (31, citing Saalfield, 
1993). For Carter, racism and fascism may be “paradigmatic” (31) of right-wing extremism, but 
are ultimately functions of its inegalitarian principle, and are not therefore strictly necessary to 
satisfy a definition of right-wing extremism. Extreme right parties exist which are neither fascist 
nor particularly concerned with race, and the extreme right is instead defined through its illiberal 
stance or hostility toward mainstream liberal democracy. Its inegalitarian principle, which Carter 
argues is the defining characteristic of the right, is shared with mainstream right-wing parties. 
Carter’s study shows that non-racist neoliberal populists, who largely accept liberal democracy, 
share ideas with neoliberal xenophobes and with neo-fascist groups which reject democracy but 
are not particularly racist. However, these neoliberal populists do not tend to share ground with 
neo-Nazis or other authoritarian xenophobes. Meanwhile, racist, fascist neo-Nazi groups share 
ideas with other authoritarian xenophobes, neoliberal xenophobes, and neo-fascists, but not with 
the neoliberal populists. A constant back-and-forth of members and ideological points exists 
between these right-wing groups, with the neoliberal parties being the closest to the centrist 
mainstream and the neo-Nazi parties furthest.  
 
Terminology in this Thesis 
 
 In this thesis I draw on a loose synthesis of the terminology outlined above. I map right-
wing movements along two axes (see Figure 2), the first being their degree of commitment to 
revolutionism versus liberalism. This is the measure used by many scholars to determine if a 
movement is ‘extremist’ or not (Carter 2017). The other axis plots groups’ commitment to 
egalitarianism versus hierarchy, following Bobbio’s (1996) insight that the tension between these 
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two principles is fundamental to the left-right split in politics. I make a three-part distinction 
between the mainstream right, the dissident right, and the extreme right, while allowing for 
significant overlap between the mainstream right and the dissident right, and between the dissident 
right and the radical right. Note that throughout this work I employ the terms ‘liberal’ and 
‘liberalism’ to refer to the dominant political-economic order emphasizing capitalism, 








 The mainstream right, being conservative, is not at all committed to revolutionism, 
preferring some version of the liberal status quo, and has some tolerance for egalitarian politics 
due to its relative proximity to the centre and the need to garner votes. The dissident right is 
ambivalent toward liberalism, overlapping with both liberal and revolutionist tendencies. It is open 
to change through reform but has a strong tendency toward directing hostility at mainstream parties 
and politicians. The ultimate goals of a particular dissident right group may be consistent with the 
continuation of the liberal order even if no mainstream party supports those goals. It has little to 
no tolerance for true egalitarianism – activists in the dissident right may support certain egalitarian 
principles like equal rights for women, for example, but are typically committed to 
institutionalizing other forms of inequality such as barring Muslim immigrants from entering a 
country. They may also support the principle of inegalitarianism in other ways, such as through a 
strong adherence to capitalist economic policies, support for imperialism, religious antifeminism, 
or other policies. The extreme right is opposed to liberalism altogether and is profoundly 
hierarchist, with this principle often being manifested most directly in the form of white 
supremacism and/or fascism. Despite their opposition to liberal democracy, extreme-right parties 
do occasionally participate in elections (Carter 2017; Caiani et al. 2012), in much the same way 
that a revolutionary communist party might run candidates while decrying the bourgeois state.  
 In order to be able to make a distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream right-
wing politics, I refer to the dissident and extreme right collectively as the far right. Right-wing 
populism can span all three categories, depending on the content of a particular movement’s 
messaging.  
 This model is a heuristic device. These categories are, in the end, unstable, relational and 
historically contingent. There is no easily available objective measure of what is ‘more’ or ‘less’ 
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hierarchical. Is a party which advocates social democracy for one racial group and expulsion for 
others more committed or less committed to egalitarianism than one which calls for cutthroat, 
deregulated, highly-stratified neoliberal capitalism presided over by a diverse ruling class? Some 
of the policies advocated by far-right groups today were unexceptional in the North American 
mainstream less than a hundred years ago, such as banning non-white immigration. At the same 
time, the recent neoliberal economic policies of mainstream parties have in some countries, such 
as the United States, resulted in levels of income inequality not seen since the Great Depression 
(Roser and Ortiz-Ospina 2013), and 50 years ago may have been seen as extremely right-wing. 
 The policies which mainstream parties are willing to adopt vary not only over time but 
regionally as well, pointing to the relative nature of terms such as ‘extreme’. Policies enacted by a 
ruling party in one country may be seen by the electorate of another country as unacceptably far 
to the right. In the United States, for example, the near-total monopoly on the political apparatus 
by the Democrat-Republican duality has had profound impacts on the political possibilities in that 
country, resulting in a very different political landscape than in some European parliamentary 
democracies. With no competition from third parties and no significant faction advocating left-
wing economic policies, the Democrat-Republican two-party state has been able to pursue its pro-
business agenda relatively unchecked (Chomsky 2003; Miller 2004; Stanley 2017). The two 
parties have also managed to fend off the formation of far-right parties able to challenge their 
power from further to the right. However, there is a significant portion of the US ruling class 
affiliated with the Republican Party willing to court dissident and even extreme right-wing 
tendencies, meaning that in the United States, a number of far-right policy points have been taken 
up by elements of the Republican Party (Caiani et al, 2012). In Québec, as I have shown, the ruling 
CAQ party shares considerable common ground with a dissident-right group, La Meute. This 
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illustrates the degree to which political categories are unstable and the interaction which can occur 





What is the Alt-Right? 
 
 
 The alt-right is primarily a kind of ideological clearing-house for North American 
Millennial white- and male-supremacism. These forms of supremacism are its organizing 
principles, without which it cannot be understood. As with other far-right movements based in 
white supremacism, it seeks to “reassert a narrow, exclusive understanding of the national identity” 
along racial lines (Perry 2004, 76). As a movement its main goal is the creation of what adherents 
term the ‘ethnostate’, a racially regimented ‘homeland’ for whites to be established somewhere in 
North America. Individuals within the movement do not always agree on how this is to be 
accomplished or even whether it can be accomplished, with a few arguing that it may be 
impossible. The final character of the ‘ethnostate’ is also controversial, with significant 
disagreement over (or lack of attention to) this imagined state’s economic and social policies 
beyond its white supremacism. Even the degree and type of racist policy the ‘ethnostate’ would 
exercise is open to debate, with suggestions from my informants ranging through a number of 
options. Some advocated the total exclusion of non-whites, while others suggested capping the 
non-white population at a few percent of the total and restricting non-whites from citizenship. 
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Several of my informants remarked that they were not opposed to “Chinatowns in big cities” so 
long as the population of non-whites did not surpass a low threshold beyond which it would 
become difficult to maintain white supremacy.  
 The place of white women in such a society is also debated. Positions on women range 
from a valorization of white women as mothers of white children -- typical of traditional neo-Nazi 
groups but a minority position in the alt-right -- to extreme hostility toward women as a group and, 
in turn, calls for their disenfranchisement and even enslavement. Others within the alt-right focus 
on rolling back the advances of gender equality, arguing that feminism has been disastrous for 
whites, particularly because of low birthrates among white women, but also because it has robbed 
men of leadership positions in society which are believed to be their ‘natural’ purview. A position 
universal among all of my informants was that women do not belong in politics (several made the 
notable exception for Marine Le Pen of France’s National Rally party, well-regarded by many in 
the alt-right). 
 The alt-right is a big-tent social movement without any clear leader or organizing 
committee. Its firm commitment to racial and gender inequality locates it within the far right, but 
the range of positions held by adherents means that it straddles the ‘dissident’ and ‘extreme’ 
subcategories. Some members of the group I studied are committed fascists, opposed to liberalism 
entirely. Others have positions which are essentially liberal in character, though this is not to say 
that they are not supremacists. Their liberalism is like the liberalism of a century ago, in that it is 
essentially for white men only; ultimately they are not opposed to representative democracy, 
individual rights and freedoms, relatively free markets or even immigration, so long as access to 
these are denied to people of colour and, where applicable, to white women. Indeed, many of the 
alt-right’s liberals do not have a single position on issues such as abortion or immigration. Rather, 
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they have one position for whites -- abortion should be illegal, immigrants are welcome – and hold 
the opposite view as regards people of colour.  
 Some segments of the alt-right or at least some individuals within it support political 
terrorism, as evidenced by the recent string of attacks carried out by men influenced by the alt-
right. This string of attacks culminated in the murder of 50 people in Christchurch, New Zealand 
on the 15th of March 2019 by a follower of the alt-right. Others within the movement condemn 
political violence for ethical or strategic reasons. I informed interviewees that if they discussed 
carrying out political violence with me, I could be legally obliged to violate confidentiality, so it 
is impossible to say with certainty what positions were held by my informants. Some members of 
the group I studied told me they considered violence to be “political suicide”. Some had engaged 
in militia training and at least one member claimed to be a member of the Canadian Forces. 
 The eclecticism of the alt-right does not mean that it has no defining characteristics. One 
element uniting the movement is its denigration of what adherents often call “trashy racists”, with 
a particular emphasis on right-wing skinheads15 and the Ku Klux Klan. My informants all think of 
themselves as more sophisticated than these groupings, members of which are indeed noted by 
scholars of the far-right for their “relatively simplistic ideological background” (Caiani et al. 2012, 
3). Almost all of my informants had completed post-secondary education, all seemed well-read, 
and most were, if sometimes not particularly consistent, at least articulate. This is in keeping with 
the alt-right’s connection to so-called “high-brow white nationalism […] complete with quasi-
scholarly journals, books and websites” (Hawley 2017, 26). Specific intellectuals are well-
regarded by the alt-right and academic credentials are used to bolster claims and cultivate gravitas 
(Busher 2016). Particularly admired are Jared Taylor, founder of American Renaissance; Kevin 
                                                 
15 Although less well-known because of the notoriety of the neo-Nazi variety, left-wing skinheads opposed to racism 
and neo-Nazism also exist. In some cities, such as Montreal, they make up the majority of the skinhead presence. 
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MacDonald, editor of the Occidental Observer; and, especially in Canada, Ricardo Duchesne, a 
professor of sociology at the University of New Brunswick and the author of Canada in Decay: 
Mass Immigration, Diversity, and the Ethnocide of Euro-Canadians. 
 Another defining characteristic of the alt-right is its status as one of the first social 
movements of any note to spring largely from internet culture. Years before alt-right activists 
began meeting up around North America to discuss things in person and plan actions ‘IRL’16, the 
roots of the movement were establishing themselves on Reddit, 4chan and the forums of the so-
called ‘Manosphere’, a collection of masculinist websites. This genesis has had a number of 
important effects on the makeup of the movement. The alt-right’s noted obsession with internet 
memes is one. The low median age of its adherents is another. Also as a result of these beginnings, 
the alt-right is, to paint with a broad brush, aesthetically and strategically distinct from older white 
supremacist and fascist groups in North America. The classic symbols of neo-Nazism – SS 
lightning bolts, German eagles, death’s heads, plenty of black and silver – are often used by the 
alt-right with several levels of irony attached, while a fondness for in-jokes and meme culture 
manifests in symbols like Pepe the Frog, a comic book character appropriated by the alt-right as a 
symbol for their movement and a far cry from a threatening Nazi aesthetic.  
 The roots of the alt-right in the masculinist internet give the movement a particular stance 
on gender. While the far right in general is effectively universally sexist (Blee 2003; Ferber 2004), 
organized as it usually is as a backlash against progressive movements like feminism (Berlet and 
Lyons 2000), segments of the alt-right take things to unprecedented extremes. Blee (2003) writes 
that while positions on women varied between the racist groups she studied in the US, in every 
case their construction of women included the notion of white women as “passive but wronged” 
                                                 
16 ‘In Real Life’. 
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by men of colour (115), requiring racist male violence in response. This construction of 
womanhood is almost totally absent from the alt-right. It has been largely replaced with a 
construction of women lifted from a set of masculinist and male-supremacist internet subcultures 
sharing a common vocabulary and ideological starting point. These subcultures include so-called 
‘pick-up artists’ or PUA; ‘neo-masculinity’, a reactionary form of sexism promoted by writer 
Daryush Valizadeh; ‘Men Going Their Own Way’, or MGTOW, a heterosexual male separatist 
movement; and more recently, the ‘incel’ (‘involuntary celibate’) subculture. Common to these 
subcultures is an unrelenting hostility toward women and the enduring belief that they are 
essentially genetic automatons, programmed to have sex only with the most ‘alpha’ men, 
including, much to the anxiety of far-right activists, black men. For the alt-right, white women’s 
mass refusal to initiate a racially motivated baby boom stems from the success of feminism at 
dismantling the structures that traditionally kept women’s racially treacherous instincts in check. 
From this perspective, women are not ‘passive and wronged’ but unleashed and genetically 
programmed to be unthinkingly and treasonously promiscuous. 
 The alt-right is not a political party and does not contest elections17. Instead, the alt-right 
is largely focused on propaganda. The method and sophistication of its propaganda is another 
factor setting the alt-right apart from older US racist groups. The alt-right is influenced by the 
French Nouvelle Droite, or ‘New Right’ (Hawley 2017), whose activists are students of Gramsci 
and act accordingly (Griffin 2017). The alt-right has picked up the French New Right’s propaganda 
strategy of ‘right-wing Gramscianism’ (Griffin 2017, Gaillard-Starzmann 2006). This stance hopes 
to affect the world not so much through policy proposals and demonstrations (though both 
movements do sometimes hold demonstrations) as through a concerted effort to influence popular 
                                                 
17 Though some groups calling themselves ‘parties’ have been affiliated with it, such as the Traditionalist Worker 
Party in the United States. 
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culture, recognizing, following Gramsci, that “cultural hegemony must precede political 
hegemony” (Griffin 2017, 21). Thus, alt-right propaganda is often carefully crafted to appeal to its 
target demographics, using black humour, irony, plenty of images including internet memes, and 
simple, understandable language (Feinberg 2017). It tends to be much less dedicated to preaching 
to the choir and signaling ideological purity than the propaganda of older US racist groups insofar 
as it is more focused on recruiting fence-sitters and disseminating racist memes through the 
internet. A major goal of this propaganda for both the alt-right and the modern far right generally 
is “normalizing and rehabilitating Nazism to a point where its ideas no longer create repulsion 
among the general public” (Griffin 2017, 20).  
 This French influence aside, the alt-right is largely US-based and its focus remains the 
United States. Several of my informants told me that they paid more attention to US news than to 
current events in Canada (not, it must be said, particularly unusual for many Canadians). However, 
the alt-right scene in Montreal was said by my informants to be one of the most active in North 
America and included several of the movement’s high-profile figures. The group with which I did 
research did have some ties to other Canadian organizations and shared at least a few members 
with other Québec-based far-right groups. Some of these organizations were treated with a great 
deal of contempt, however, particularly La Meute, which was dismissed as an ineffectual mob of 
Boomer civic nationalists but a potentially useful recruiting ground nonetheless. The Montreal alt-
right group also overlapped significantly with an ‘identitarian’ group (see Chapter 6) with which 
it shared some of its leadership figures. This second group was dedicated to promoting a more 
palatable, serious, and classically liberal brand of ethno-nationalism.  
 There are some ideological points on which the movement as a whole largely agrees. A 
commitment to white racial chauvinism of some kind unites them, as does anti-Semitism. The 
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‘ethno-state’ is another anchoring idea, together with the defense of settler colonialism, with 
adherents arguing that Canada and the US were always meant by their early leaders to be white 
supremacist states. The alt-right is nationalist, but not necessarily patriotic, in that adherents 
conceive of themselves as being loyal to a racially defined white nation and not to a civic state. 
Some version of the ‘white genocide’ conspiracy theory, which claims that Jews and progressives 
are attempting to erase the white race through demographic warfare, is used to understand the 
phenomenon of immigration. Muslim migrants are particularly reviled for their perceived cultural 
incompatibility, while the Islamic world is in some ways admired for what alt-right adherents see 
as a ‘strong’ culture including institutionalized patriarchy and high birthrates. Biological 
determinism, antifeminism, and male supremacism of some sort are nearly universal. Right-wing 
anti-imperialism is very common, as adherents see foreign adventurism as costly, of little benefit 
to whites, and forcing Western countries to be unnecessarily embroiled in the affairs of non-whites. 
Anti-globalization rhetoric grades into vague right-wing anti-capitalism; attitudes on capitalism 
vary but as a whole the alt-right can be said to be opposed to the prevailing corporate order to some 
degree though many members are not explicitly anti-capitalist. It is also, as a whole, implacably 
opposed to all forms of leftism. A profound commitment to hierarchy and elitism is uncomfortably 
coupled with populist rhetoric about workers and regular folk. Similarly, a purported concern with 
the environment is very common though, at the same time, anthropogenic climate change is usually 
seen as a hoax being leveraged by enemies of the white race to weaken Western countries 
economically.  
 All this adds up to a portrait of a political tendency firmly in the far right, heavily influenced 
by, but distinct from, neo-Nazism, the French New Right, and other fascist schools which have 
grown up since WWII. A strong fascist wing exists as a result, but at the same time, the alt-right’s 
  
56 
emergence in the heart of liberal capitalism has resulted in a willingness on the part of many 
members to accommodate liberalism to some degree so long as rights and freedoms are reserved 
mainly for white men. These members share a vision of an explicitly white supremacist Canada 
legally enshrining the dominance of heterosexual men. For some this state would be aligned with 
conservative Christianity; others, in keeping with the alt-right’s generally secular bent (Hawley 
2017), see Christianity as more of a cultural symbol than a sincere object of faith. This vision, far 
from having to be imported from Nazi Germany or Mussolini’s Italy, reflects a desire to return to 
what my informants see as the foundations of the modern liberal Canadian state. Canadian alt-right 
activists share with many of their leftist opponents an understanding of this state as having been 
predicated on white supremacism and heteropatriarchy.  
 The alt-right proposes policies considerably more extreme than any serious political party 
in Canada and is far more dedicated to institutionalized racial and gender hierarchy than is 
considered acceptable in the mainstream. Together with the fact that the more liberal wing of the 
movement is in constant dialogue with the overtly fascist wing, the alt-right can comfortably be 
categorized as a far-right movement. It is a mistake however to assume that this makes it somehow 
foreign, alien or un-Canadian. Many of the tenets upheld by the alt-right were, within living 
memory, considered relatively uncontroversial in this country. Liberal capitalism can easily 







4. Men and Masculinity in the Alt-Right 
The Roundtable 
 
 The first time I went to an alt-right meet-up I was early, but I wasn’t the first to arrive. Two 
young men, out of their teens but not by much, were loitering near the door. Both were 
broadcasting tough nonchalance as hard as they could, but their excitement was clearly 
discernable. One was dressed quite neutrally, while the other was dressed in his full alt-right 
regalia. He wore a trenchcoat-style jacket, in military camouflage, with the flags of a couple of 
eastern European countries sewn on. A black t-shirt underneath proclaimed a pro-Pinochet 
message. Around his neck hung a Schwarze Sonne or Black Sun, an esoteric swastika-like symbol 
used by neo-Nazis. His hair was cut in the severely parted ‘fashy’18 haircut popular in the alt-right, 
and modelled after the undercut favoured by German officers in WWII. Tall and lean, he gave the 
impression of being gangly – though his Instagram, when I looked him up later, included a number 
of photos of him shirtless, showing off built-up muscles well-lit from above for maximum bulge. 
His desire to look like a scary fascist was almost palpable. I took all this in in a moment, my senses 
heightened by adrenaline. His name was Andrei.   
 Our host was late, so as we stood by the door, I introduced myself as the anthropologist, 
hoping that my contact had done as he had promised and informed everybody coming to the meet-
up that I would be attending. Almost right away, the postures of the two young men shifted and 
they perceptibly relaxed. I believe they initially saw me  as a fellow alt-right adherent. In hyper-
                                                 
18 From ‘fascist’. This is a term used by people within the alt-right. 
  
58 
masculine settings, especially in cases where people are on edge because they are in potentially 
dangerous or compromising situations, the arrival of a stranger is always an occasion for an 
anxious sizing-up. However, finding out that I was the researcher meant that I was established not 
to be part of the peer group among whom confrontation and status-jockeying was relevant. I was 
outside the power structure of the alt-right group and therefore not a threat, at least not in the sense 
of threatening the social positions of these young men vis-à-vis the others in the group.  
 They became quite friendly, and Andrei immediately launched into an account of the 
exciting fight that he and his friend had just narrowly avoided. On their way to the meetup, they 
had encountered a man in the metro who Andrei described as “a Latino antifa” (antifa meaning 
anti-fascist) who had objected vigorously to Andrei’s t-shirt, Pinochet being a Chilean dictator 
perhaps best-known for his habit of throwing leftist critics out of helicopters. With a wounded 
attitude, the pair invited me to commiserate with them about the affront of a Latin American 
holding robust views on the topic. Andrei was keen to show that he had not been afraid of “the 
antifa.” Confiding to me with an awkwardly forced casualness that he had “a black belt in karate,” 
Andrei explained that he had used his martial arts training to de-escalate the situation, avoiding a 
confrontation in the metro itself. However, the obstinate adversary had waited for the duo outside 
the metro in order to accost them again. Here, Andrei’s friend had “almost” pulled a knife, but had 
decided not to. He showed me the knife conspiratorially. 
 It was at this point that the story trailed off, as the somewhat embarrassingly un-dramatic 
nature of the confrontation became obvious to me and Andrei’s friend – though apparently not to 
Andrei, who tried to tell the story three or four more times as the night went on, to anyone who 
would listen. Each time, he started by telling listeners about his black belt. Most of the attendees 
had some sympathy regarding being confronted by antifascists, and validated Andrei’s sense of 
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injustice about the episode. His bragging about his expertise in karate, however, was greeted with 
polite subject-changing and in some cases, barely veiled contempt – though one young man named 
Derek made a joke about the idea of de-escalating the fight, asking “what, you don’t like to skin 
your enemies alive? What are you, a cuck19?” Finally, Andrei asked one of the leaders of the group 
to gather the attendees together so that he could tell everyone at once about the altercation. The 
older man put him down, gesturing at the six or seven men sitting nearest and telling him, “This is 
what you’re going to get” before wandering away himself, clearly not willing to put his name to 
Andrei’s grandstanding. Andrei appeared ashamed and didn’t mention the story again. 
 By that point, of course, our host had already let us into the outdoor area where the meet-
up was to take place. At the beginning of the night, there were only six or seven of us, sitting in 
lawn chairs on the gravel expanse. They drank beer or vodka and cracked jokes about cannabis 
being inappropriate for whites due to its association with black people. The only leadership figure 
present at that point was about a decade older than most of the other men. He asked them their 
ages and acted surprised when they said 19, 20, 21. 
 A few friendly-seeming men asked me questions about myself and my work. One asked 
me what it meant to be Canadian, what Canadian culture meant to me. I stumbled over my words, 
unsure of how much to disclose about my views. “Well,” I said, “I don’t know. Shouldn’t I be 
asking you that question?” They laughed and seized on my uncertain answer. It was evidence, they 
said, of Canadian culture having been almost entirely destroyed, primarily through changing 
patterns of immigration but also through the fecklessness engendered by leftism. One man used 
the past tense to refer to Canadian culture. Another said that “true Canadians are Anglo-Slavic”, a 
notion apparently based on the large number of Eastern European immigrants who arrived in the 
                                                 
19 A favourite alt-right insult, short for ‘cuckold’; see p. 87 for a more detailed discussion. 
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19th and 20th century. It was unclear if he thought that this meant that Canadian culture was an 
amalgamation of Anglo and Slavic influences, or that it should be, or if this was meant to refer 
only to the genetic inheritance of “true” Canadians. The Québécois, in this formulation, were 
treated as a separate nation from a separate ethnic stock. I could see why this ‘Anglo-Slavic’ idea 
could be a popular idea among the attendees, as a disproportionate number of them seemed to be 
of Eastern European extraction. 
 As more people arrived, the attendees began boasting about their influence within the far 
right. One man told me that he ran a group doing militia training in rural areas. He offered to put 
me in touch with leaders of other far-right outfits like La Meute and Soldiers of Odin. Others spoke 
about the meme pages or chat forums they administered. The actual leaders of the group mostly 
refrained from engaging. I noticed one attendee whom I recognized as a very popular and 
influential neo-Nazi online content creator; throughout the night he was relatively tight-lipped and 
refrained from bragging. Andrei on the other hand said he ran a popular fascist Facebook page of 
which the others seemed not to have heard. He then segued into an account of how he had started 
out as a Titoist – Josip Tito being the president of communist Yugoslavia until his death in 1980 
– but had then become an ‘anarcho’-capitalist20 for a while before converting to fascism. His time 
as a right-wing ‘anarchist’ had apparently given him a soft spot for the left-wing variety, and he 
spent some time trying to convince the other attendees that in a more perfect world, “anarcho-
communism would work”. This was greeted with general derision, and he backtracked unhappily. 
 More men began to arrive, and the volume increased as the sun began to set. The mood 
was reminiscent of the opening stages of a house party thrown by somewhat socially awkward 
high school boys, right down to the total absence of any women. Many of the men seemed to be 
                                                 




meeting in person for the first time, though they mostly seemed to be acquainted with each other’s 
online handles, and the awkwardness was conspicuous as they tried to translate internet personas 
into viable offline masculinities. There seemed to be a roughly 50/50 split between men cultivating 
a studied aloofness and men enthusiastically swapping alt-right bona fides, throwing around 
shibboleths like ‘cuck’, ‘degenerate’, and ‘beta’ with gusto. Many wore alt-right merch: T-shirts 
and other gear emblazoned with Pepe the Frog, Kekistan logos, and various elaborate memes and 
in-jokes21. Others wore the emerging uniform of the movement popularized by figures like Richard 
Spencer – a prep-school look harking back to 1950s styling, featuring button-ups and khakis. I 
began to circulate a bit, trying to make contacts other than the leader figure who had originally 
guaranteed me access, speaking to men standing in little knots spaced across the area.  
 One, a recent immigrant to Canada named Felix, explained how he had entered the alt-right 
through the so-called ‘Manosphere’ – a constellation of websites, blogs and forums focused on 
men’s issues, with content ranging from relatively tame ‘men’s rights’ ideas with some sympathy 
for moderate feminism to hardcore reactionary male-supremacism. In particular, he recounted his 
enthusiasm for a Manosphere figure called Roosh V, real name Daryush Valizadeh. Valizadeh is 
an American author known for writing books on ‘pick-up artistry’ or PUA22, also known to insiders 
as ‘game’, a subculture or community in which men share strategies for manipulating or coercing 
                                                 
21 ‘Kekistan’ is a good example of how elaborate these memes and in-jokes can become. ‘Kek’ is internet slang for 
laughter or humour; it derives ultimately from the way Korean users of the 90s online game Starcraft, which lacked 
support for Korean Hangul script, would indicate laughter. In Korea, ‘hahaha’ is written by repeating the Hangul 
character representing the consonant ‘k’, yielding ‘kekeke’. ‘Kek’ became further popularized when the 
development team of the game World of Warcraft built it into the game as the Orcish ‘translation’ for ‘lol’. 4chan 
users realized that Kek is also the name of an Ancient Egyptian frog-headed diety; they associated this diety with 
Pepe the Frog, an innocuous comic book character-turned-meme since appropriated as a symbol by the alt-right. 
Eventually the fictional country of ‘Kekistan’, whose denizens worship the Pepe-god Kek, became a meme, with its 
own forum on Reddit and a flag modeled after the Nazi Reichskriegsflagge (War Flag). While Kekistan was not 
originally an alt-right invention, and indeed is still claimed by some to be a satirical send-up of the alt-right’s 
obsession with militarism and Nazi imagery, the meme has been appropriated by alt-right internet users and the 
Kekistani flag is used by some in the movement as a ‘plausibly deniable’ alt-right symbol. 
22 Throughout, I refer to both ‘pick-up artists’ and ‘pick-up artistry’ as PUA. 
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women into sex. In his books, Valizadeh details his purported sexual successes in various  
countries to which he claims to have traveled, and maintains a website on which he publishes 
articles and essays on his male-supremacist ideology, which he calls ‘neo-masculinity’. In more 
recent years, he has retained his focus on gender but has shifted to writing more broadly about far-
right politics. His non-European parentage aside, he is relatively well-regarded by some in the alt-
right though not, by any means, by all – some see him firmly as a ‘degenerate’ despoiling white 
women. 
 I lingered on this conversation, because the influence of this type of male-supremacist 
ideology on the alt-right was a topic of great interest for me. In fact, my research had originally 
been focused on followers of figures like Valizadeh. I had shifted toward my current program of 
study when, upon contacting the leader of a PUA group in Montreal to ask about doing research 
with them, I discovered that the group had transitioned wholesale into an alt-right organization. I 
had asked if I could conduct some interviews and fieldwork anyway, and my contact had accepted 
the proposition. Given that access to far-right groups is typically very hard to secure, I had elected 
to alter my topic of research to cover this alt-right group. 
 Felix and another man named Joe explained to me that things had been shifting in the 
Manosphere. It wasn’t just Valizadeh, either; there had been a concerted shift in many of the 
Manosphere communities toward explicitly far-right political stances, including various nativist 
and racist positions. Felix told me, “At a certain point, Roosh stopped talking about game and 
moved on to politics.” I asked them about the Red Pill, a Reddit.com forum dedicated to a heady 
mix of extreme male-supremacist rhetoric and PUA strategy. Joe waved a hand. “Oh yeah,” he 
told me. “Red Pill guys don’t countersignal much anymore.” As mentioned earlier, 
countersignalling is a term appropriated by the alt-right from social psychology and behavioural 
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economics. In these fields, the term refers to a phenomenon arising in an environment in which 
many individuals are all attempting to signal their fitness, wealth or another desirable quality. In 
such a setting, it may be in the interest of some particularly fit or wealthy individuals to decline to 
signal, thus standing out from the crowd by showing that they don’t need to signal like the rest. I 
go into more detail about countersignaling in the next section. In alt-right circles, the term retains 
some of its original meaning but also seems to sometimes simply be used as a synonym for 
‘disavow’.  
 Felix and Joe were members of the group when it had been dedicated purely to PUA topics 
and were thus some of its most senior figures. They had not simply watched the shift in the 
Manosphere from specifically gender-based thinking to broader right-wing extremism; they had 
been part of it. After a period of plying their pick-up ‘artistry’ in Montreal bars and nightclubs, 
and becoming more and more well-versed in Red Pill ideology, ‘neo-masculinity’, and 
Manosphere anti-feminism, they had made the leap to white supremacism. As Joe told me, “If 
you’re already ready to go against feminism, which means going against the whole establishment, 
then becoming a ‘racist’ is not a big deal.” He rolled his eyes and made air quotes as he said the 
word ‘racist’.  
For these men, the tepid liberal progressivism of the North American mainstream is 
indistinguishable from a perceived ‘feminist’ establishment. Indeed, from the hyper-reactionary 
perspective common among Red Pill adherents, who regularly advocate for male-only suffrage 
and an end to careers for women, the two may as well be the same thing. Rejecting the concept of 
female autonomy is not of course a stance which springs from a vacuum; this perspective is rooted 
directly in the Christian patriarchy historically underlying Canadian and US settler society, a fact 
which my informants were happy to underline. Further, sexist attitudes which minimize women’s 
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agency or yearn for more patriarchal relations are by no means rare in North America. However, 
to bluntly and apologetically propose the end of women’s participation in the public sphere as a 
key ideological tenet, and one largely based in secular thinking at that, is today a radical departure 
from the norm. A departure like that can easily pave the way for further dramatic political 
developments, such as the swerve toward fascism. 
 Throughout the evening, resentment against feminism remained a theme. A man with 
bulging muscles and an intense stare named Jean-Christophe, wearing a little girl’s bright purple 
backpack (he explained that this was to point to if he was accused of being sexist or homophobic), 
told me that he had been falsely accused of sexual misconduct by feminists and had lost his position 
at an institution as a result. Standing very close and gazing at me intently, he showed me PDFs on 
his phone to prove it. Documents about the investigation into his sexual misconduct flashed by on 
the screen, all the allegations ending with the words ‘validé’ or ‘verifié’. I found the experience 
very disturbing. Regardless of his animosity toward feminists, Jean-Christophe later told me that 
having more women in the group would be good for appearances, as their presence would make 
members “look less like virgin losers”. 
 Blee (2003) writes that although women in the far-right certainly exist, groups are 
overwhelmingly male-dominated. By the time the main event of the night was ready to begin, I 
counted about 20 men present, a number which fluctuated throughout the night, and one woman. 
The lone woman was on the arm of a muscular, broad-shouldered man with boots and closely 
cropped hair wearing a shirt emblazoned with a cisgender pride slogan. 
 By this point the sun was starting to set and the evening air was getting cooler. A leadership 
figure gathered all the attendees into a circle where they sat on an assortment of folding chairs and 
benches. Some of them were clearly drunk, and it took a while to wrangle them into position. The 
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manoeuvring was interrupted by the arrival of three or four men carrying a huge Red Ensign, the 
old colonial flag of the Dominion of Canada, to cheers from those gathered – including, 
unexpectedly, from some of the francophones present. They put it up against a wall in a corner. 
Finally, the main facilitator of the meeting stood and began to give a speech about the group. 
 “We are fascists, yes,” he told them. “But we’re also a networking group. And because of 
that, we need flexible rules and flexible membership, to a degree.” One of the men in the crowd 
joked, “Diversity is our strength,” mocking a slogan associated with Trudeau’s Liberal Party, to 
which others shouted assent. Another clarified, “European diversity,” to laughs from the group. A 
third said, “Well, actually, Aryan.” People began to joke about Italians and their apparently 
questionable status as true Aryans. An Italian-Canadian man with slightly darker skin than many 
of the other attendees squawked in a falsetto, “I’m different!” to general hilarity.  
 The man making the speech was able to quiet them down and continue. He explained that 
in the interests of unity on the far right, it was necessary for the group to embrace members with 
varying political positions. Therefore, he proposed a roundtable for the men to voice their views 
and introduce themselves and their political backgrounds to the others, thus giving the group as a 
whole a better idea of what ideas were represented within it. This was of course an anthropological 
goldmine, and an unexpected opportunity – my contact had not mentioned anything about this 
happening. It would be an unparalleled chance to get a good handle on the diverse, sometimes 
even paradoxical viewpoints within the alt-right movement. For the next few hours, I scribbled 
notes frantically as they spoke one by one.23 
 The hulking man with the cisgender pride shirt, Greg, was seated next to the leader and so 
went first. He told the group that he was new to the alt-right. “I just got into it,” he said. “I’m fresh. 
                                                 
23 Some of the quotations in the following section are not verbatim, as I was not permitted to record and was writing 
down keywords instead, while also occasionally writing out full statements verbatim when time permitted. 
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I didn’t used to be into this stuff, I didn’t know about any of this stuff really. I was a nice guy. 
Then I went to a demonstration to counter Antifa because I didn’t like what they were doing. It got 
me thinking. Then I just started looking into things.” He became interested in (relatively) moderate 
anti-Islam movements, he said, but quickly realized that “radical Islam is only a symptom of the 
problem.” The real issue, he learned, was demographic. White women of childbearing age make 
up only 2% of the world’s population, he informed the group24. He gestured at his girlfriend: “This 
one’s mine, so fuck off, I’ll kill ya.” The men guffawed while the woman looked at the ground 
with a small smile on her face. He had realized, he concluded, that the real ‘diversity’ issue facing 
the world was that its white population was threatened with extinction, so he had become a white 
nationalist and joined the alt-right. Now he was eager to learn more and contribute to the 
movement. 
 The next person in the circle was Greg’s girlfriend, whose name I never got. As she opened 
her mouth, a man yelled, “The girlfriend says nothing!” Another shouted “White Sharia!” to 
laughter and cheers. She closed her mouth. The men looked on with expressions of glee. I stared 
in amazement. The next man began to speak as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened. 
 “It’s too bad there’s not more people here,” he said, “but there’s a reason for that. Leftists 
say ‘black lives matter’. But they never talk about white lives. White lives matter too. We have 
white lives! And what do white lives mean? White lives mean working hard, self-sacrifice, making 
things happen. White lives mean responsibility. And that means that some people are out working, 
                                                 
24 A claim associated with Andrew Anglin of the neo-Nazi website Daily Stormer. By a very narrow definition of 
‘white’, this statistic may be more or less accurate. Of course, like many demographic statistics leveraged by white 
supremacists, it lacks context. In particular, it relies on the listener assuming that this is a very low number, since 
2% sounds small; but 2% of the world’s population is still 150 million people. It also relies on the listener being 
unable to easily estimate the proportion of other groups made up of women of child-bearing age, and thus not 
knowing that, for example, the Arab League has a total female population of only around 207 million – less than 3% 




or taking care of their families, so they can’t be here. But they will be.” He predicted that the alt-
right would grow vigorously in the near future, including by assimilating disillusioned leftists. 
“Most leftists aren’t really our enemies. If they’re white, we’ll fight for them. We fight for all 
white people.” This point was greeted with a combination of nodding and skeptical looks. The 
irony of having just silenced the only white woman present appeared to be entirely lost on the 
group, or else they did not perceive it to be ironic. Fighting for someone, after all, is not the same 
as respecting them as a political actor. 
 Next in the circle was a young man who qualified himself as an avowed Trumpist. “Trump, 
people started hating on Trump after the election because he didn’t do that, or he didn’t do this. 
But Trump came back recently. He’s back. And me, I’m a hardcore Trump supporter.” He went 
on to describe himself as “alt-light”, a term used by alt-right activists to denigrate figures related 
to the movement who are not seen as being committed enough to race or gender supremacism. A 
leader interrupted to assure the group that he trusted this man, even though he was alt-light, and 
that therefore they should too. The man continued, referring back to the previous speaker’s 
comments about people on the left of the political spectrum. “Most liberals,” he said, “are liberals 
because they’ve been indoctrinated.” The implication was that if white liberals could be 
deprogrammed – or if their indoctrination could be interrupted – then they would be more likely 
to embrace the tenets of the alt-right. 
 At this point attention turned to Émile, the figure I had identified earlier as a prominent 
neo-Nazi content creator. He spoke a bit about his work writing articles for fascist websites before 
moving on to some current events in the far-right universe. A few months earlier, a man named 
Devon Arthurs had murdered his two roommates in Tampa, Florida. All three were members of 
the US white supremacist terrorist organization Atomwaffen Division, a group that has been linked 
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to several other murders and members of which have been arrested on terrorism charges (Swenson 
2018). Atomwaffen Division advocates propaganda by the deed, the violent overthrow of the US 
government, and purposefully precipitating race war through terrorism. Arthurs told police that he 
had recently converted to Salafist jihadi Islam and that he had killed his roommates and fellow 
Atomwaffen members for mocking his conversion. Émile told the group that “the guys in 
Atomwaffen are young, and not very wise.” One had converted to Islam, and killed the others; 
Émile’s takeaway was, “If you have different views, if you have any group of people and there are 
different views within that group, there will be violence. It’s just the way the world works, and we 
know this. So we need uniformity in some parts of our lives, like religion, et cetera, in order to 
have peace and stability. It can’t always be about freedom. People are starting to move away from 
a Judaized, freedom-oriented direction.” For Émile, the cause of violence is difference itself, 
whether that difference applies to a minority group within a given state or a jihadi in a neo-Nazi 
terror cell. Freedom, which breeds difference, is thus in opposition to peace. By this logic, then, 
peace can be achieved through ethnic cleansing and coerced uniformity. 
 He went on to offer his views on the left. “The left is radicalizing in an absurd and 
disgusting direction,” he told his listeners. “And we couldn’t wish for a better opposition. They’re 
obsessed with trannies and genderfluid faggots and all this.” At the mention of the word 
‘genderfluid’, laughs erupted from the group. “They’re not serious. When people see us fighting 
Antifa, they see heroes. We look like superheroes. Because what do they see? We’re in shape, we 
look good, we’re normal people! Antifa is a bunch of disgusting blue-haired freaks and they’re 
degenerates. So we look good next to them. They’re the perfect opposition.” Everyone was 
laughing and nodding. This was a significantly different take than Andrei’s, who I noticed was 
looking sullen. Throughout the night, I got the sense that Antifa was an object of ridicule and 
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derision as well as of fear and hatred. Here their attitude toward Antifa reminded me of the 
archetypical Nazi attitude toward Jews, who as part of such an attitude are described in the same 
breath as both subhuman weaklings and as superhuman, indeed practically supernatural, overlords 
(Ferber and Kimmel 2004). In the same way, Antifa was consistently characterized as consisting 
primarily of hysterical, out-of-shape stooges of suspect sexual orientation, while also routinely 
alleged, sometimes by the same people, to be a shadowy force financed by Jewish billionaires and 
the intelligence apparatus and to have access to secret paramilitary training camps. (Felix, for 
example, told me in an interview: “We can’t fight Antifa in the street – we will lose. They have 
military training and financial backing from George Soros. You can look it up.”) 
 A quiet, well-dressed man named Philippe was next to speak. I had interviewed Philippe 
already as part of my preliminary contact with the group, and knew him to be an articulate speaker 
in French and English. He liked expensive drinks, seemed to be in a position of some authority, 
and was significantly older than most of the group members. His speech praised the efforts of the 
primary leader figure in the group: “I spent many lonely years knowing no one who shared my 
sentiments. Thanks to him, I am no longer alone.”  He recounted his transition from skepticism 
about immigration and a concern about the influence of Islamic fundamentalism to full-fledged 
white identity politics, and spoke at length about how alone he had felt during that period and the 
difficulties of being a white nationalist in Montreal. He was very happy that the group had been 
formed, he told his listeners, and reminded them that thanks to the group’s leadership, the alt-right 
movement in Montreal was the largest of any Canadian city. Joe butted in to point out that since it 
was so difficult to be a nationalist in general in Montreal because of the city’s notoriously left-
leaning bohemianism, the alt-right could successfully integrate defectors from the flagging Québec 
sovereigntist movement through an emphasis on European heritage. This would help the alt-right 
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continue to grow in the city. Philippe agreed, and encouraged group members to look to the 
example of their leader. “Be like him,” he told them. “Be a leader. And if you aren’t a leader, that’s 
fine, not everyone is – give your time to leaders.” As Philippe finished his speech, group members 
began shouting ‘Heil!’ and performing the fascist salute, laughing, pleased at this ironic-but-not-
ironic reference to WWII-era Nazi protocol.  
 Joe was next and continued on his line of thought regarding Montreal as a recruiting ground 
for the alt-right. It made sense that Montreal would have a strong scene, he said, precisely because 
the city was, in general, so left-wing. That lefty status quo provoked a backlash which clever 
leaders could exploit. The group’s bilingualism (almost everyone present was fluent in both 
languages, in classic Montreal fashion) and openness to specifically francophone Québec 
nationalism also helped in that regard, he noted, appealing to Montreal’s specific demographics. 
After all, he said, the alt-right was pro-European, not specifically pro-Anglo; and Montreal was in 
Québec, and Québec, he said, “is French territory, which we acknowledge”. In left-leaning spaces 
in much of Canada it is usual to begin events with a land acknowledgement naming the indigenous 
nations for which that area is ancestral. Joe was effectively carrying out the white nationalist 
version of this practice, substituting the area’s settler nation for its indigenous ones. 
 At this point, someone asked our host if he could use the washroom inside. Suddenly about 
half the group stood up, clamouring that they needed to go too. While the rest of us waited for 
them, I talked to a few men I had not yet met. One man told me that a teacher in his public school 
had told him never to have children, because white children – specifically white children – were 
bad for the environment. He assured me that this was a common occurrence and evidence of 
widespread anti-white prejudice in Québec society25. Another man, Derek – the attendee who had 
                                                 
25 Of course I cannot test the accuracy of his claim. However, the reader may be interested to know that at the time 
of writing, typing in quotation marks “white children are bad for the environment” into Google produces exactly one 
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earlier spoken of skinning one’s enemies alive – was trying to explain to me that the hardcore anti-
Semitism common in alt-right rhetoric was “actually just used to hook people who are in the middle 
class of the IQ range and get them into the movement. It’s the easiest way for them to understand 
what’s going on. It’s serious but it’s not really serious.” Derek is young, and was drunk enough to 
be staggering slightly and slurring his words. I stared at him, a little shocked, thinking through 
everything I had heard and read up to that point. Certainly, the anti-Semitic rhetoric to which I had 
been exposed thus far had seemed completely sincere. Was this man trying to tell me that it was 
essentially a cynical ruse, taking advantage of existing anti-Jewish prejudice to explain a kind of 
vulgarized, pseudo-Marxist populist economics to people deemed too unsophisticated to 
understand the real deal? Unfortunately, upon questioning the man proved too inebriated to explain 
himself and seemed to get more and more confused about his own statements as I gently tried to 
tease some sort of clarity out of him. 
 By this time, it was dark and getting quite chilly, and I was feeling underdressed as well as 
increasingly burnt out from being on edge all evening. More or less everything I had heard all 
night made me feel viscerally ill, and I was constantly worried about accidentally giving myself 
away as someone who enthusiastically engaged in most of the behaviours these men thought of as 
‘degenerate’. A sleeve riding up too high could reveal my tattoos; my septum piercing falling down 
from where I had tucked it up inside my nose would immediately arouse suspicion. I was watching 
my speech patterns and mannerisms closely, but I knew I had already inadvertently said a few 
things through the evening that had slightly undermined the aura of ‘neutral’, straight, WASPy 
                                                 
result. It is a tweet by a white nationalist about the ‘Coudenhove-Kalergi Plan’, the subject of a conspiracy theory 
which alleges that early European federalist Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi left behind a secret plan to replace 
indigenous Europeans with Africans, to be ruled over by Jews and the remnants of the European aristocracy, and 
that this plan is today being carried out by the top echelons of European Union. The tweeter seems to be alleging 
that occasional statements by environmentalists arguing that people should have fewer children are actually directed 
specifically at white parents as part of the Coudenhove-Kalergi plot to exterminate whites. 
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masculinity that I was trying to cultivate. Even my clothes were causing me discomfort, since I 
was trying to blend in to some degree and was wearing a far stuffier outfit than I was used to. I 
was starting to feel distinctly nauseated and a little light-headed from the constant adrenaline. I 
kept reaching into my tote bag to grip the comforting heft of the hammer I had stashed in it in case 
of the worst of worst-case scenarios. 
 Eventually, most of the men returned from inside and the ragged circle reformed. Providing 
a counterpoint to what Derek had just been telling me about anti-Semitism, the next speaker, Ben, 
launched enthusiastically into a lecture about “the Jews” and explained his understanding of 
history as seen through an anti-Semitic lens. He had discovered, he told his listeners, that the 
history of interreligious hatred in Europe was largely the history of Jews trying to kill or control 
Christians, rather than the other way around. Hitler had had many Jews in the SS, he assured us, 
and the Holocaust had not really happened. Instead, the German Nazis had been defending against 
the Jewish-organized persecution of Christians – a persecution which Ben believed stretched back 
many centuries and penetrated every aspect of European society, and which by WWII had reached 
its pinnacle in the form of the Bolsheviks, who were Jews intent above all else on slaughtering 
Christians. “The Jews hate Jesus more than vampires hate garlic,” he said. “But I love Jesus, and 
I love Hitler. And if we don’t come back to Christianity, I don’t think there’s a movement. You 
have to learn about Christ. If you don’t learn about Christ, then the Jews have stolen your history. 
Your history is in the Bible, and the Jews have stolen it from you, trying to make you believe that 
Christianity is a Jewish religion. It’s not. Actually, the true Israelites were the enemies of the Jews.” 
According to Ben, Jews successfully convinced European gentiles of a false history, even though 
the real history is written down in Christian holy texts. Further, both the increasing liberalization 
of many Christian denominations and the declining rate of worship in the general population are 
  
73 
the results of a Jewish conspiracy to strip whites of their history and their heritage, making them 
more amenable to conquest and control. This conspiracy, he believed, had been ongoing since time 
immemorial and stems from a grudge beginning specifically with the Roman conquest of ancient 
Judea two millennia ago. The duty of white Christians, for him, is to reclaim their religion – the 
more orthodox the denomination, the better – and thus their identity from the shadowy influence 
of these resentful evildoers.  
 An immigrant from Russia was next to speak. He told the group, “It’s easier to be red-
pilled in Russia because Russia is really racist.” Since it is more acceptable in Russia to express 
racist views in public, he explained, people are freer to develop fully-fledged white-supremacist 
viewpoints. He went on, “Me, I’m not a Nazi, I’m a pure fascist. A traditional fascist. I’m a 
European-culturalist, a white supremacist in the proper sense of the word.” He was not at all against 
multiculturalism, he related; it was just that he believed that “monoethnicism is the real 
multiculturalism”. He explained that if there is the same mix of ethnic groups everywhere, local 
cultures will disappear and therefore multiculturalism will be impossible. Rather, local cultures 
should be protected through a policy of monoethnicism – one ethnic group per area – thus 
maintaining the world’s overall diversity of cultures. (The glaring fact of his being an immigrant 
belonging to a foreign ethnic group from the other side of the world did not seem to bother him.) 
Nowadays, he said, there are “kebabs26 everywhere you go. That’s why I’m an identitarian.” Why 
would you want to travel anywhere if everywhere was all the same, he asked? Conversely, he 
pointed out, when he had gone to Thailand on vacation he had enjoyed it very much because it 
was so different. He wanted Thailand to retain its difference, just like he wanted European 
countries to retain theirs.  
                                                 
26 ‘Kebab’ is used as a derogatory term for people of Middle Eastern descent.  
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 I heard versions of this argument many times during my research and began to call it ‘the 
Tourism Model of White Supremacism’. Typically it involved a claim that very soon, European 
countries would be 30% black, 20% Arab, 20% Chinese, and 30% white. Sometimes other 
variations on these percentages were used but they were always similar numbers. Incidentally, 
estimates of the actual numbers of these groups in the European Union vary widely, but using the 
highest estimates I could find anywhere online (12 million people with some African ancestry, 6 
million Arabs, and 3 million Chinese), the current percentages would be 2%, 1%, and 0.5% for 
those groups respectively – not exactly a crushing demographic tide for the 512 million EU 
citizens. The argument continues – often using Venice as an example for some reason – by 
claiming that in this imminent future, all places in Europe previously worth visiting will be 
essentially the same. Everywhere one goes, one will encounter the same mix of blacks, Arabs and 
Chinese, none of whom will have assimilated to the local country’s culture, and the indigenous 
population will be so subdued by its demographic collapse relative to other groups that it will stop 
generating meaningful culture. Instead of encountering Italian culture in Italy and German culture 
in Germany one will simply find the same handful of monolithic foreign cultures throughout 
Europe.  
 More than once I was asked, triumphantly, whether it would be worth it to go to Venice if, 
when I got there, I was to discover that my gondolier was Chinese. The implication is that this 
would detract from the sense of authenticity consumed by tourists in Venice. Of course, what 
tourists consume is firmly a simulation of authenticity anyway, as the fleet of Venetian gondolas, 
once the primary means of transportation within the city, are now exclusively used for ferrying 
tourists around in circles and are no more ‘authentic’ than the horse-drawn carriages in the Old 
Port of Montreal. It is difficult to escape the suspicion that the people advancing the Tourism 
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Model have rarely interacted with any of the non-white descendants of immigrants in Europe, or 
in Canada for that matter. A francophone rapper from the banlieues of Marseilles whose 
grandparents were Harkis, Algerians who fought for France during the 1954-1962 Algerian War 
of Independence and later settled in the metropole – is clearly culturally distinct from a Dutch 
computer scientist whose parents came to Europe from Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Both 
are distinct from a Yemeni fisherman’s wife. In the Tourism Model of White Supremacism, no 
meaningful distinction exists between these three examples while an unbridgeable gulf separates 
them from white Europeans. The Marseillais recording a rap album in France, in French, about the 
streets of his native city, is in this formulation not an example of urban French culture but the 
negation of it. 
After the Russian had finished speaking, a man who claimed to be a soldier in the Canadian 
military recounted that he was being required to take classes as part of his service. In these classes, 
he said, “the girls are all feminists. The leadership is indoctrinating people to love fags and 
trannies. The Minister [of National Defense, Harjit Sajjan] is a fraud and a traitor. It’s disgusting.” 
He was deeply disillusioned and hated what was going on in the Canadian military, he said, 
although there were “still good guys left.” He went on to ask if anyone was interested in coming 
with him to a 48-hour militia boot camp to take place in a northern US state, at which participants 
would learn military skills and tactics. Several men were interested and indicated that they would 
talk to him after the meeting. The final speaker was Derek, who slurred about “chinks and niggers” 
and Zyklon B27 for several minutes before trailing off. 
 Although only about half of the attendees had spoken at the roundtable, it was cold and 
dark, and a lot of people were drunk and their attention spans were flagging. The circle broke up 
                                                 
27 The poison gas used in Nazi death camps. 
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as people began to drift off to talk in small groups. My ability to stay neutral waning dramatically, 
I politely told people that I needed to go. I walked a few blocks away to where I had locked my 
bike and released an enormous outpouring of tension by crossing half of Montreal in ten minutes. 
Arriving at my partner’s communal loft apartment – shared by half a dozen loving, compassionate 
artists and musicians, its DIY walls and homemade fixtures imbued with a decade of vibrant 
Montreal counterculture – I bolted down the meal they had prepared for me and basked in the 
atmosphere of safety and acceptance. I suddenly realized that my shoulders had been tensed and 
raised for hours, and with a sigh, I let them drop. 
 
Masculinity as Homosocial Enactment in the Alt-Right  
  
 Ferber (2004) writes that it is impossible to “understand [organized racism] without 
examining it through a gendered lens”. Far-right racist movements present themselves as the 
defenders of white men while these men are also “repeatedly attacked by the movement for 
becoming feminized (and unsettling the natural order) and are encouraged to become ‘real’ men” 
(Ferber 2004, 8). White masculinities, and therefore white men, are in a fraught position in such 
movements, with members perpetually needing to prove themselves to each other. This echoes 
cyclical claims of ‘crises of masculinity’ in contemporary Western societies, almost always figured 
as crises of white masculinity; white masculinity is frequently the object of idealisation and anxiety 
at the same time (Kimmel 2018; Connell 1995; Atkinson 2011).  
 I started the chapter off by noticing the tension in the postures of the two young men I met 
before the meet-up. This type of tension was palpable throughout the night. As I noted, the 
attendees were virtually all male. The gender dynamic was, in other words, one of male 
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homosociality. As such, the men were engaged in ‘homosocial enactment’, a term used by Kimmel 
(1994) to describe that aspect of hegemonic masculinity which relies on the attention and approval 
of other men in order to reproduce and maintain itself. Such homosocial enactments are performed 
more for the benefit of other men, and to establish a place in a masculine hierarchy, than to impress 
women. As such, they require an element of competition between men in order to be coherent, as 
hegemonic masculinity is always constructed in relation to subordinated masculinities (Connell 
1987). This dynamic of male posturing figured throughout the evening, with attendees’ grappling 
for a comfortable position within the group’s emerging hierarchies cutting through what Blee 
describes as the “forced conviviality” typical of racist gatherings (2003, 153).  
 In order to successfully navigate masculinity as a homosocial enactment, men need to 
appear as though they are embodying a given masculine ideal relatively effortlessly. “Masculinity 
as a homosocial enactment,” writes Kimmel, “is fraught with danger, with the risk of failure, and 
with intense relentless competition” (Kimmel 1994, 64); to be seen to be trying too hard is to fail, 
so making an effort to assert oneself in such a setting involves risk. If one’s attempt falls flat, one 
not only fails to reach one’s target of respect but in fact can incur a penalty as a poser or a try-hard. 
Andrei made repeated efforts to assert himself. He wore a head-to-toe fascist outfit, with haircut 
and jewelry to match; tried multiple times to tell a story meant to demonstrate his virility, expertise, 
and attachment to the fascist cause; and attempted to exhibit his general free-thinking edginess by 
namedropping other extremist political tendencies with which he had been involved in some way 
(e.g., Titoism; ‘anarcho’-capitalism; etc.). He failed to pick up on the loud signals coming from 
the men around him that his attempts were failing to impress and were, indeed, incurring a social 
penalty – he had try-hard written all over him. Derek was in a somewhat similar situation, making 
jokes about skinning people, talking about Zyklon B, and making incessant use of racial slurs and 
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alt-right in-group terminology like “cuck”. He, however, was less obviously trying to appear 
threatening or unique – seemingly more concerned with just seeming edgy and part of the group – 
and so incurred less of a penalty. 
 Greg, on the other hand, brought with him one of the most important props for an 
atmosphere of homosocially enacted masculinity: a woman (Connell 1987; 1995). He could make 
a threat (“this one’s mine, so fuck off, I’ll kill ya”) and it was both a successful joke that got a 
laugh and immediately credible as a real threat due to his muscular build, combat boots, and air of 
easy confidence. His behaviour and appearance successfully achieved the appearance of being 
‘natural’. Likewise, figures like Émile, who had a large following on neo-Nazi websites and was 
occasionally invited to give speeches at far-right events in other regions, did not need to make 
comments about gas chambers or murder in order to be heard and taken seriously; nor did he need 
to brag about his clout, as it was already well-established. In Émile’s case, things he has written 
online are in any case so much more extreme than any of Derek’s edgy slurs that his reputation as 
a risk-taking extremist needed no defending. Though Émile is quite a bit less imposing physically 
than some of the other attendees, he was not trying to make any non-credible claims to physical 
intimidation– no boots or shaved head, no obvious Nazi insignia, no tight T-shirt over bulging 
pectoral muscles – and so incurred no penalty on that front. 
 Viewed through this lens, much of what takes place at an alt-right meetup can be seen as 
posturing undertaken as part of the competition involved in a North American masculine 
homosocial dynamic. According to Kimmel (1994), generally speaking, men’s most primal fear is 
that other men will see that they are not who they are pretending to be; that their efforts to prove 
themselves are ultimately fraudulent. They are afraid of being unmasked as the sissy or the faggot. 
For this reason, many masculinities can be said to use misogyny and homophobia as organizing 
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principles: distance from womanhood and homosexuality is one barometer of success (David and 
Brannon, 1976). In order to stave off the terror, many men will engage in risky behaviours and go 
to great extremes to build up this distance.  
 Of course, increasingly large numbers of men are relatively unconcerned about being 
identified with femininity or queerness, while still retaining an attachment to masculine gender 
(Anderson 2012). Also, for those for whom this is a concern, this may not be because they 
personally feel that to be feminine or queer is to be fraudulent, but rather because they understand 
that to be feminine or queer can result in severe reprisals in the form of violence perpetrated by 
those who do. However, Kimmel is certainly right in that men – and indeed everyone – are often 
engaged in signaling gendered qualities that they feel to be desirable, downplaying qualities they 
don’t, and trying to make sure they don’t slip up in the delicate balancing act involved in getting 
the level of effort just right. In some circumstances this signaling may be relatively passive. In 
high-stakes male homosocial environments populated by young men, these signals can reach a 
fever pitch. 
 
Alt-Right Conceptualizations of Internal Masculine Social 
Hierarchies 
 
 The alt-right as an intellectual community has some understanding of these signals and has 
adopted theoretical languages for dealing with them and the male social jostling from which they 
spring. Based on my fieldwork, I have identified three separate but interrelated conceptualizations 
used by alt-right adherents regarding social hierarchies among relative peers, or internal masculine 
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social hierarchies. These three conceptualizations are the alpha/beta distinction, the high-
quality/low-quality distinction, and signaling theory.  
 
Alphas, Betas and the Manosphere 
 
 The alt-right has deep connections to the ‘pick-up artist’ (PUA) scene and the rest of the 
reactionary masculinist parts of the Manosphere. Masculinism is an ideology which justifies 
patriarchy, naturalizes certain perceived differences between men and women, assumes that 
heterosexuality is ‘normal’, unquestioningly accepts the dominant or traditional sexual division of 
labour, and “gives primacy to the belief that gender is not negotiable” (Brittan, 1989, p. 4).  The 
reactionary masculinism with which PUA thought is deeply embroiled is strongly influenced by 
‘evolutionary psychology’ (Van Valkenburgh 2018; O’Neill 2018). This perspective, rejected or 
criticized by the majority of scientists studying evolution today (Van Valkenburgh 2018; Fuentes 
2017), attempts to argue that an “adapted universal psychology” underlies all human behaviour 
and thought, and that direct conclusions can be drawn about various contemporary human 
behaviours based on hypothesized prehistorical environments, and vice versa (Fuentes 2017, 3). 
In the PUA community, male social behaviour is scrutinized zealously and combed over for clues 
regarding what women might like, which are interpreted according to an evolutionary psychology 
framework. A categorization system for male social hierarchy has been developed in which men 
are split into categories based primarily on their sexual success. This system functions as one 
“interpretive key” (Busher 2016, 78) for men affiliated with the alt-right, a way to frame and make 
sense of things. The classic distinction is alpha/beta, sometimes including omega, with an alpha 
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male signifying a man who is very sexually successful, beta describing mediocrity, and omega, 
when used, referring to those men who are exceedingly unsuccessful in their sexual life.  
 Critics of evolutionary psychology have noted that the field has a tendency to take 
‘commonsense’ beliefs from dominant Western discourses and uncritically legitimate them using 
evolutionary theories. A common critique is that scholars in the field tend to ignore the wild 
profusion of existing human social structures where these structures conflict with their theories, 
preferring to base their ideas on an idealized “calculus of genetic self-maximization” often derived 
from the study of non-human animals (McKinnon and Silverman 2005, 106). Another critique is 
that the conceptualization of human prehistory that forms the basis for much of the theorizing done 
by evolutionary psychologists is not supported by the available archeological and anthropological 
evidence. This conceptualization tends to be one of a Rousseauian, essentially pre-cultural ‘State 
of Nature’, in which all humans lived in tiny isolated bands of close kin until a few thousand years 
ago with the rise of agriculture. The evidence instead suggests that “from the very beginning, 
human beings were self-consciously experimenting with different social possibilities”, including 
relatively large communities, and mobilized labour on a large scale for ritual building purposes 
(Graeber and Wengrow 2018). A tenet of evolutionary biology, echoed by masculinist 
pseudoscience, is that prehistoric humans evolved in circumstances (tiny bands) under which 
women had less access to subsistence due to the necessities of childcare work, and therefore needed 
a man to access resources for them, while men needed to “attract fertile women and ensure their 
fidelity” (McKinnon and Silverman 2005, 108).  
 This vision naturalizes the single-earner patriarchal nuclear family while failing to account 
for such human cultural commonplaces as babysitters (grandparents, friends, siblings and older 
children taking care of younger children) and efficient food production labour undertaken by 
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women in pre-/non-agricultural societies. Food production by sex varies between contemporary 
hunter-gatherer societies, with women providing the majority of subsistence calories in many 
groups (Codding et al. 2011) and typically gathering steady but small harvests adequate to provide 
for themselves and offspring (Bird et al. 2009). 
 The common understanding of gender relations in the reactionary masculinist world is that 
women are hypergamous28 and Machiavellian by nature because they evolved under circumstances 
where men wandered in a state of prehistoric liberty, un-henpecked, while women tried desperately 
to find strong men to impregnate them with superior genes. Some versions of this origin myth of 
the sexes also involve the claim that, in evolutionary settings, women would often or even usually 
try to then cuckold an oblivious male who, though weaker and inferior, could be relied upon to 
provide for her. In doing so he would essentially be furnishing her and her offspring with 
prehistoric child support payments (see for example Tomassi 2014). This story retroactively 
applies contemporary male anxieties around sex, sexuality, and gender relations to an imagined 
evolutionary past, and in so doing normalizes masculinist tenets – such as very strong gender 
differentiation, male superiority, female unproductivity and domesticity -- as fundamentally 
natural qualities of the material world rather than culturally specific, socially constructed variables.  
 One of the male anxieties at issue here is reflected in the preferred alt-right insult for men: 
‘cuck’. This epithet, remarkably versatile in its layered connotations, is well worth a quick aside. 
Cuck is short for cuckold, a term with multiple interrelated meanings. The conventional meaning 
is a man who is unknowingly raising a child fathered by another man. A second meaning refers to 
a role within a kink dynamic, in which a woman has sex with another man while her partner, the 
‘cuckold’, watches or sometimes participates in a submissive and often homoerotic capacity. A 
                                                 
28 Hypergamy is the practice of mating with men of a higher social rank than one’s own.  
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third meaning refers to a category of pornography depicting variations on the above, often with a 
strong element of sexualized racial tension (or racialized sexual tension), as the scenario shown is 
frequently one in which the cuckold and his wife are white while the second man is black. As such, 
the insult manages to be simultaneously racist, sexist and homophobic, setting up a distinction 
between unambiguously straight, powerful, white men who would never consider allowing ‘their’ 
women to have sex with anyone else, let alone a man of another race, and weak, whipped men so 
pathetic and grovelling that they let black men have sex with their wives, and who even enjoy it, 
or pretend to. Importantly, it is a racist, sexist, homophobic insult leveled consciously at straight 
white men; they are not being accused of being homosexual, they are accused of possessing a 
hopelessly compromised heterosexuality. They are not accused of being like women, exactly, but 
rather of embodying such feeble masculinity that they cannot even control a woman, let alone 
stave off another man. They are not accused of being non-white, either; instead their whiteness is 
linked to their masculinity in such a way that the purported frailty of the latter is made to undermine 
the authenticity or purity of the former. The term constitutes a precise reflection of the far right’s 
preoccupation with “the twin threats of miscegenation and emasculation” (Berlet 2004, 30). As a 
metaphor, it is applied generously to opponents of the alt-right, implying that they are letting 
themselves or their country be symbolically cuckolded by Jews and people of colour – as is 
reflected in the alt-right’s term of choice for the mainstream right, ‘cuckservative’.29 The slang 
word ‘based’ (an adjective meaning cool, strong, independent) is often used as a kind of opposite 
of ‘cuck’. 
 Reactionary masculinists argue that women are naturally attracted to powerful, aggressive 
males because they evolved to be that way. In a male-supremacist tract called The Misandry 
                                                 
29 The alt-right’s fictional/meme country of Kekistan is often depicted as being at war with ‘Cuckistan’. 
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Bubble, listed as ‘required reading’ on the sidebar of the reactionary masculinist PUA Reddit.com 
forum The Red Pill (TRP), the author imagines a “pre-civilized norm of alpha men monopolizing 
3 or more young women each, replacing aging ones with new ones, while the masses of beta men 
fight over a tiny supply of surplus/aging women” (Khan 2010). This scenario echoes neo-Nazi 
David Lane's imagined “primitive and natural society” in which “the strongest or otherwise most 
successful male captures the most females and the most desirable females” (Dobratz and Shanks-
Meile 2004, 126). Both visions seem to be based on the dominance hierarchies of gorillas and 
dismiss the staggering variety of sexual, relational, and kinship models practiced by humans across 
the globe and through time, all of which, like all human institutions, are “mediated by cultural 
understandings” (McKinnon and Silverman 2005, 113). 
 Not all men can be equally powerful and aggressive, so there are ‘alphas’ who embody 
these natural masculine traits most perfectly, and ‘betas’ and ‘omegas’ who cannot. In such a 
vision, women are assumed to be voraciously sexually attracted to alphas, flinging themselves at 
large, strong, square-jawed men who display the most evidence of domination and power; they 
“pursue wealthy and attractive male partners in what is considered to be an epiphenomenal 
expression of their material genetic imperatives” (Van Valkenbergh 2018, 6). Women are by 
contrast are only mildly attracted to betas, mostly for their stability and status as walking wallets, 
and to omegas not at all. Estimates by reactionary masculinists of women’s own understanding of 
this dynamic range from their being quite oblivious to it to their consciously hiding it from men as 
part of what amounts to a conspiratorial ‘sexual strategy’ disguised by feminism (Van Valkenburg 
2018).  
 This understanding of heterosexual relations is shared with pick-up artists by other 
masculinist and male-supremacist tendencies such as Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) and 
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the separate but related ‘incel’ phenomenon. The difference between these tendencies lies in large 
part in the solutions they propose for the problems they perceive in heterosexual relations. Posts 
on the main MGTOW forum, goingyourownway.com, reveal that due to what users perceive to be 
the fundamentally parasitic nature of women, their predilection for cuckolding their partners, their 
universal indifference toward regular beta men, and the general state of runaway matriarchy 
prevailing in the modern world, users think the best solution is to avoid women altogether. By 
contrast, one of the main incel forums, reddit.com/r/braincels, shows that incels believe that they 
are ‘omegas’, not really through any actions or behaviours of their own but rather through purely 
physical and immutable characteristics such as weak jaws or thin wrists, as opposed to what they 
call ‘Chads’ (alphas) and ‘normies’ (betas). They do not believe there is any way out of this 
situation and blame women as a class for incels’ lack of success in dating, seeing it as evidence of 
cruel and selfish shallowness on women’s part. Mainwhile, pick-up artist ideology, particularly in 
the form taken by The Red Pill, hinges largely on the idea that men who are ‘naturally’ beta males 
(and even omegas in certain circumstances) can attract women by fooling them into thinking that 
they are alphas (Van Valkenbergh 2018). They believe that this can be accomplished through 
methods usually classified by outsiders as tactics of grooming and abuse, such as purposeful 
physical boundary-crossing, insults and other displays of dominance, and the repeated extension 
and retraction of affection designed to confuse a woman and keep her emotionally off-balance.  
 Alt-right adherents frequently use the alpha/beta terminology and employ understandings 
of gender drawn directly from the positions I have outlined above. The putative primeval 
distinction between alphas and betas is assumed to continue into the present day, and the traits 
which are thought to attract or repel women are assumed to continue to correlate broadly with 
success or mediocrity in contemporary society. As such, even though the categories involved are 
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usually figured in terms of women’s attention, they remain basically homosocial, in that women 
are not actually understood by reactionary masculinists to be social agents in the same way that 
men are.  
 In the alt-right, alphas are seen as natural leaders, but their status is relative to other men 
and the place of women in the equation is essentially as a sort of natural ‘points system’ with which 
their superiority can be measured. Betas are ‘regular guys’ who can either hack the gender system 
through ‘taking the red pill’, and enjoy sexual success, or wallow in their brainwashed blue-pill 
cuckoldry. Omegas are men who have essentially failed at masculinity; men who, in Kimmel’s 
understanding, have been unmasked and revealed to be incapable of embodying their manhood 
successfully, as measured by the attention (or lack thereof) of desirable women. The term ‘omega’ 
is routinely levelled as a kind of total dismissal disqualifying someone from participation in the 
affairs of real men: a pitiful wretch. Some alt-right writers employ even more elaborate 
classifications, such as popular author ‘Vox Day’, real name Theodore Beale, who advocates a 
similar system but with seven categories instead, running all the way to lambda30 (Vox Day 2011).  
These systems of classification have been criticized from within the alt-right. As a far-right 
movement, the alt-right generally considers rigid, naturalized social hierarchies to be a good in 
and of themselves, so the notion of categorizing men in such a manner is not itself typically 
attacked. However, the heterosocial connotations of the alpha/beta pick-up artist social 
categorization system have been criticized as being not masculinist or homosocial enough. James 
                                                 
30 The definition for his ‘sigma’ category, incidentally, is amusingly indicative of how many pick-up artists would 
presumably like to see themselves:  “Sigma: The outsider who doesn't play the social game and manage [sic] to win 
at it anyhow. The sigma is hated by alphas because sigmas are the only men who don't accept or at least 
acknowledge, however grudgingly, their social dominance. (NB: Alphas absolutely hate to be laughed at and a 
sigma can often enrage an alpha by doing nothing more than smiling at him.) Everyone else is vaguely confused by 
them. In a social situation, the sigma is the man who stops in briefly to say hello to a few friends accompanied by a 
Tier 1 girl that no one has ever seen before. Sigmas like women, but tend to be contemptuous of them. They are 
usually considered to be strange. Gammas often like to think they are sigmas, failing to understand that sigmas are 
not social rejects, they are at the top of the social hierarchy despite their refusal to play by its rules.”  
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Lawrence, another popular alt-right author, writes that both the original alpha/beta system and 





 Top tier: effortlessly 
masculine, very 
attractive to women 
Middle tier: average 
masculinity, not 
unattractive 
Low tier: unsuccessful 
masculinity, actively 
unattractive 
Red Pill Alpha Beta Omega, etc 
Incel Chad Normie Incel 
 
Figure 3. Various versions of the alpha/beta hierarchy. Note that to be intelligible, they all rely at 
least in part on a man’s relationship to women. Hypermasculinity often requires a tense 
combination of homosocial enactment and enforced heterosexuality. 
 
Signaling Theory and ‘White Sharia’ 
 
 In another one of his articles, James Lawrence (2017), mentioned above, discusses a second 
theoretical ground employed by the alt-right to understand social hierarchies: signaling theory. I 
mentioned this term on page 62, when Joe told me that the PUAs on The Red Pill no longer 
‘countersignaled’ the alt-right much. Connelly et al. (2011) explain that signaling theory has been 
most extensively theorized in economics, where signaling is understood as a method of reducing 
information asymmetry between economic actors. For example, if two firms of differing quality 
have access to information about their own quality, but prospective investors do not, there is a 
difference in the respective access to information enjoyed by the investors and the representatives 
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of the firms. The two firms can then use various tangible symbols of quality, such as financial 
records, as signals to provide investors with information concerning something more intangible, 
their quality itself, with the goal of getting investors interested in putting money down. The higher-
quality firm, having more convincing evidence, would be capable of sending a more convincing 
signal. Another example provided by Connelly et al. is that of a prospective employee signaling 
her ‘quality’ by providing an employer with proof that she has had an extensive higher education. 
Feltovitch, Harbaugh and To (2002) note that an important element in signaling is the cost of the 
signal; often an effective signal will be quite costly, as can be the case with higher education. 
 Since effective signals are costly, one might expect therefore that high-status, high-quality, 
or wealthy signalers would send the costliest signals, since they are most able to afford them. 
Feltovitch, Harbaugh and To argue that this is not the case. Instead, the highest-status signalers 
can rely on other information about themselves – their current job, background, reputation and so 
forth – being passively diffused into the signaling environment, effectively differentiating them 
from the lowest-status signalers pre-emptively. At that point, they can shift their focus toward 
differentiating themselves instead from the medium-status signalers. Since the medium-status 
actors cannot rely on background information as much, they are compelled to signal – and the 
highest-status actors can differentiate themselves by refusing to signal, which is called 
countersignaling. Feltovitch et al. (2002) give the examples of a bright student declining to answer 
the easy questions in class, considering them embarrassing, while mediocre students might jump 
at the opportunity; or a highly-respected person refusing to dignify slander with a response while 
the average person might angrily defend herself. This economic understanding of signaling theory 




‘the behavior where agents with the highest level of a given property invest less into proving it than individuals 
with a medium level of the same property’ [citing Wikipedia]. In other words, it means ‘showing off by refusing 
to show off’ – and thereby differentiating yourself from those who have to show off, in order to distinguish 
themselves from those who have nothing to show off. (2017) 
 
Within the alt-right, accusations of countersignaling are widespread, and do not always conform 
to the standard definition, notes Lawrence (2017). I noticed this myself; once, Joe told me that a 
demonstration against refugees which had been organized with the attendance of all the major local 
far-right groups in mind had been ‘countersignaled’ by La Meute, had faltered as a result, and had 
eventually been canceled. Apparently La Meute had gotten wind of the fact that the optics of the 
demonstration could make them appear racist, and had pulled out in order to protect the non-racist 
image they attempt to cultivate. It is difficult to see how this would qualify as countersignaling 
according to the standard definition; in this case it seemed to be more about disavowing something 
because being associated with it would have been contrary to strategic goals. However, as 
Lawrence (2017) points out, the occasional misuse of the term does not mean there is not real 
countersignaling going on within the movement. Further, there is also a kind of sneaky mimicry 
of real countersignaling which can take place, wherein an agent of lower status might mimic a 
countersignal in order to appear like an agent of higher status. He gives the example of someone 
who might countersignal words like ‘cuck’, loudly refusing to use them, “not because they have a 
good reason why they are no longer useful, but simply because they are becoming too widely used, 
like an obscure  band that commits the sin of getting popular” (2017, emphasis his). Or, he writes, 
someone might countersignal the alt-right as a whole, refusing to affiliate with it, not because they 
disagree but so that they can “look like deep original philosophers whose beliefs cannot be 
contained in any one political movement” (2017). This is a kind of false countersignaling which 
Lawrence believes can be dismissed as narcissistic posturing.  
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 However, a more constructive form of true countersignaling can and should exist within 
the movement, Lawrence (2017) claims. The purpose of this type of countersignaling is two-fold; 
first, to conserve social capital instead of spending it gratuitously, just as an aristocrat might keep 
his money close and thus be able to leave it to his children, while a nouveau-riche might constantly 
feel the need to signal his status by laying piles of cash on the figurative table and end up broke. 
Second, by countersignaling aspects of alt-right messaging that are particularly attractive to low-
status men, high-status men (among whom Lawrence, unsurprisingly, appears to count himself) 
could distinguish themselves, which for Lawrence constitutes a good in and of itself. 
 Lawrence (2017) gives the example of the ‘White Sharia’ meme31 as an example of just 
such countersignal-worthy messaging. ‘White Sharia’, which is what attendees shouted at the only 
woman present at the meetup in order to stop her from talking, was described to me as “a joke, but 
not a joke”32. The meme is based on a misunderstanding of Islamic sharia law, a broad range of 
schools and practices which include progressive as well as conservative traditions. Sharia law is 
conflated in this meme with practices like purdah (a form of strict gender segregation traditional 
to the Persian world and northern India, including among some Hindu groups) and schools of 
thought such as Salafism and Deobandi, the puritanical revivalist sects of Sunni Islam from which 
Saudi and Taliban legal interpretations are drawn. Sharia in the alt-right formulation refers only to 
social and sexual control over women, not to any system of rules which would affect men. 
Originally developed by an alt-right blogger calling himself Sacco Vandal, the idea is that: 
 
                                                 
31 I, like Lawrence, am using the term ‘meme’ to describe not only online image macros themselves but also the 
information or concepts that they successfully spread. In this case there are classic image macro-style internet 
memes about ‘white sharia’ but there is also the concept of white sharia itself, a joke/not-joke spread being spread 
by alt-right internet users. 
32 A good description, I have found, for a lot of alt-right content intended to shock. 
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calls for our people to adopt a sharia-like form of extreme patriarchy are an effective tactic because […] it is the 
only living example of extreme patriarchy left in the world today […] It is real, alive, and visible to everyone, 
glaring at us and taunting us for being alienated, atomized cosmopolitans. And let’s be clear: our race and our 
people will disappear from the face of the Earth unless we implement a radical, rigid form of extreme, regimented 
patriarchy, even more extreme than what we in the West had in the past. Either we appropriate the successful 
tactics of those of our enemies who are winning against us due to their more patriarchal cultural forms, or we 
continue to lose the war. I don’t like Muslims, but if they had invented the wheel, I would have no qualms about 
stealing it from them. (Vandal 2017) 
 
According to Vandal, “extremely edgy and multi-layered irony” is the best way to reach American 
youth; the White Sharia meme is both “an extreme form of edgy and ironic humor [and] a distant 
beacon of the patriarchy we as a people need and will one day have. It is both a rallying cry for the 
disillusioned young men in our movement as well as their guiding light” (2017). The ‘humour’ 
derives from the unexpectedness of white supremacists advocating Islamic religious law and from 
the shocking images such a combination conjures. The phrase is also satirical insofar as it uses 
hyperbolic imagery to mock perceived contradictions in Western progressive ideologies, which 
are thought by adherents of the alt-right to simultaneously support feminism and, through tolerance 
for immigration, repressive foreign religious law (Lawrence 2017). By calling for sharia law to 
govern white women, those pushing the meme see themselves as humorously revealing the 
hypocrisy of progressives who, in their view, are happy to allow sharia law to flourish in Western 
countries. These progressives are seen as being too foolish, cowardly or hoodwinked to 
acknowledge that they are permitting the enslavement of ‘their’ women by foreign invaders 
(migrants). It may also be understood to be satirical in that it parodies the mindlessly evil Nazi 
archetype held by many people in the mainstream; ‘only an idiot would believe the joke, believe 
that we really want sharia law’.  
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 Of course, as Vandal makes clear, this joke is not a joke. It is true that its originators may 
not want to copy Islamic law in a literal way, since they are not Muslims and see themselves in 
opposition to Islam. However, the disquieting images conjured when one is confronted with a neo-
Nazi calling for ‘white sharia’ indeed reflect more or less what the pushers of the meme want, 
since, as with other white supremacists, they feel that the relative independence of women from 
men in the contemporary West threatens the racist project (Perry 2004). The policies underlying 
the ‘irony’ include repealing female suffrage, widely understood in the alt-right to have been 
disastrous for the West; ending no-fault divorce and removing women from the workplace, since 
the economic dependence of women on husbands and fathers is seen by the male-supremacist right 
to be a primary mechanism of control of which white men have been robbed by feminism; 
repealing any and all legislation motivated by an egalitarian spirit, since for these men, 
egalitarianism is a pernicious myth; and for some, literally reducing women as a class to sexual 
servitude enforced by a male-supremacist fascist state. The Southern Poverty Law Center reports 
that in a (now-deleted) blog post, Vandal explained that “we have to strip females of suffrage and 
most if not all political, legal, and economic power. […] Our men need harems, and the members 
of those harems need to be baby factories” (Kelley 2017). This vision of harems for the foot-
soldiers of the alt-right echoes both the ISIS policy of rewarding fighters with sex slaves and the 
misogynist dreams of older racist figures33.  
 Lawrence counsels ‘high-quality’ men to countersignal the ‘White Sharia’ meme, but is 
not the only alt-right thinker to have a problem with it. The dramatic disagreements about the 
meme on the far right played out in the comments below a video made by female YouTuber and 
                                                 
33 For example, David Lane, originator of the ’14 words’, wrote a novel entitled KD Rebel in which racist 




white nationalist PhilosophiCat entitled ‘Watch Me Countersignal White Sharia’. Take the 
following comment thread [all sic]: 
 
Kelley: The White Sharia meme is meant to expose the hypocrisy of liberal, White women, who to be blunt, are 
the albatross of Western Civilization. They are the single class of people who have turned their back on the very 
values & identity that have created them. No other group has ever done such a thing collectively. Women like you 
have their voices nullified because liberal women have no values, no principles, no dignity, etc They are the reason 
White race is endangered. And as far as I understand, White Sharia is meant to convey what a pathetic mess these 
women are by rubbing their noses in their own shit with this meme, which is reflecting their values back at them. 
It puts these women in a position to either accept it as a valid policy or admit that their entire world view is a 
concoction of Cultural Marxists. 
 
PhilosophiCat: They are attacking white nationalist women, and the women who are the alleged targets of the 
meme don't even know about it. Yeah, so effective... not.  
 
TRUECONSERVATIVEtm: They wouldn't be attacking you if you just accepted that Women should have their 
roles reverted to the pre-1960's.  
 
Vandal FashKat: PhilosophiCat yea women who are willing to breed white babies and return to the home where 
they belong do their part of saving the white race will not be getting attacked, it's just the clueless feminist thots34 
who are refusing to breed and literally genociding us for the sake of having a career. true whit nationalist women 
are safe, its just bitches who don't know their place.  
 
roksolana 1505: Kelley Thomas Take your "white sharia" and shove it straight up your ass! White women will 
NEVER "submit" to you.  
 
salochin999: white sharia is a pro-Islam meme designed by anti-whites for divide and rule (PhilosophiCat, 2017)35 
 
 
Clearly, the idea is not accepted by all within the alt-right. Some object to it on the grounds that it 
seems too pro-Islamic, others that it takes anti-feminism too far, into territory which divides the 
white race or disrespects white women. Some strongly believe that the whole thing is a counter-
intelligence operation run by intelligence agencies and/or Jews. Its defenders typically retort that 
it is obviously a joke, but then, to the frustration of their colleagues in the movement and the 
confusion of everyone else, continue to act as though it is quite serious: one poster called 
                                                 
34 ‘Thot’ stands for ‘That Hoe Over There’, and is a slur, synonymous with ‘slut’, which has been appropriated 
‘ironically’ by the alt-right. 
35 The video has since been removed by YouTube; in the bibliography I have included a link to an archived version 
of the page. 
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Starfighter_Alpha_88, in a comment under Vandal’s (2017) article, writes, “Take one look into 
Nordic societies, and tell me with a straight face (I dare you!) that the women there don’t need a 
very stern punishment, beginning with a period of forced burqa-fication.” The way it was leveled 
at the woman present at the meet-up certainly suggested a solid degree of seriousness. Some agree 
that the meme is useful as a barbed joke, but also that the concept of white sharia isn’t European 
enough; another comment under Vandal’s article reads, 
 
The only good thing about this meme is that it trolls alt-lite types who are anti-Islam only because it is anti-
democratic, anti-feminist, anti-gay, etc. The problem with the Middle-Eastern invasion of Europe isn’t an anti-
liberal religious fundamentalism, it’s that these people aren’t us. That strength is also [the meme’s] greatest 
weakness. These people aren’t us, and Islamic brutality is fundamentally Semetic [sic] and anti-European.  
  
 James Lawrence takes a different tack. For him, one problem with the meme is aesthetic – 
the optics are bad. Another, apparently, is that it is misinformed – according to Lawrence, the 
gender system in Saudi Arabia actually privileges women, unlike what feminists would have you 
believe (2017). But most importantly, he argues, the sort of unmediated rage at women expressed 
by the meme and its pushers tends to attract the kind of men he does not want to be associated 
with. He explains,  
 
what happens with ideological focal points that try to focus male anger squarely on women – as is the case with 
White Sharia, which provides an outlet for all sorts of violent and vengeful fantasies – is that they tend to fill up 
with males of objectively low human quality, who use them as therapeutic outlets for their unproductive whingeing 
and ranting. (No, this does not mean that everyone promoting the meme right now is a resentful omega male – 
only that such people will gradually cluster around the meme, and in time make it toxic to everyone else.) 
(Lawrence 2017) 
 
These ‘males of objectively low human quality’ have a perfectly good point, Lawrence maintains. 
They are frustrated at the “the degraded behaviour of Western women, who have been liberated 
from any need for husbands and fathers by a managerial state that feeds them on the requisitioned 
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wealth of millions of men” (2017). The argument here, also a staple of the ‘incel’ phenomenon, is 
that since women are largely no longer dependant on husbands and other male family members, 
they can now participate in a sexual culture in which they exercise choice – or depending on who 
you ask, biological imperatives – in who they sleep with and who, or if, they marry. As a result, 
men who feel themselves to be unattractive to the majority of women (such as, perhaps, internet 
neo-Nazis) feel cheated out of sex. More specifically, they feel cheated out of what they perceive 
as the right to a wife whose sexuality and labour they can access, and the right to exercise authority 
over other female family members as well. Lawrence specifies that this anger deserves attention, 
writing, “I am not saying that we should be too ‘high-minded’ to give a voice to male social and 
sexual frustration, still less that we should follow sneering females and their bitch-boys in blaming 
all such frustration on the deficiencies of males themselves” (2017).   
 Thus, the problem with these ‘resentful omegas’ is not that they are resentful – it is that 
they focus all of their resentment on women, instead of competing with other men for control over 
women. For Lawrence, the whole issue of women’s ‘degraded behaviour’ (free choice in sex and 
marriage) can be sidestepped. According to the male-supremacist thought used in Red Pill/PUA 
culture, it is inevitable that women should behave in such a way, as they are scarcely more than 
genetic automatons, in thrall to their reproductive imperatives, and sexually insatiable – for certain 
kinds of ‘Alpha’ men, anyway – as a result. As one common Red Pill saying goes, AWALT – ‘All 
Women Are Like That’. Instead of being enraged at the perfectly normal behaviour of women, 
which for him makes as little sense as being enraged at the natural behaviour of an animal, 
Lawrence feels that men need to engage with the ‘real’ problem: 
 
What men can do well, and very seriously, is to fight other men for possession of women – which is why the Alt-
Right should, as I have suggested, focus instead on the male managerial elite that has made all the excesses of 
Western women possible by usurping the position of husbands and fathers, and channel male anger against this 
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elite into the general project of cutting our people loose from the Cosmopolitan managerial state. […] One way to 
make use of the anti-managerialist view would be to consciously allow it to become a focus of 
countersignalling: by choosing to focus less on the evils of women, and focusing more on our struggle against the 
managerial elite that enables these evils, higher-quality men could differentiate themselves from the morass of 
sour grapes without backsliding into a pro-feminist point of view. [italics his] (2017) 
 
 Lawrence is arguing that disavowing (countersignaling) the White Sharia meme could 
serve a useful purpose: not to uphold the liberty and humanity of women, or female comrades in 
the struggle, or even one’s sisters and mothers, but rather to distinguish oneself from deficient 
males who are simply motivated by jealous resentment. The basic premise of the white sharia 
meme is correct for Lawrence – white women should be stripped of basic rights and freedoms and 
forced into marriages enforced by an authoritarian state in order to give white men access to sex 
and facilitate a racially-motivated baby boom. The real issue with the meme is that losers have 
flocked to it. They do not understand that the real target should be the ‘Cosmopolitan managerial 
state’, not women themselves, who are presumably barely aware of what they are doing and 
anyway are property to be fought over by men, not really agents in their own right. These losers 
are giving the movement a bad name, but happily are able to provide the service of acting as a 
backdrop against which high-quality men like Lawrence can stand out. 
 Interestingly, if one adopts the lens of signaling theory, the whole ‘White Sharia’ 
phenomenon can itself be seen as an attempt at countersignaling in the first place. Men who are 
struggling to form fulfilling relationships with women – the “dregs of the sexual marketplace”, to 
quote Lawrence (2017) – are essentially removing themselves from that marketplace by denying 
that it should exist. In this sense they are like the office drone employee in the 1999 film Office 
Space, who, having been accidentally hypnotized into not caring about consequences anymore, 
wins over interviewers sent in to downsize the company by showing up in jeans and calmly telling 
them that he hates his job and does only a few hours of real work a week, leading to the downsizers 
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enthusiastically marking him as definite management material. These men are proclaiming 
themselves to be so masculine, so resistant to the soft, blue-pilled, feminized and feminist 
mainstream, that unlike all the other peacocks strutting around showing off their plumage to 
impress the females of the species, they are completely indifferent to the desires of women. In fact, 
not only do they not care about the desires of women, but they actively oppose those desires and 
declare them to be worthless at best and dangerous at worst. In fact, not only do they oppose the 
desires of women, but they just hate women in general – and make misogynist memes as 
“therapeutic outlets for their unproductive whingeing and ranting”, to quote Lawrence again 
(2017). 
 If these men are motivated in their misogyny primarily through failing at the aspect of 
mainstream masculinity which demands sexual prowess, they may have a strong fear of being 
named the faggot or the sissy. They would therefore have a strong incentive to overplay their hand 
with things like the white sharia meme. I say overplay because while the likelihood of a wave of 
ultra-reactionary revolutions resulting in a post-feminist new world order is up for debate, it does 
not take a social sciences degree to guess that in the current mainstream climate, the likelihood of 
“getting laid” or gaining respect by advocating for the enslavement of women is probably low. 
However, in an ideologically boundaried homosocial environment like an alt-right 
meeting, taking a hard line – an exaggeratedly hard line in some cases – can win you status points. 
Lawrence points out that far-right activists with less-than-glowing pasts can “signal maximum 
anti-Semitism – you’ll gain some status as ‘the guy with the hardest line on the Jews’, even though 
your words about Jews on the internet are not worth a fraction of someone else’s functioning 
organisation” (2017). This goes some way to explaining my informant Derek’s comments about 
anti-Semitism being a sort of hook with which to reel in new recruits who may not be the most 
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intellectually sophisticated. Lawrence mentions that while becoming vocally anti-Jewish can be 
socially costly for people who want to appear respectable, “this step is taken much more easily in 
the case of a loser in life who has nothing left to lose, and this is reinforced by the fact that the 
Jewish Question is easily grasped by duller people while other aspects of the Alt-Right are not” 
(2017). Derek may have been trying to articulate something like this perspective. In any case, 
being able to credibly take a hard line can be useful for an individual attempting to bolster his 
social standing. 
 Lawrence’s critique reveals a further, more complicated dynamic: that individuals in a 
given signaling environment may struggle over the ‘right’ to signal or countersignal. Connelly et 
al. note that  
 
if a signaler does not have the underlying quality associated with the signal but believes the benefits of signaling 
outweigh the costs of producing the signal, the signaler may be motivated to attempt false signaling. If this were 
to happen, misleading signals would proliferate until receivers learn to ignore them. Thus, to maintain their 
effectiveness, the costs of signals must be structured in such a way that dishonest signals do not pay. (2011, 45) 
 
Low-status men pushing the white sharia meme are using false signaling, since they are 
overplaying their hands. It can be seen as a gambit used to accumulate social ‘points’, but one 
which ultimately rests on a false representation of one’s real ‘underlying quality’. This 
representation is false because a low-status man actually cannot ‘afford’ the signal he is 
countersignaling. To put it in terms of one of the examples given earlier, he is like a student 
refusing to answer a teacher’s questions not because he is too bright to bother but because he does 
not know the answers. A man who believes himself to be capable of attracting women regardless 
of what he says believes that he can ‘afford’ extreme misogyny as a countersignal, while a man 
who is motivated by resentment over his lack of sexual success knows that he is signaling falsely.  
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 Over time, such false signaling could result in a degradation of overall credibility for all 
individuals engaged in that signal or countersignal. Other men in the alt-right, who are often 
acutely aware of their position in the hierarchy and see themselves as ‘high-quality’, wish to 
maintain the credibility of their own signals and countersignals, which is threatened by the false 
signaling and false countersignaling. Therefore, it makes sense for them to ensure that the cost of 
false signaling is high. One way to do this is related to the observation I made earlier in this chapter, 
that failed attempts to assert oneself in male homosocial environments can incur a heavy penalty; 
men can put each other down directly when they perceive their peers to be vulnerable to having 
their credibility questioned, just as was done to Andrei. This is equivalent to calling out false 
signaling. Another way is refuse to engage in a particular signal, just what Lawrence is arguing for 
in relation to the ‘white sharia’ meme – in effect, countersignaling the false countersignaling. 
 
 
Topic: Heterosexual Relations Signal Countersignal 
True 










Figure 4. Lawrence’s vision of an alt-right signaling environment focused on the topic of 
heterosexual relations. Mid- and low-tier men both attempt to signal their attractiveness to women, 
but low-tier men are signaling falsely. Bottom-tier men falsely countersignal the whole topic via 
the ‘white sharia’ meme. Top-tier men, through their silence, legitimately countersignal not only 
the men trying to appear attractive (the mid- and low-tier men) but also the men trying to appear 




High-Quality versus Low-Quality Men 
 
 A set of terms used frequently by my informants is high-quality versus low-quality men, 
as in Lawrence’s article where he refers to “resentful omega males” as “males of objectively low 
human quality” (2017). Quality is one of the most direct and severe ways to differentiate between 
human beings. It is also, in its ambiguity, a versatile framework. One’s ‘quality’ is often seen as 
something over which one has only a limited degree of control, so the term connotes 
insurmountable hierarchies in keeping with the far right’s penchant for biological determinism. It 
therefore ties in neatly with eugenic discourses which rank human ‘races’ based on their inherent 
‘quality’ and echoes the language often used by racists around IQ. (It is important to note however 
that I have not seen the term often leveled against non-white men or against women, who seem to 
not often be ranked on the same scale as white men, being seen as fundamentally incommensurate.) 
At the same time, a strong streak of self-improvement rhetoric also runs through the alt-right. 
Adherents typically like to see themselves as people who have transcended hardship to arrive at a 
place of rightful status that was waiting for them all along. In this sense, calling someone low-
quality can have simultaneous (or competing) connotations of inherent inferiority and insufficient 
will-power to become high-quality. In using the term, a sense of value-free neutrality can also be 
leveraged – we’re not saying you’re a bad person, we’re just saying that you’re low-quality; it’s 
no one’s fault. It is in this sense that the term is used in economics, such as in the examples 
concerning signaling theory given earlier in the chapter. A disproportionate number of the men I 
interviewed had ties to finance, banking and business, and I suspect that at least part of the term’s 
popularity among them derives from this fact even if it is also used by alt-right men with no 
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discernible tie to economics. Different actors within the alt-right have different conceptions of 
what constitutes a ‘low-quality’ peer.  
 Out of all of my informants, Joe, an image-conscious man in his early 30s with a 
background in finance, uses the terms low- and high-quality most frequently. Though he described 
the Montreal alt-right group to me as a kind of social club, I never saw him acting in a particularly 
friendly manner toward anyone. He rarely smiled, and when he drank he became more impatient 
and bossy with his comrades rather than more laid-back or jovial. Blee (2003) notes that in racist 
groups activists often feel a sense of contradiction between their striving for an impossible Aryan 
purity and the more banal reality of their comrades, who sometimes are far from embodying these 
ideals. For Joe and many others within the movement, there is a constant tension between the 
attempts of more strategically-minded men to build up what they openly refer to as a ‘brand’ for 
their groups, and what they see as the frustratingly tone-deaf, crude, or divisive behaviour of many 
of their colleagues. The class divide within the group often makes itself felt along this axis of 
tension. Those with whom Joe disagrees are usually deemed low-quality, while he and his 
confidantes are considered high-quality. People whose displays of masculinity are questionable 
are also low-quality. He is critical of people he considers low-quality getting too close to positions 
of authority within the group. Anyone hoping to find comradeship and belonging in the alt-right 
group, thought by most scholars to be an incentive for joining far-right outfits (Blee 2003; Busher 
2016; Caiani et al. 2012; Bjørgo 2009), would be unlikely to find them in Joe.  
 Joe seems to have little respect for most activists outside his immediate cadre. He told me 
about meeting the men running the then-popular Canadian alt-right podcast This Hour Has 88 
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Minutes36, telling me that they were “low-quality” and “short, fat nerds who won’t take any risks” 
and “have no balls”. His view of quality is often couched in classist language around appearance. 
He described members of the Traditionalist Workers Party (TWP), a now largely defunct US 
fascist organization, as low-quality as well: “The super fashy TWP stuff isn’t good optics. It 
doesn’t have a lot of resonance. They’re dirty and they’re tattooed and they’re waving swastikas 
around. Basically they’re LARPing37.” He described Québec City-based fascist group Atalante in 
similar, but slightly more sympathetic terms: “They have that skinhead thing going on, the 
skinhead styling. Which we don’t like. But the leader is very ideological so they have that. And 
for them the trashy thing is okay, because they’re a regional Québec group. Québécois people are 
trashy and have tattoos and everything.” He recounted that at a major regional alt-right conference 
he had attended, a neo-Nazi skinhead with many visible tattoos had shown up and been ejected 
due to his image. “Skinheads,” Joe told me, “are broken people with problems. Hanging out with 
skinheads means you lose the air of reasonableness.” Of the regional conference, “there were three 
high-quality guys there,” he told me, and then named himself and two of the leader figures in the 
Montreal group. 
 Joe’s distaste for ‘low-quality’ activists was not confined to people in other groups. He 
spoke approvingly of a new rule instituted for the alt-right meet-ups forbidding attendees from 
getting drunk (though he himself was drinking almost every time I saw him), saying that it was 
contributing to an atmosphere which was not serious enough. He said that in some other far-right 
groups, particularly ones associated with the Identitarian movement, which have a strong emphasis 
                                                 
36 ‘88’ being a common neo-Nazi code, wherein the number 8 stands for the 8th letter of the alphabet, therefore 
signifying ‘HH’ for ‘Heil Hitler’. The name is a play on This Hour Has 22 Minutes, a popular Canadian news 
comedy show. 
37 LARP stands for Live-Action Role Play, a recreational activity in which participants don mock armour and 
weapons and enact elaborate fantasy battles. It is associated with nerd culture and is used as a pejorative meaning 
play-acting, not to be taken seriously, etc. 
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on optics, “they’d kick you out immediately if you got drunk and started sieg heiling.” He noted 
that some people he knew in the alt-right were ‘low-quality’ because they had done things like 
impregnate teenagers. Racist activists sometimes lose the ability to work due to repercussions and 
are drawn into poverty (Blee 2003, 9). Joe calls this “welfare activism”, the state of affairs arising 
when such a person decides to live on welfare and spend more time doing activism. His disdain 
for welfare recipients was tempered slightly in the case of fellow racist activists, “but only if they 
are healthy and fit.” At one meet-up, I saw him – and nearly everyone else – completely ignore 
one overweight man who showed up. This man was a classic stereotype of someone ‘from the 
internet’ – big, slouching, in an extra-large sweater and too-baggy jeans, with glasses, acne, greasy 
hair, and huge headphones hung around his neck. Virtually no one spoke to him and he lurked 
uncomfortably around the margins of the group, looking painfully awkward. Though the deep 
internet culture of 4chan, 8chan, Reddit and so on are an important part of the alt-right’s makeup, 
such an ‘omega’ masculinity was avoided as though it might be contagious, perhaps being seen as 
not looking serious or masculine enough.  
There were also people like Bernard, who could get uncomfortably passionate about his 
beliefs. During my last interview with him, Joe told me that he had “put him [Bernard] in his place” 
for getting too preachy about religion – a lapse into low quality that threatened the status quo of 
the group. Bernard, a militantly Christian fascist, talked about quality in a different way, repeatedly 
using a race-based analogy to describe low-quality men. He also tended to equate low quality with 
degeneracy, an important frame used in far-right, especially fascist, discourse. Fascism stresses 
‘palingenetic ultranationalism’, calling for national rebirth or cultural reversal from a state of 
having been brought low by evil forces (Griffin 2017). This low point is often thought of in terms 
of degeneracy: a decline in desirable faculties and properties, whether moral, physical, cultural or 
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otherwise, on the level of the civilization/race as a whole but also on the level of individuals. Some 
individuals are seen to be more degenerate than others, perhaps through no fault of their own 
necessarily, but certainly with consequences. Bernard likes to call such people ‘white niggers’, 
making clear his disdain for them through the use of the racial epithet. 
He related to me his journey into the heavy metal scene and his eventual exit due to the 
degeneracy he perceived. He told me: 
 
When I was 14 I got really into metal, and I learned guitar, and I would just even skip class and like practice all 
day, and I was very antisocial, in that sense, so like, I had a yearning, I had a transcendence, like this feeling, like 
it was this theme throughout my whole life essentially, a yearning for something more, you could call it a ‘will to 
power’38, right, that I was never able to satisfy. And I didn’t realize why this is the case, so I thought at first, “oh 
it’s metal!” This is the first thing that really hooked me right? And the thing is – metal is mostly white [laughing], 
right, it’s a mostly white culture. 
 
A period of illness changed Bernard’s perceptions and made him question his allegiance to the 
metal subculture:  
 
I started realizing, “okay, the metal scene, it’s a little bit degenerate, these people” – you know, I did it as well, I 
participated in the degenerate lifestyle, uh, different woman every single night, and the uh, get drunk every single 
night, go to a different city, do the exact same thing. I was touring and everything. I was very busy, full-time. And 
it was fun, yeah, but it was degenerate. And I started seeing, “but okay, these people don’t have the same will to 
power as I do”, you know, you could call them, like, in the alt-right [smiling] you would call them ‘white niggers’, 
right? [laughing] They’re like, white niggers. That’s how, uh, it was a traditional way that you know Americans 
used to call white trash, right.  
 
Other groups for whom he reserved the term included skinheads and the KKK, as well as some 
people within the alt-right. He described white supremacist author Jared Taylor as the opposite of 
such a person, saying “Jared Taylor is not a KKK, low-IQ, white nigger. He’s an academic, you 
have to respect his work.” While explaining degeneracy to me, he said: 
 
                                                 
38 A prominent concept in Nietzche’s philosophy, popular with far-right activists. 
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Our civilization is degenerated in the sense that it’s less of what it was. That’s what it means to ‘degenerate’. It’s 
decomposed. And this gives a certain – low-class aspect to it. For example, skinheads… [pause] are seen as white 
niggers by the alt-right. Right? Because they’re degenerate. Because they’re low-IQ, they cause violence for no 
reason. It’s not white culture to degenerate, that’s what it means. In the right, there are also others who don’t call 
themselves alt-right because they don’t wanna be associated with the degeneracy. 
 
The degeneracy he sees within the alt-right includes too strong an affiliation to the pick-up artist 
scene, groups who accept gay men, the acceptance of pagan or otherwise anti-Christian members, 
and an over-reliance on crass humour and memes, among other elements. He thinks about optics 
differently than Joe, being less interested in having everyone look suave and clean-cut, but like 
Joe reserves a great deal of disgust for fat people, as well as for visibly gay men: 
 
The alt-right disavowed Milo, the Daily Stormer disavowed Milo, because Milo was not alt-right, why? Because 
he is homosexual and he doesn’t renounce it. [pause] It’s not that they’re against reforming homosexuals. But, 
living in sin – you can’t do that. Or if you’re fat and obese you can’t represent our movement. Even if you’re a 
nice guy, even if you agree, because… you don’t live it. 
 
 On the topic of gay men, Bernard renounces the idea of sexual orientations, taking a strict 
conservative Christian perspective in which “homosexual acts” are a choice which some men 
engage in and which they must renounce in order to be good Christians and good fascists. He 
believes that the urge to make those choices constitutes a fetish arising from childhood sexual 
abuse – but that in many ways, the worst part of ‘homosexuality’ is not the sexual acts themselves 




No matter what happens to you as a kid, if it’s sexual in nature it will give you a fetish that you will later on want 
to follow. And grow into, essentially. And homosexuality is kind of like a fetish. It’s something which always 
existed in culture, especially white culture, Greeks and Romans: they engaged openly in pedastry [sic – he means 
pederasty] and homosexual sex, but, in restricted ways. Not even like what we have today. They wouldn’t let fags 
walk around and, and promote [his voice fills with disgust] um, non-masculine ideals, and, and being pussies and 
fags and degenerating our culture. They wouldn’t tolerate these things from fags, either. They’d say “stop being a 
faggot”. It’s a term – even Milo uses it in a certain way – it’s like calling someone a nigger39, like – don’t be a 
faggot, don’t be a feminist. Live up to what you are. Right? 
 
Like many far-right activists, Bernard feels that “racial purity cannot be sustained without strict 
adherence to rigid constructions of appropriate gender and sexual behaviour” (Perry 2004, 76). 
 Ben, another highly religious informant, was shocked when I told him that the group of 
which he was a member started out as a pick-up artist club. 
 
Ben: Sexual immorality is a sign of a sick nation, a sick people that are about to be destroyed. And I’m not just 
against homosexuality. I’m also against one man going around having sex with multiple girls. I would put that guy 
in the same category as a gay man. Sexual immorality. 
 
J: How do you feel about the pick-up artist roots of the group that you’re in? 
 
Ben: The pick-up artist roots? As in some of these guys are uh… 
 
J: Before it was an alt-right group, it was a pick-up artist group.  
 
                                                 
39 He is referring here to his view that this word, when applied to white people, is a judgement that they are not 
living up to their true racial potential. He may also be alluding to the view held by some people that the word is only 
for ‘bad’ black people and therefore should not be considered an offensive racist term. 
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Ben: Are you serious? I actually didn’t know that. Uh, well, I read a book on that. It was called The Game. Neill 
Strauss I think was the author. I read the book, thought it was interesting, and I actually went to a bar one night 
and tried the routine. And I was shocked, I saw it absolutely worked. And I thought it was one of the most 
disgusting, shallow, uh, it was a mind-game. These guys literally built a formula on how to get girls’ numbers. 
[…] It’s manipulative and uh, no actually I had no idea that my group started off as a pick-up artist group. That to 
me disgusts me. I’m very pro-marriage. One man, one woman, you know, love each other, sacrifice for each other, 
build a family, you’re going to die one day, raise your family, raise your kids right, and leave this planet knowing 
you left it a better place. To me it’s very degrading towards women to go into a bar, play a mind-game with them, 
just so you can get in their pants. 
 
Ben went on to explain his belief that men were in part responsible for what he sees as the 
dangerous rise of feminism:  
 
If men were just a little bit more grateful to their wives, most women would laugh at the idea of feminism. If most 
men weren’t out picking up girls, using manipulative tactics, just to sleep with them for a night, women would 
have a different approach to the men in society. You know, women would laugh at feminism today. They would 
say why would I wanna work – I wanna be a mom, I wanna be there for my husband, I wanna support him. And 
this is the foundation of a healthy society. And because men have kind of failed to do their jobs… for instance, 
me, I find, I always pay for women. Doesn’t matter if they’re my girlfriend, or just a friend, or a stranger. I will 
always pay for a woman if they’re in my presence. I feel like it’s a man’s job to do that. And my Québec woman 
friends never felt comfortable with this. And then I found out why. And it’s super interesting. Because the mindset 
of the average Québec or Ontario guy is: if you pay for a woman, for dinner, the man’s now expecting something. 
He’s expecting sex. So the women would rather be independent and actually throw in her half to avoid this… you 
know… [pause] 
 




Ben: Right, this power dynamic, to disarm the man from actually having the right to say, “well now you owe me, 




Ben: So uh, I understand women. I’m anti-feminism but I understand it. And I think men need to be more, you 
know — there’s no shame in, man look, I’ve raised kids, I’ve worked in a factory, um, I’ll come home from 
working the factory and tell my wife, “take three hours off, I got the kids.” 
 
In a National Socialist society, he told me, feminism would make no sense, because the male 
fecklessness and sexual immorality driving it would not exist. 
 Out of all my informants, Ben is the most ardently enthused with Hitler and German, 
WWII-era Nazism. He is also, counter-intuitively, probably the informant with the position most 
sympathetic to women. He grew up in and out of shelters with his single mother, a troubled woman 
and a survivor of brutal intimate-partner violence at the hands of Ben’s father, and he refers to this 
fact often and makes sure to stress his respect for mothers and his distaste for crass overt misogyny. 
His interpretation of feminism is “trying to make women into men”, so it is unlikely that he would 
ever describe himself as a feminist. His views are very conservative, emphasizing women’s roles 
as mothers and caregivers and men’s as breadwinners and leaders. His stance on gender relations 
is ‘pro-feminist’ only relative to the extreme misogyny characterizing the views of many of his 
comrades. Nevertheless his position represents a dramatic departure from the ‘mainstream’ line 
within the alt-right generally and within the Montreal group. He was visibly uncomfortable with 
the un-Christian implications of the pick-up artist angle, and told me that as an old-school Nazi, 
his major point of difference with the alt-right proper was on its lack of commitment to proper 
Christian values, among which he placed respect for women. 
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 For Ben, a high-quality comrade is one who is a committed practicing Christian, a follower 
of orthodox National Socialism, and one who intends to raise children within a committed 
heterosexual partnership. He has little patience for meme culture or edgy posturing. He, like Joe 
and Bernard, hates neo-Nazi skinheads. He also came to be uncomfortable with calling himself, or 
being called, a racist. In my final interview with him, he told me about some of these reservations, 
which were becoming more and more difficult for him to ignore. His comments are illuminating: 
 
The most dangerous thing we have to the National Socialist movement are these “neo-Nazis”. These guys with 
[singsong cadence] shaved heads and dress like punks, and uh, giving sieg heils and covered in tattoos. Um, the 
typical Jewish Hollywood version of a neo-Nazi. Look, you wanna go back to Germany, lets define a Nazi. Nazis 
were married men with children and very hard-working. Kay? They were clean-cut, no tattoos, just your traditional 
European – I mean look at how the Nazis dressed. Look at their uniforms. Look at how clean and proper these 
men were. And the Germans are known for being the hardest-working people, the most organized people on the 
planet. There’s no one more organized, more logical, than Germans. So what you see, this image that they’ve 
projected through the media and through this neo-Nazi garbage, these plants, I would totally call them plants, or 
misguided people, um… Hardcore racist, you know, racist for no reason. Hitler was not a racist. Hitler wanted to 
see every race be the best that they could be and put their own people first. I mean you listen to his speeches. He 
never yelled at blacks, or… you know, or hated anybody. He hated uh, Jews, and he attached them to Bolshevism, 
and communism, right. Which I don’t blame him and it’s very true. Uh, so… these guys that are in the movement, 
these ‘neo-type’ Nazis, I fight with them all the time. I’m hardcore Christian with these Christian values. And 
these guys fight me tooth and nail. They wanna go back to some Pagan occultic [sic] Earth-worshipping ancient-
European-style religion. So, serious clashes. What are they, are they alt-right, are they National Socialist? I’m 







Ben: And I started realizing this after I talked to you, after the last time we talked. Uh, um, cuz me and Bernard, 
we don’t fit in with some of the other guys. 
 
J: Right. Yeah because you guys are like, really fascists right.  
 
Ben: You know, we’re hardcore fascists. But I don’t hate anybody. Nobody. I treat everybody equal. Um, so, and 
this is what I’m gonna say, as a National Socialist: we don’t hate anybody. Uh but we do want to defend our 
homeland. And defend our tribe and defend our people.  
 
J: But I think you’re in a minority of the people who call themselves ‘National Socialists’, man. I think most of 
those people are probably skinheads and so on. 
 
Ben: [pause] Yeah. Yeah, it’s not an easy battle, man. I’m… we are out-numbered and we’re hated on both sides. 
We’re hated from the communists, the Antifa groups; and then we’re also, even within our own groups we are not 




Ben: To uh, to not be so ignorant. Like, the ignorance that comes outta these people when talking about women 
and about other races and stuff, it’s just illogical, you know, and then you can sympathize for the Antifa people, 
you can sympathize for the opposite side all of a sudden when you see the ignorance. This pure hatred – you just 
hate that guy because he’s black. You know? I’m sorry, fuck you. You know? Um, look, I don’t wanna move to a 
black neighborhood. I see what happens when blacks are together in their, in their, you know, culture, in there. 
And I don’t want any part of that. But, I’m not gonna [laughs jovially] hate some guy, uh, because of the colour 
of his skin, and I find a lot of the guys in the alt-right will just hate someone. Or these neo-Nazis, they’re just 
gonna hate someone for the colour of their skin. But there were Indian Nazis, there were African Nazis, and you 






Ben: So don’t tell me the Nazis were racist, you know. The stereotypical Nazi, today, is nothing [pounds fist on 
table] like the traditional, [pound] Adolf Hitler, [pound] Nazi Germany Nazi. There’s a whole world of difference. 
I bet you most of these skinheads aren’t married, they don’t have children, they don’t have family values or family 
principles. Nobody loved women more than the Nazis. They praised their women, they said their women are the 




Ben: Y’know, and they are. And a lot of the guys in the group, they’re anti-women. They don’t just hate you 
because of the colour of your skin, but they also hate women.  
 
Ben is certainly a white supremacist, in the sense that his goal is a racially-regimented Canada, 
legally, socially and economically dominated by whites, without ‘Third World’ immigration and 
with second-class citizenship or deportation for any remaining non-white residents. However, like 
many people, he equates the term ‘racism’ with an active and irrational hatred of others based on 
skin colour. He does not think of himself as someone who actively hates others, and distinguishes 
himself from what he sees as the banal mindlessness of skinhead culture. In this interview he is 
also distancing himself from the purposefully offensive and inflammatory content typical of major 
alt-right neo-Nazi website The Daily Stormer, which regularly uses slurs, calls for ‘white sharia’, 
foments race war and attempts to appear as racist as possible. He is also clearly a sexist who 
believes strongly in different, biologically and religiously ordained roles for women and men, but 
thinks of himself as someone who respects women a great deal and is strongly opposed to the 
casual hatred of women common in the alt-right. He presents himself as a reasonable, moderate, 
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regular working-class guy who isn’t trying to hurt anyone, and who just happens to support 
National Socialism as a great model for Canada. 
 These three men have divergent ideas about a comrade’s quality. All three of their 
conceptualizations, however, relate directly to masculinity. It may be true that this is because they 
can scarcely imagine a woman who they might treat as an equal political actor, but it is revealing 
nonetheless. Many struggles within the alt-right scene map onto a struggle over the correct kind 
of masculinity or posture toward masculinity. Joe aims at a relatively cultivated, secular, smooth, 
bourgeois white masculinity which can be leveraged for optics and branding to present the 
‘alternative right’ as just what the name is calculated to suggest: a sophisticated, youthful 
alternative to conservatism, just as serious but with a fresh and exciting take on identity. Bernard 
is invested in what could be called a kind of modern “Crusader masculinity” (Holt 2013): zealously 
Christian, intense in affect, contemptuous of femininity, paternalistically populist, deeply invested 
in hierarchy as a principle, somewhat courtly in mannerism, and emphasizing values such as 
honour and valour. Ben values an idealized conservative-revolutionary, family-first, blue-collar, 






Figure 5. Informants’ understandings of high-quality and low-quality people, and their preferred 




 Deep divisions run through the alt-right on a number of axes. Many of these divisions are 
played out on the terrain of masculinity. Masculinity, as it is enacted in the alt-right, is mostly a 
homosocial affair, with women in the movement being vanishingly rare and accorded little 
importance as actors. The competitive element of homosocially enacted masculinity is theorized 
by members of the alt-right group primarily through the frames of an evolutionary psychology-
influenced dominance hierarchy using the terms alpha and beta; through an economics framework 
using the terms signaling and countersignaling; and through a spectrum of worth using high or low 
quality as indicators.  
 High Quality Low Quality Preferred 
masculinity 
Joe Himself; strict Euro 
identitarian groups 
Skinheads; LARPing; “short, 
fat nerds”; “dirty and […] 
tattooed”; too religious 
Secular 
bourgeois 







Ben Christian values; 
marriage/family; classical 
Nazis; “clean-cut, no tattoos, 
just your traditional European” 
“Sexual immorality”; “racist 






 Alt-right adherents, as with other men, often competitively attempt to most successfully 
enact masculinity, and judge one another on these attempts. These attempts can be, and often are, 
understood through the framework of signaling by members of the alt-right. Men who perceive 
themselves as high-quality or high-status – who believe that they are enacting masculinity much 
more successfully than others – can contest the grounds upon which certain signals and 
countersignals of masculinity can be made, in an attempt to maintain an environment in which 
false signaling is costly. In doing so they are defending their ability to credibly countersignal so 
that they may maintain their perceived position within the social hierarchy of the group. 
 However, my ethnographic data suggests that the struggle over who can most successfully 
enact hegemonic masculinity is not the only struggle at play. What is also at stake is what qualifies 
as hegemonic masculinity, or more precisely, which masculinity is most correct for an alt-right 
adherent to enact. Coles (2017) writes that struggles around hegemonic masculinity are not only 
played out on a structural, society-wide field; rather, “various subfields exist [accounting] for the 
variety of dominant masculinities that may be present at any given time” (31). To successfully 
define the hegemonic masculinity through one’s actions is to devalue other versions of masculinity 
(Beynon 2002). Biological-determinist theories of gender notwithstanding, my informants have an 
intuitive understanding of the existence of a spectrum of different possible masculinities. These 
may be understood as gradations from purity to degeneracy, or from being a good Christian to sin 
and heathenism, or from being classy to being crass. One can be an alpha or a beta, based40 or a 
cuck. These gradations amount to an array of possible masculinities over which alt-right adherents 
contend. When describing low-quality and high-quality masculinity, my informants do not 
describe identical characteristics, and indeed find themselves clashing significantly depending on 
                                                 
40
 A slang term appropriated by the alt-right, meaning solid, cool, independent, strong.. 
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their own understandings of what makes a good fascist or a good Christian or a real man. 
Interestingly, one of the most hypermasculine archetypes available in white Western culture, the 
skinhead, is universally maintained by my informants to represent low quality, even though, as Joe 
told me, “We probably have the same basic values [as skinheads], but we have a different brand.” 
 With regard to high quality, opinions vary. All three of the masculinities I outlined – white 
bourgeois masculinity, ‘Crusader’ masculinity, and Nazi proletarian masculinity – contain within 
them the seeds of threateningly un-masculine elements. Bourgeois masculinity can be seen to be 
weak and effeminate, with its pretentious intellectualism, its emphasis on appearance, its chasing 
after women and its distance from manual labour and the land. An extremely religious masculinity 
like Bernard’s can be problematic in another way. One man in the group told me that he was 
planning to join the priesthood in a denomination which generally demands clerical celibacy. As 
in medieval Europe, where real Crusader masculinity was first developed theoretically by religious 
authors, the resolution of male celibacy with masculinity’s traditional focus on having sex with 
women is problematic (Holt 2013). Further, Bernard’s ardency and earnestness about his faith 
clash with the unflappable, cool-minded trope valued in many people’s idea of proper masculinity. 
Meanwhile, Ben’s repudiation of overt misogyny, his disapproval of casual sex, and his 
willingness to emphasize parenting as an appropriate activity for men contrasts starkly with the 
playboy masculinity cultivated by men involved in the alt-right’s pick-up artist roots. His view on 
the origins of feminism as being primarily the ‘fault’ of insufficiently grateful husbands also flies 
completely in the face of the logic of the Manosphere and marks him as profoundly ‘Blue Pill’ 
with regard to gender, rendering his masculinity potentially suspect in the eyes of many of his 
fellow far-right activists.  
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 It is not appropriate to argue that one of these three men is most successfully enacting 
hegemonic norms of masculinity. All three appear relatively secure in their gender. All three enact 
a masculinity with ‘flaws’ in it, but these flaws only point to the impossibility of a single, perfect 
masculinity. There are major, often insurmountable contradictions involved if one is to be 
simultaneously a fatherly family man and a playboy pick-up artist, or to be a rich, powerful and 
sophisticated blue-collar regular Joe, or to be passionately religious and also cool-minded, 
utilitarian and ultra-rational at the same time. To extend this observation beyond these three 
examples, other types of masculinity exist in the group as well. Greg is about as much of a skinhead 
as is permitted in the group, while Émile is the stereotype of a neo-Nazi internet propagandist, pale 
and quiet, unshaven, wearing dark glasses even at dusk, with thousands of pages of obsessive 
extremist racist writing to his name. The masculine archetype of the lone intellectual sacrificing 
his time and energy to the tireless theorizing of a specific cause can coexist only uneasily with that 
of a strong, virile fighter who does his thinking out on the streets with his fists.  
 Alt-right men, like all men, run up against these contradictions and have to resolve them in 
various ways. One way is simply to present their own version as superior: Joe pulls no punches 
about considering markers of working-class or ‘alternative’ masculinities, such as tattoos, to be 
contemptible and beneath him. Another tactic I observed is the attempt by some of the men to 
simultaneously embody as many of the classically masculine traits as possible. This can lead to an 
incoherent mixture of positions and ideas, like when Bernard told me that Vikings were real men 
“in line with the natural order” because they “released their sexual desires all over the place, raped 
a whole bunch of women, [and] ran around freely”, but that this behaviour was nevertheless a sin 
that required absolution from a Christian priest – raising questions about Christianity’s relationship 
to his much-vaunted ‘natural order’. Interestingly, this embodiment of multiple apparently 
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contradictory masculine traits does not have to be concurrent. For many of my informants, an 
important part of their self-narrative is of overcoming a state of degeneracy, often associated with 
one type of masculinity, and arriving at a state of renewed purity, corresponding to another type 
of masculinity. 
 For example, Bernard’s story about discovering that his heavy metal lifestyle was 
degenerate was echoed by another informant, Simon. Simon is a mild-mannered man in his early 
twenties, who is a self-styled ‘Roman pagan’ and valorizes ancient Rome as a political model. 
Simon recounted a childhood spent feeling like the world was against him, giving examples of 
injustices such as receiving harsher penalties on the playground than little girls who committed the 
same infractions. He told me that at a young age, he decided that democracy was nonsensical and 
became an authoritarian. At a certain point he too discovered and then abandoned metal, in a 
process he described to me as ‘Faustian’: 
 
I’d try to find the most uh, [pause] I wouldn’t even know how to describe it, uh, heavy? Dark? Almost devilish. 
Just the most rebellious music I could possibly find. 
 
J: Like black metal41, stuff like that? 
 




M: Well, black metal, sure. I wasn’t really into that. I listened to the most brutal death metal you could find. […] 
In CEGEP I transitioned from Satanic death metal to classical. […] My grandmother left me a grand collection of 
vinyls. So I purchased a record player out of my own money and started listening to them. She was an opera singer.  
 
J: And you just lost interest in metal? 
 
S: And I started listening to the records. I lost interest – I think the reason for that is cuz uh, it’s a bit of a Faustian 
concept. Philosophically it means that you’re always trying to push to an extreme and go further and further and 
towards the infinite, towards infinity, but you never can reach infinity. So you start – in my case, for listening to 
the heaviest music, I was always kind of pushing boundaries, but. It came to the point where the whole purpose 
was just to push boundaries. Faust, in Goethe, he’s already super intelligent, and his name literally translates to 
                                                 
41 Black metal is a genre of heavy metal music known for its emphasis on Satanism, paganism, and extreme hostility 
toward Christianity. It has an active racist subgenre, NSBM (National Socialist Black Metal) 
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Latin as ‘happy’42. He makes this deal with the Devil and he essentially ruins his entire life because he tries to 
push things to their limits. He meets the witch who gives him a potion, who makes his life expanded by giving 
him youth; he literally travels to Hell and meets, I think it’s Helena of Troy, who you know represents beauty in 
the classical world. There’s an entire story of how he’s pushing his entire life to extremes. Uh, much like Western 
civilization does. And, which is the whole point of the story, obviously, and along the way he learns lessons. And 
I was not aware of this at the time, but I did understand that, I just – I came to the comprehension that I was just 
pushing myself with my music tastes, to the point where it became absurd. It didn’t mean anything to me anymore. 
It probably never did? It meant very little. From there I just abandoned it, I said, what’s the point? There’s nothing 
intellectual, there’s nothing sophisticated. It’s just a bunch of anger, it’s not even top-tier music. [long pause] So I 
switched to classical. 
 
Although Simon’s understanding of the Faust story is a little confused, he is making a three-part 
comparison between himself, Western civilization and Faust. Like the character, he and the West 
both started out with everything they needed – traditional white masculinity, for example – and 
both pushed themselves to “devilish” extremes in the pursuit of some other type of satisfaction. In 
Goethe’s version of the story, Faust eventually realizes the extent of his guilt and ultimately, his 
soul is freed from the Devil’s clutches and is admitted to heaven. Simon eventually realized that 
his heavy metal boundary-pushing was futile and did not reflect his true values of ultra-reactionary 
conservatism, represented by classical music; he hopes that the West will take a similar path, 
jettisoning the liberal politics that have taken it to degenerate extremes. 
 Stories somewhat similar in form were common among my informants. Men related a 
previous lifestyle which, though problematic from their current standpoint, embodied an 
alternative but also highly-valued mode of masculinity. Joe had been an avid PUA enthusiast, but 
when I met him, had a steady live-in girlfriend and claimed that he had moved on from that 
lifestyle, saying, “You get bored. Nobody wants to be 65 and clubbing. It’s sad. Guys who don’t 
grow out of PUA are pathetic.” He said he didn’t have a problem with men in the movement “going 
out and getting laid” but that he didn’t encourage the “degeneracy or gloating” that comes with the 
                                                 
42 Faustus in Latin translates to ‘lucky’. 
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PUA scene. Felix had a similar take on PUA, also having joined the group when it was devoted to 
the sub-culture. 
 Kathleen Blee (2003) writes that when her informants, racist women activists43, talked 
about their conversions to organized racism, the elements which they chose to bring up or dwell 
on were highly determined by their current beliefs. Events from their pasts which had not seemed 
racial to them at the time were retrospectively racialized, “recast as ordeals that clarified racial 
perception” (Blee 2003, 39). My informants also engaged in this to a degree, but less frequently 
and less explicitly than did Blee’s. However, my informants frequently cast their pasts in a light 
which emphasized a transformation from one kind of socially valorized masculinity to another. As 
with Blee’s women activists, my informants often described their former selves as directionless 
and naïve, in keeping with their narratives about movement outsiders, who are seen as either 
foolish, weak or treasonous (Blee 2003, 37). Unlike Blee’s informants, none of the members of 
the Montreal alt-right group that I interviewed described their former selves as being weak. Nor 
did they describe their former selves as non-masculine.  
 For Bernard and Simon, their former heavy metal lifestyles had been rewarding in terms 
of embodying masculinity in a subculture described by one researcher as a “haven of male 
homosocial interactions”, one in which masculine physicality and strength are emphasized (Riches 
2014, 88). Bernard also described his time in the scene as one of non-stop drinking and casual sex, 
activities typically associated with a type of socially valorized masculinity. Joe and Felix happily 
explained that they had spent years conscientiously approaching hundreds, if not thousands, of 
women at clubs and bars, practicing a sexually-defined nightlife masculinity distilled to a pure 
form. Though these masculinities are ‘degenerate’ in their distance from ultra-conservative values, 
                                                 
43 The term ‘racist’ is emotionally loaded. Here, it is being used as a scholarly descriptor of an ideological position, 
not as a pejorative, and it is used as such by Blee in the work I cite.  
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they are degenerate in a successfully masculine way. None of my informants disclosed having 
been, for example, a friendless nerd, a desperate incel, having a marginalized sexual orientation, 
or similar. Greg may have been a “nice guy” before joining the alt-right, but he was a nice guy 
attending ‘anti-antifascist’ demonstrations, demonstrating his manly distance from hysterical blue-
haired leftists. Other informants told me about having been liberals and therefore lost prior to 
joining the movement, while emphasizing the financial success associated with hegemonic 
masculinity that they had enjoyed at that time. Ben presented himself as having been somewhat 
directionless before finding Christianity and National Socialism but having always been tough, 
thoughtful and hardworking.  
 It is worth briefly noting the similarity between these alt-right masculinity ‘makeovers’ 
and the before-and-after narratives so popular in the neoliberal imaginary. The ubiquitous 
injunction of neoliberalism is to self-optimize endlessly. One must discipline one’s body not only 
on a corporeal level, that is, as a collection of limbs and organs and so forth, but also on a molecular 
level, ‘optimizing’ one’s brain chemistry with pharmaceuticals (Rose 2009). One must not only 
submit to governance; one must show that the “capacity for self-governance” (Rose 1999, 271) 
has been successfully instilled. As a worker-consumer one must perpetually be the ‘best’ version 
of one’s self. One must be productive, attractive, rational, acquisitive, healthy, and not suicidal. 
One must artfully navigate consumer choices. One must skillfully market one’s labour and become 
wealthy through merit. It is rather as though the idea of Nietzche’s Übermensch – by which my 
informants are also certainly influenced – has been stripped of its anticapitalist connotations and 
yoked to the mechanisms of contemporary ruling-class cultural hegemony.  
 By presenting themselves as having transitioned from one form of relatively desirable 
masculinity to another, my informants are able to admit their former flaws as a ‘normie’ without 
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having to relinquish their claims to the successful enactment of manliness. They are also able to 
embody multiple contradictory masculinities , albeit consecutively rather than concurrently. It 
would be difficult for someone to dispute Bernard’s manliness on the basis of his intense 
religiosity, for example, if they knew that he had spent years with “a different woman every night”. 
As a movement with roots in the PUA scene, the majority of men in the alt-right tend to approve 
of male heterosexual promiscuity on some level (as Joe put it, “the guys can go out and fuck sluts. 
But no sluts in the movement”) while in theory disapproving of the existence of the liberal social 
order which facilitates this behaviour. Boasting of having been formerly promiscuous is therefore 
a popular way for men to bolster their masculine credibility while they transition to a more straight-
laced, Christian-influenced version of gender enactment. Before-and-after stories like these also 
allow the men access to a narrative in which they overcome or transcend the temptations of a 
debased liberal life – in which they nevertheless exercised their natural manly qualities 
successfully – and emerge, masculinity intact, into the brave new world of white supremacy and 
fascism.  











5. Secular Male-Supremacism: PUA and the 
Red Pill as Conduits to the Alt-Right 
 
 I sat in a downtown bistro across a table from Felix, a slight, friendly, nervous-seeming 
young immigrant man and one of the members of the alt-right group most enthusiastic about my 
research project. At one meet-up when it had become too dark to see clearly he had conscientiously 
held a flashlight over my shoulder as I wrote in my notebook. Today, he had brought with him a 
print-out of some alt-right material he wanted to discuss with me. 
 Felix had been one of the early members of the group, having joined when it was still 
devoted to PUA. He told me that he had started out as a moderate leftist, but had become 
disillusioned with the left due to “the identity politics and oppression Olympics”. Exploring the 
internet for new ideas, he had stumbled across the Red Pill forum on Reddit. He discovered that 
although its critics painted the Red Pill as a den of misogynists, “it wasn’t like that at all. It wasn’t 
a bunch of rapists. It’s testable. It makes sense.” Through the Red Pill, he explained, he had 
discovered Men’s Rights Activism (MRA) and the veil was lifted from his eyes. An epidemic of 
false rape allegations was sweeping the Western world, he had learned. “And who are the people 
pushing false rape claims?” he asked me triumphantly. It was a rhetorical question.  
 After immigrating to Canada, he met one of the leaders of the Montreal pick-up artist group 
at a speaking event this man had organized for a prominent American reactionary masculinist. 
Felix promptly joined up. As time went on, the group got more and more politicized. “Knowing 
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how to pick up girls is nice,” he said. “But what are the implications of this knowledge?” The pick-
up group was created because it filled a need, he said. For Felix and other members like Joe, 
however, it was more of “a reaction to feminism” and ultimately became “a path to the political 
side”. 
The majority position in the alt-right proposes the near-total dismantlement of women’s 
rights and feminist influence. This reactionism is informed by specific modern cultural forms and 
political tendencies. My research indicates that online male-supremacist platforms such as The 
Red Pill and Return of Kings have made significant contributions to the content, style, and 
membership of the alt-right. These platforms have introduced young men to reactionary politics 
and funneled some of them into white supremacism, while providing an intellectual, subcultural, 
and aesthetic milieu from which the alt-right has borrowed. Many of the alt-right’s points of 
divergence with older, better-known racist and fascist tendencies can be traced to this influence 
from online male-supremacist platforms.  
  
Taking the Red Pill 
 
 Today the term ‘Red Pill’ is a metaphor for a kind of reactionary ‘wokeness’, the process 
of becoming enlightened as to the degeneracy of the modern world and discovering deeper racist, 
sexist, and far-right truths. It comes from the movie The Matrix, in which the main character Neo 
is offered a choice between two pills, one of which will have him remain in ignorance, and the 
other which will awaken him to the horrible truth about the world. However, when I came across 
it in the early 2010’s, the term referred primarily to a forum, still in existence, on the social news 
and discussion platform Reddit.com. These forums on Reddit are called subreddits. 
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 The Red Pill subreddit is both the product and producer of a particular intersection of 
masculinist orientations. The first of these orientations involves the trend known variously as the 
pick-up artist, game, or seduction community. This is a phenomenon, sometimes described as akin 
to a self-help regimen (Hendriks 2012), in which men trade tricks and tips on how to secure sexual 
access to young women through the deployment of scripted interactions or psychological 
manipulation. The second is a hardline secular type of antifeminism which describes women’s 
empowerment in apocalyptic terms and does not generally use religious reasoning. Instead 
arguments for patriarchal rule and against feminism are borrowed from conservative (and often 
discredited) sociological, anthropological, philosophical and psychological sources. The third is a 
scientistic biological essentialism. This outlook conflates sex and gender and constructs both in a 
set of rigid hierarchies based on the conjecture of ‘evolutionary psychology’ (Van Valkenbergh 
2018) and borrowing freely from descriptions of the social structures of non-human animals. 
Combined, these orientations form a tendency I call secular male-supremacism.  
Secular male-supremacism tends to make heavy use of scientism. Scientism refers to an 
excessive valorization of science and the scientific method, which can lead to a type of fallacy in 
which valid scientific claims are used to advance unfounded ethical, philosophical or metaphysical 
ones (Peterson 2003). It can also refer simply to the tactic of using scientific-sounding arguments 
in order to borrow some of the discursive authority accorded to science (Popper 2003). It is in this 
sense that secular male-supremacism employs scientism to promote the view that women are 
biologically programmed to be irrational, manipulative/parasitic, and animalistic, while men are 
rational, both competitive and cooperative, and more fully human. Women are born, according to 
this model, while men are made.  Following the most conservative strains of evolutionary 
psychology, in this vision men and women are locked in an evolutionary arms race with one 
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another, wherein women attempt to procreate with strong exciting men while cuckolding stable 
providers, and men try to procreate with as many women as possible while not providing for the 
offspring of other men (Van Valkenbergh 2018). Feminism is seen as a catastrophic social ill 
propounded by a conspiratorial cabal. However, because this worldview has a strong tendency to 
biological reductionism, that is, reducing complex social phenomena to hormonal or genetic 
causes, feminism is also described on the Red Pill subreddit as a ‘female sexual strategy’, a social 
manifestation of the evolved natural propensity of women to manipulate and parasitize men. The 
‘pick-up artist’ element of the Red Pill is thus envisioned as men’s sexual strategy, a counterpoint 
to feminism. The gendered social order is often described as a ‘gynocracy’, that is, rule by women, 
allowing men to take on victim roles when useful for rhetorical or emotional reasons (Ging 2017). 
There are many similarities between Red Pill and white-supremacist ideological positions. 
Since I first began to study the Red Pill in 2013, I have noticed increasing drift from the Red Pill 
to the racist right as I have watched the alt-right coalesce on the internet. Even in 2013, I considered 
the Red Pill and the associated Manosphere sites, particularly the Return of Kings forums run by 
‘pick-up artist’ Roosh V, to be serving as nurseries for far-right groups. Indeed, as mentioned, the 
alt-right group in Montreal which I studied grew directly out of a Red Pill-style pick-up artist 
group. I have already written about how the Red Pill’s categorization of men into alphas and betas 
has become a common way of speaking about men in the alt-right. In this section I explore some 
of the other ways in which aspects of the alt-right flow directly from secular male-supremacism, 
particularly the Red Pill and its associated complex of sites and forums.   
The Red Pill and the alt-right share four key components. They share certain subcultural 
and philosophical roots; they share in large part their demographic; they share a set of enemies and 
scapegoats; and they share important aspects of their outlook or worldview. This is significant 
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because the mechanism by which men are funneled from the Red Pill to the alt-right functions 
within these areas of overlap.  Susceptible men enter the Red Pill subculture and then find 
themselves situated within these areas of overlap, making it easier for them to join the alt-right. It 
is also significant because these areas of overlap, these roots in the Red Pill, are an important part 
of what gives the alt-right its character or its ‘genetic inheritance’. They also largely determine 
what the alt-right’s relationship to men and masculinities looks like. Further, this overlap has 
explanatory power with regard to boundary work being performed in the alt-right group to exclude 
certain types of white men and attract others. This boundary work is an important element in the 
formation of a group identity (Perry 2004). 
 
Neoreaction 
 In earlier work on the Red Pill (Marquis-Manicom 2013), I identified a political trend 
known variously as neoreaction, NRx, or the Dark Enlightenment44 as being important in the 
development of what could be called the base of Red Pill philosophy. The Red Pill was 
unapologetically misogynist and pro-patriarchal, and could be seen as part of a trend of 
masculinists responding to the much-hyped 'crisis of masculinity'. One response to this ‘crisis’ is 
to advocate for a return to an idealized past social mode in which people followed the natural roles 
set out for them by their biological sex and enjoyed “gender certainty” (Brittan 1989, 25) – a past 
which we are wont to view “through the foggy lens of nostalgia for a mostly mythical past” 
(Coontz 2016; see also Coontz 2016b).  Neoreaction consists of several related schools of thought 
which also transcend conservatism by advocating a return to social models which last existed in 
                                                 




the West before living memory, or never existed at all, but are imagined as having existed in the 
past.   
 Neoreactionary writings include various mixtures of anti-modernism, religious and secular 
versions of theocracy, autocracy, ethno-nationalism and white supremacism, as well as monarchist 
elements. Neoreaction has been described as the radically authoritarian turn taken by right-
libertarians who realized they would never win an election (MacDougald 2016); one proposal by 
neoreaction’s éminence grise, Curtis Yarvin, is to privatize government by replacing it with more 
‘efficient’ “joint-stock republics” (Moldbug 2015). As regards gender, the neoreactionaries 
support the male-supremacist view, arguing that the mainstream conservatives have become far 
too lenient with women. As one neoreactionary blogger put it, “The thesis that Game [PUA] works 
is logically equivalent to what used to be the right wing view of women, before the right became 
the left […] Rightists used to believe that fertile age women were uncontrollably and self 
destructively lustful, and therefore needed male adult supervision” (Jim 2014, 597). While 
evolutionary psychology offers male-supremacists a scientistic or evidentiary framework, however 
flawed, neoreactionary authors offered a sophisticated philosophical or doctrinal basis for the early 
Red Pill site. Instead of just being seen as an ‘angry misogynist’, a Red Pill adherent could point 
to this body of neoreactionary political theory and justify his political views with reference to it, 
particularly his views on feminism. Neoreaction also represented a divergence from the 
mainstream conservatism that Red Pill adherents saw as tainted by socially ambient feminism and 
‘gynocracy’. 
The alt-right, like the Red Pill, is also a divergence from mainstream conservatism, and my 
informants tell me that neo-reactionary thinkers had a major influence on the early alt-right. Joe 
told me that the neo-reactionary thinkers are considered by some in the alt-right to be the 
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“intellectual elite” of the right, but that ultimately these thinkers have little direct sway anymore. 
“It’s the alt-right foot-soldiers who have the real sway,” he said. The alt-right has evolved away 
from neoreaction proper, preferring less intellectualism and more propaganda; in addition, one of 
the primary theorists of neoreaction, Curtis Yarvin, is half Jewish and largely rejects anti-Semitism 
(Moldbug 2007). For their part, the neoreactionaries, according to Joe, now “look down on the alt-
right because some [alt-right members] aren’t so classy.” Hawley (2017) also notes that many 
neoreactionaries reject the alt-right “not because they believe racism is wrong but because white 
nationalism is too democratic” (46). 
However, the influences of neoreaction are still visible. For one thing, neoreaction has 
always been highly elitist in all senses of the word. Apart from advocating rigid hierarchy up to 
and including monarchy as an ideal system of government, it uses frequently quite complicated 
writing to convey its ideas, rather than easily understandable propaganda (Hawley 2017). 
Neoreactionaries decline interviews with journalists, considering them to be part of a hostile 
establishment, and their writing “is explicitly and purposefully opaque, and has no interest in 
appealing to a wider audience” (Gray 2017). Neoreaction also tends to treat the popular masses 
with a great deal of contempt, advocating for a ‘meritocracy’ ruled by property-owners. The alt-
right is certainly attempting to build a mass movement of a sort, and some adherents, such as Joe, 
describe it as “right-wing collectivism”. The alt-right has thus been disavowed by a number of 
neoreactionary thinkers as a dilution of the original elitist ideas. However, as elaborated in the 
previous section, in my research with the alt-right I found that a major element of its boundary 
work was an elitism, especially with regard to aesthetic but also extending to other markers, 
wherein the group excluded men who were seen as ‘low-quality’ or ‘degenerate’. These men 
included those with visible tattoos, those who were overweight, and those with dress styles which 
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were too subcultural, marginal, or just sloppy. Skinheads, as I have noted, were not permitted into 
the group.  
Neoreaction has a decidedly theocratic (or theonomist – rule by Biblical law) bent (Land 
2014). However, even the theocratic elements of neoreaction are in a way secular in the sense that 
they are not attached to any one particular religious denomination but rather they mostly advocate 
for religious law in general as a powerful way to maintain social order and cohesion. Indeed, 
neoreactionaries see religion as such a powerful force that they call their enemy, the cultural 
apparatus steered by ‘progressive elites’, the Cathedral. The Cathedral is described as a 
“progressive atheocracy” (Laliberte 2014, 222), a kind of atheist state religion bent on persecuting 
white Christian capitalists (Land 2014). Other segments of neoreaction are deeply atheist. This 
means that neoreaction could satisfy one of the Red Pill’s conditions, which is that it has remained 




This secular outlook has to do with the Red Pill’s demographics: largely millennial men 
from the Anglophone world, disproportionately skewed towards tech and gamer scenes, and also 
self-selecting as men who don’t have a religious reason to refrain from the ‘pick-up artist’ ideal of 
lots of casual sex. The secular bent is shared by large segments of the alt-right, partially as a result 
of the influence of the largely secular Nouvelle Droite (Hawley 2017). Even though there is a 
significant pro-Christian presence in the alt-right, religion is, as with neoreaction, construed by 
many of my informants as a kind of necessary civilizational infrastructure around which authority 
and tradition can be maintained, rather than as an actual metaphysical truth or code of life. Joe 
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describes himself as culturally Christian, but says that anyone who puts religion before race should 
be excluded from the alt-right. There are exceptions to this secularism, and – as I have already 
shown – some men in the alt-right are sincerely religious. But the second area of overlap between 
the alt-right and the Red Pill is that they share a demographic of mostly young, functionally secular 
straight white antifeminist North American men. 
Joe believes that “any straight white man who isn’t in deep with the feminists is on our 
side”. For him, the alt-right “gives people a reason not to be ashamed of who they are. It’s the next 
best thing since the Church. You don’t have to be a cog anymore, sitting around playing 
videogames. You can be proud of yourself.” Likewise, the Red Pill subreddit bills itself as a place 
for the “discussion of sexual strategy in a culture increasingly lacking a positive identity for men”. 
White men who feel that they are being excluded or left behind by modern cultural developments, 
or who experience feminism and antiracism as persecution, have reason to gravitate to movements 
like the alt-right and the Red Pill, which offer them a place of pride, authority, and scientistically 




The third area of overlap between the alt-right and the Red Pill has to do with their 
respective enemies and scapegoats. Antifeminism is the central component of Red Pill (and other 
secular male-supremacist) ideology. That said, antifeminism was so completely normalized in the 
alt-right group I studied that they had more or less stopped talking about it when I was working 
with them, which was a strange experience because I had expected it to be much more prominent 
in their discourse. However, it seemed to have reached a place of such uncontroversial acceptance 
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that there was no longer much need for members to discuss it except when I asked them questions 
about it directly. In any case, the alt-right largely identifies the same enemies as the Red Pill: 
progressives, socialists, what they call ‘liberals’ (US Democrats, the federal Liberal Party, the 
centre and centre-left), so-called ‘cultural Marxists’, feminists, and an establishment which they 
imagine to be firmly committed to destroying the ‘natural order’ of genetically predestined 
patriarchy. Of course, the alt-right makes a significant addition to this list, Jews, and thereby opens 
up a whole new ideological dimension, by including anti-Semitism and white supremacism among 
its tenets. Interestingly, one of the most common explanation for why Jews are running the world, 
in alt-right circles, is a racist version of the 'feminism as evolved sexual strategy' trope; it is an 
anti-Semitic theory developed by Kevin MacDonald called 'Jewish group evolutionary strategy', 




The fourth area of overlap is in terms of outlook. There are three key elements here. First 
is a rigid hierarchical dualism, dividing people into alphas and betas, quality versus degenerate, 
virtuous men and manipulative women, and so on. Second is their reliance on biological 
determinism as the basis for these views and their conviction that differences in power and wealth 
and so forth are largely natural, inevitable and just, or would be if the world were not controlled 
by Jews, the Cathedral, or the gynocracy. Third, the Red Pill and the alt-right share a relationship 
to the wider society characterized by a sense of victimhood at the hands of elites and a desire not 
to end the rule of elites but to replace them with allies. The fact that 'Red Pill' has become a verb 
used by the alt-right to describe their conversion experiences is telling in itself. In the case of both 
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the alt-right and the Red Pill, a comparatively powerful and privileged demographic is 'waking up' 
to the 'fact' that they are not only losing some of their privilege, but that actually there is a huge 
range of powerful forces arrayed directly against them. Further, there is a feeling of being part of 
the chosen few, the enlightened ones – 'The One', to take it back to The Matrix. Only they can see 
what has been hidden. Other people disagree because they do not see, either through fear or 
complacency or weakness or brainwashing by the ‘elites’. There is an enemy which causes all this 
to happen, and that enemy goes against nature, since nature requires patriarchy and white 
supremacy. In this view, the enemy is trying to emasculate and annihilate men in general and, in 
many cases, white men in particular. 
 
Red Pill to White Genocide 
 
Through these areas of overlap, the Red Pill acts as an antecedent, a filter and a funnel for 
the alt-right. It was around before the alt-right really coalesced during Donald Trump’s presidential 
campaign. Since the Red Pill promotes what Berlet (2004) calls “a hyperbolic version of 
preexisting masculine norms” (34), many men who come across the Red Pill are already primed 
for entry through their ordinary socialization. If they are white, they are upon entry already part of 
the alt-right's key demographic. Once involved with the Red Pill, they encounter a set of enemies 
and scapegoats that is already virtually the same as those of the alt-right, but without an obvious 
anti-Semitic angle. If they cannot handle this or decide it is not for them, they leave and are filtered 
out. In the meantime, those who stay are potentially having more sex or at least feeling better about 
themselves. I am not aware of any peer-reviewed scholarly research about the efficacy of pick-up 
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artist strategy45, and it would probably be unethical to carry it out, but it is easy to see how a lot of 
PUA strategies would work: at its most basic level, the PUA scene encourages men to work out a 
lot, approach women relentlessly, and not take no for an answer, things which are likely to increase 
their chances of having sex. Even if one is not successful in having more sex, one is working out 
and so may feel more confident or at least more healthy. There might thus be some kind of a 
physical reward, as well as a sense of belonging to an elite group and a sense of intellectual 
superiority, not to mention a rush from beating the enemy's system.  
Blee has written that many people who join racist groups initially join not because they are 
unusually racist or far-right, but rather because they are lonely, or they want protection, or they 
are searching for identity, or some other reason (Blee 2003). It is only once they join that they are 
indoctrinated into the ideological component of racism, going beyond just prejudice and getting 
into the genetic arguments, reading Mein Kampf, learning about conspiracy theories and so on. In 
my work with the alt-right, I noticed that everybody I talked to had joined because they were 
already invested in far-right politics, which seems to contradict Blee's findings. 
This can be explained at least in part because the process of indoctrination, for many of 
these men, took place first in the Red Pill milieu. They joined the PUA scene because they wanted 
to have sex, and probably did not hold views that were very much more sexist than an average 
person. After all, biological determinism, support for normative gender roles, a belief in the power 
of science, and casual sexism are not rare in the general population. Once there, they begin to be 
exposed to more and more content originating in neoreactionary and far-right thought. Over time, 
they come to understand themselves as having 'taken the Red Pill'; and this means to reject the 
received orthodoxy of their society, within a frame of reference which sees this received orthodoxy 
                                                 
45 King (2018) discusses PUA strategy, but is unfamiliar with basic feminist scholarship and uncritically accepts the 
claims of pick-up artists on a number of topics, reducing the extent to which his work can be seen as credible. 
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as being matriarchal, broadly Marxist, and run by traitor elites who hate men. As Joe put it, “If 
you’re already ready to go against feminism, which means going against the whole establishment, 
then becoming a ‘racist’ is not a big deal.”  In the Red Pill, however, men are not just rejecting the 
more contentious theoreticians of hardline second-wave feminism; they end up rejecting the basic 
elements of women’s formal legal equality that most people, including very conservative people, 
tend to accept as settled common sense. Arguments against women having the vote are common 
on the Red Pill and Return of Kings as well as on incel forums. Roosh V from Return of Kings is 
notorious for 'satirically' arguing for the legalization of rape and suggesting that women should not 
be educated. Dramatic dehumanization of women is commonplace in these scenes. 
Once this shift has taken place for Red Pill men -- that is, when they are able to completely 
reject some of the most uncontroversial elements of social equality -- another round of filtering 
has taken place. Men who find the pill hard to swallow are gone at this point. What is left are men 
who have demonstrated that they are intellectually and emotionally capable of going down that 
road, and who have already been exposed to months or years of ideas originating in these 
authoritarian, hierarchist, anti-modern philosophies. At that point, extending one’s analysis to race 
and joining the alt-right is just one of the logical extensions of what one already believes, and one 









6. The Dialogics of the Alt-Right 
 
 
A Meeting in the Rain 
 
 Bernard is standing barefoot in front of a group of men, eyes glinting, preaching. “I’ve 
noticed something in the alt-right,” he tells them. As usual, he enunciates all the letters when he 
speaks, so that ‘alt-right’ comes out as ‘all trite’. “A more degenerate side to things. It doesn’t 
mean that the alt-right is necessarily degenerate! But it’s there. And it’s because people are 
inherently sinful.” A certain amount of eye-rolling greets this pronouncement, but some of the men 
are looking interested. “Us, though, we’re different because we work on ourselves,” continues 
Bernard. “And we work together. We’re diverse, yes. But we’re united on the 14 Words.” The 14 
Words are a slogan coined by the late racist terrorist and neo-Pagan ideologue David Lane. The 
slogan reads, ‘we must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children.’ As part 
of the cipher 14/88 – with 8 standing for H, the 8th letter of the alphabet, and thus 88 for Heil Hitler 
– the 14 Words persistently turn up in racist contexts. Most recently, ‘#14’ was painted on the gun 
of the Christchurch racist terrorist, along with the name of Alexandre Bissonnette, the far-right 
attacker who murdered 6 Muslims in a mosque in Québec City in 2017. 
 Even though the group has mostly been good at working together, Bernard says, there has 
still been unfortunate in-fighting in the movement. Pagans, atheists and Christians have been at 
each other’s throats, contending for dominance in the group and in the movement at large. It’s fine 
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to be an atheist, he says, and maybe even a Pagan, as long as you acknowledge the central place 
of Christianity in European history. Further than that, Bernard says, a good fascist needs to 
acknowledge the privileged relationship Christianity has to the ‘natural order’, the source of all 
political legitimacy. “As Christians we follow the natural order,” he says, “and that’s what makes 
us fascists. It’s okay to be interested in different ideas, but we need to follow the natural order. We 
need to follow logos, the Word. Jesus Christ. We have to be in line with that and take it seriously. 
And humour is okay! We have humour in the alt-right. But if we let that take us over, or if we 
forget about the natural order, we become degenerate.” In any case, he says, less fighting is what’s 
needed. “If you are fascists or National Socialists, you don’t want pagans and Christians fighting. 
We need to focus on what unites us. And what unites us is that we strive. We have the will to 
strive.” He ends his speech with a recommendation to engage in more “theological arguments” as 
opposed to flat-out in-fighting – calmly discussing the philosophical details of Christian doctrine 
as they relate to racism and fascism, rather than attacking one another. 
 A few minutes later Joe is also addressing the group. Joe, who is not religious in any 
meaningful sense, echoes the sentiment about not fighting. He also subtly puts Bernard’s 
enthusiastic religiosity down, saying “We don’t want dogmatic pagans or dogmatic Christians in 
the group. They divide the right, they don’t unite the right.” It’s dangerous to get too dogmatic, he 
admonishes the group. “Don’t get involved in the purity spiral”, he tells them; don’t find 
yourselves trying to outdo one another proving your commitment to the cause, getting more and 
more narrow in your views and more and more disconnected from the mainstream. “We need to 
be a very inclusive movement if we want to succeed at all,” he says. “Well, to an extent. I mean, 
not like Milo.” Milo Yiannopoulos, a ‘provocative’ right-wing commentator who was associated 
with the alt-right by much of the media in 2016 as the movement grew in notoriety – while rejected 
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by most within the movement itself – is gay. “But we can accept people who don’t like Hitler.” 
Laughter ensues. 
 Shortly thereafter, Andrei is loudly asserting his extreme uniqueness. “Everyone here is 
Red Pill,” he says, referring to the use of the term as a Matrix-inspired metaphor for converts to 
the ‘hard truths’ of reactionary right-wing thought. “I’m the only one here who considers himself 
Black Pill!” I am reminded of conversations in leftist spaces where a long conversation hammers 
out some kind of rough consensus about an issue, only for someone to come along and insist on 
the immediate armed overthrow of the bourgeois state as the only possible solution to any given 
social problem. The Black Pill is a term first coined in 2011 on the incel blog OmegaVirginRevolt  
to refer to a more nihilist, more cynical and more strenuously misogynistic alternative to the Red 
Pill. Where the Red Pill had some hope in the immediate future for mankind – and I use the term 
mankind advisedly – and in particular some hope for successfully having sex through the use of 
PUA tactics, the Black Pill as elaborated on the blog did not. According to the author of the blog, 
the Black Pill represented the realization that “there is no personal solution to systemic problems, 
and feminism/women is a systemic problem,” and that systemic problems “can only resolve over 
evolutionary time” (The Man In The Orbital Castle 2011). In contemporary incel spaces such as 
r/braincel, memes and ideas which promote extreme despondency and purport to convincingly 
demonstrate the bleak hopelessness of reality are called ‘blackpills’. In an alt-right context, the 
term tends to denote a more-radical-than-thou position which completely denies the possibility of 
reform and views the world in the most negative possible light (at least, the most negative possible 
light for people in the alt-right). It is related to what Blee calls “the politics of despair” (2003, 50), 
a deep defeatism as regards meaningful change held by some on the far right. Those of this 
persuasion sometimes advocate accelerationism, the idea that the dominant liberal order is hurtling 
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toward its own demise anyway, so the best thing to do is help it along in various ways and be ready 
to take power when society collapses. This is exactly what Andrei is telling anyone who would 
listen. “Just let it collapse, and start over!” he exclaims. 
 His listeners push back. Someone proposes building a system of communes in which racists 
could live together. “Make your own communities,” he argues. “We could buy a compound.” They 
debate over what the Black Pill really means. Andrei is trying to make it sound impressive. “Let it 
die,” he tells them. “There’s nothing to save. Let it all die.”  
 Joe isn’t having it. “Alright,” he says. “Yes, things are very bad. But what are we doing 
here if we’re just going to give up? We have goals. We want to affect culture and policy. That’s 
why we’re here. We need to be smart, not just edgy. We have a brand. We need to use it.” He is 
clearly irritated by the previous speakers. I know that Joe wants the alt-right to be seen as a serious 
political force and Bernard’s Nazi mysticism and Andrei’s posturing are pushing his buttons. 
 Bernard exclaims, “Multiple fronts! Diversity is our strength!” This joke is getting tired, 
but many of them still seem pleased with it. Bernard argues that the movement should involve 
above-board groups more or less playing by the rules as well as more revolutionarily-minded cells. 
There was room in the alt-right’s big tent for people of many political persuasions, he tells them – 
but he also reminds them again that Christianity should remain central to the alt-right project. The 
men discuss how ‘Black Pill’ accelerationist propaganda can be good for recruitment if nothing 
else. They touch on survivalist training; one man says he and some others had participated in a 
training with a militia member in the US, and had enjoyed it. Unfortunately, he said 
disapprovingly, the militia member had been “okay with blacks and women. Some of those guys 
are on our side but not all of them.” Another man suggests trying to gain political and economic 
power as a secret group, and using that power to pursue their goals. “Help each other out,” he says. 
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“Make our own companies and hire each other. Get into politics. Get to the highest level possible 
so we can out-Jew the Jews.”  
 It begins to rain quite heavily. The attendees stand around soggily, arguing over what to 
do. Some suggest going to a bar. A few do not seem pleased about this idea, as the new no drinking 
rule has just been announced (“as an unenforced ideal, to get away from the drinking club kind of 
thing” says Joe). Others guess that the rain might stop soon. The discussion drags on for an 
uncomfortably long time. Everyone seems to be waiting for one of the leaders to make a decision 
for them, but none seems forthcoming. I’m getting soaked and starting to worry about my little 
notebook getting ruined.  
 There are two men present who are visiting from out of town and we share a baffled look, 
mystified by the group’s inability to make a simple decision. I mosey over and we compare notes. 
Frankly, they tell me, they are unimpressed. The group seems seriously divided among different 
factions to them. They point out that any group that has to spend almost the entirety of a meeting 
arguing about not arguing is not doing very well. I reflect that the brand-conscious politician types 
in the movement must be getting more and more frustrated with edgy Black Pill rhetoric and die-
hard neo-Nazis. This is clearly not a unified political tendency. Eventually, as the men continue to 
mill about in the rain, I make my excuses, say goodbye and leave.  
  
The Character of Tensions Within the Alt-Right 
 
 I have struggled with how to characterize the tensions within the alt-right. As a big-tent 
movement, it encompasses a constellation of right-wing perspectives, many of which are odds with 
each other, some in quite fundamental ways. The only things that really seem to hold true for all 
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of these perspectives are their commitment to racism and sexism. Many of these different alt-right 
positions can be connected to another alt-right position by a thread of tension, resulting in a 
network of binary oppositions. For example, a position which emphasizes respectability and 
pragmatism is in tension with a position which emphasizes edginess and shock value. They cannot 
easily be reconciled nor is there really much of an attempt within the alt-right to do so. By looking 
at these threads of tension, it is possible to say what the alt-right is concerned with, what conflicts 
occupy it, and what is dynamic within it. Looking at the tension just mentioned, I can say that the 
alt-right is concerned with effective strategies of outreach and public relations. 
 By drawing connections between the poles of different sets of oppositions, it is also 
possible to identify broad, unstable categories or camps within the alt-right. Those activists who 
desire to appear ‘respectable’ in the public eye, I have found, often identify more strongly with 
bourgeois values, which is in opposition to another class position within the alt-right which yearns 
for non- or pre-capitalist class relations. In turn, this latter position is associated with the fascists 
within the movement, while the former is more popular with individuals more invested in 
liberalism as a political order. All these connections, when drawn out, result in two major camps 
emerging, which are usually in considerable ideological, strategic and aesthetic disagreement. 
These camps represent idealized meta-positions which often do not map perfectly onto real-life 
informants. This is because my informants often hold a mixture of beliefs, drawing primarily from 
one camp but borrowing freely from the other to form meta-positions of their own.  
 Opposing positions within the alt-right may not necessarily be the subjects of explicit 
attempts to reconcile them (though sometimes they are), but that does not mean that they are 
isolated from one another. They exist within the same pool of ideas and are constantly influenced 
by one another via the dialogue of the actors holding them. Not only do different individuals hold 
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a mixture of positions, but different positions actually can end up borrowing elements from one 
another, forming semi-hybridized positions which nevertheless remain in tension with their 
opposing position. Several of my informants who identified themselves openly as fascists told me 
that ‘freedom of speech’ was an important principle to them, even though individual rights of this 
sort stem firmly from liberal thought (and were treated with contempt by figures like Hitler, who 
wrote of the need for the State to totally control the media and avoid being “misled by the boast of 
a so-called ‘freedom of the press’” (Hitler 1941, 330).) Having been influenced by liberal rhetoric 
for their whole lives, and being exposed to more liberal elements within the alt-right, these 
informants now hold a fascist position modified to include a putative interest in this individual 
right. 
 In these cases, rather than attaining a synthesis, the different positions remain opposed but 
modified by one another. A fascist who expresses a concern about free speech has not attained a 
middle ground between liberalism and fascism. Rather, the way he thinks about fascist propaganda 
and street politics has been influenced by liberalism in such a way that in conversation, he frames 
them in terms of individual rights, the right to free expression and free assembly. One of my 
informants told me -- just seconds after expressing how much he values free speech -- that 
pornographers should be jailed because such material is degenerate. Another was upset that the 
Unite the Right rally had not gone as planned; he felt that the right of American citizens to freedom 
of assembly had not been respected by the city and the police. This man identified himself a fascist 
and told me that what happened at Charlottesville, with the rally’s permit being revoked, was a 
“real civil rights issue”. The inverse also exists; informants on the more liberal side incorporate 
ideas originating in more revolutionary settings, also without necessarily attaining some sort of 
synthesis of the two stances. One informant repeatedly referred to himself as a classical liberal, yet 
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also told me that a fascist coup could be useful as a tool to be used to safeguard the racial makeup 
of the nation, seeming to believe that the coup leaders would then set up a liberal democracy again. 
 
Camp A Concern Camp B 
Racist Liberalism Relationship to current political order Fascism 
Respectability Politics Relationship to the public Edginess 
Pragmatism Relationship to compromise Purity 
Rationalism/scientism Relationship to materialism Esotericism/spiritualism 
Reformism & Entryism Relationship to current power structure Revolutionism & 
Accelerationism 
Bourgeois Relationship to class Aristocratic/non-capitalist 
Non-violent Relationship to force Violent 
Capitalist Relationship to capitalism Anti-/non-capitalist 
Crypto/covert Relationship to exposure Overt 
 
Figure 6. The various tensions within the alt-right, sorted into camps and organized by specific 
concern.  
 
 To recap, the opposing positions within the alt-right are in both tension and dialogue with 
one another; they rarely attain a synthesis but sometimes modify one another. Further, the two 
wings these positions make up are unstable and porous, with individual adherents often borrowing 
ideas from both camps. These caveats established, I argue that the alt-right comprises two wings, 
which are arranged around a central split between liberalism and fascism. Camp A, the liberal 
wing, is much more focused on maintaining a reputable aura for the alt-right, imagining that a 
pragmatic approach to politics requires the respect of ‘ordinary’, middle-class whites and even 
potentially some people of colour. This position is hopeful about the possibility of incremental 
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reform through electoral means, focusing on such issues as ending immigration from non-white 
countries. Camp A is relatively covert about the true extent of the racism and sexism of its 
positions, preferring to present a ‘moderate’ front. The class identification of Camp A is with the 
bourgeoisie and while extensive lip service is paid to Christian values, the spiritual outlook of 
Camp A is decidedly secular and materialist. By contrast, Camp B is dominated by fascist ideas 
and is more interested in maintaining ideological purity than political respectability. Camp B is 
associated more with the use of slurs and with sometimes violent rhetoric and imagery. It is 
unenthusiastic about the possibility of change through democratic means and indeed is relatively 
contemptuous of democracy as a concept, though often tolerant or supportive of Donald Trump. 
There is a strong revolutionist and accelerationist streak in Camp B, corresponding to a conviction 
that only chaotic or even apocalyptic circumstances will allow white supremacists to achieve their 
goals. Correspondingly Camp B is open about its goals and beliefs to the point of exaggeration. 
The class position of Camp B tends to be a confused amalgamation of non-Marxist populism and 
an identification with the pre-capitalist aristocracy. Camp B tends to be more invested in sincere 
religiosity and spiritualism, including Christian, pagan and mystical elements. 
 Given these tensions, is the alt-right best understood as a ‘public sphere’ (Habermas 2015) 
where citizens engage in lively debate and eventually exert influence on the state? Or is it more a 
counterpublic, “defined by [its] tension with a larger public” (Warner 2014, 56)? Or again, is it 
best thought of as a white-supremacist liberal public containing its own smaller fascist 
counterpublic? Is it indeed a site of struggle between two main forces? Between clusters of 




In her book Righteous Discontent: The Women’s Movement in the Black Baptist Church 
1880-1920, the historian Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham (2003) grapples with similar questions. 
Though it is certainly odd and even on some level disturbing to apply the work of a scholar of 
women in African-American social movements to the inner workings of a white- and male- 
supremacist group, the alt-right is also a social movement, and like the Black church at the turn of 
the last century, is rooted in racial and gender consciousness. Like the alt-right, the church’s Civil 
Rights activists included several disparate camps which nevertheless shared common political 
goals. The interactions of these camps were played out as particular type of dynamic. 
Higginbotham understands the tensions within the Black Baptist church of that era as being 
“dialogic”, rather than dialectical, and imbued with “’dynamic tension’ in a multiplicity of protean 
and concurrent meanings and intentions more so than in a series of discrete polarities” 
(Higginbotham 2003, 16). A dialogic tension is one in which opposing elements are continually in 
reference to one another, thus modifying and conditioning one another without necessarily ever 
constituting a synthesis. Dialectical procedures can be distinguished from dialogical ones as “two 
ways of practising a conversation, the one by a play of contraries leading to agreement, the other 
by bouncing off views and experiences in an open-ended way” (Sennett 2012, 24).  It is less a 
relation of polarity than one of multiplicity, for Higginbotham. In the Black church, she writes, 
“such multiplicity transcends polarity – thus tending to blur the spiritual and secular, the 
eschatological and political, and the private and public” (Higginbotham 2003, 16). 
In the alt-right, two main camps can be observed, taking the form of clusters of positions. 
The relation of these clusters to one another is also a dialogic one. This is why lines are continually 
being blurred without a unifying synthesis emerging. The movement, ideologically, is given form 
by the tensions it encompasses; its various sub-positions all exist with reference to one another, 
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influenced by one another, opposing one another, but always connected to one another. This is 
why my informant Roman can in one breath describe himself as a classical liberal and in the next 
describe fascism as a “sword that you take out when it’s needed, use, and put back in the sheath 
again”. It is why Joe can call himself a radical accelerationist46 while participating in talks to form 
a liberal-seeming front group which encourages women to join and positions itself as a moderate 
advocacy group for European-Canadians. Quite different opposing viewpoints can contain the 
seeds of each other within themselves.  
Tensions like these have been observed in other far-right groups. Blee (2003) notes a 
similar split between more moderate and more radical wings within the modern KKK. Busher’s 
(2016) ethnography of the English Defense League (EDL) argues that like other social movements, 
far-right movements “develop and negotiate cognitive frames” with which to interpret the world 
(8). This negotiation between alternative frames does not have to lead to synthesis and instead may 
lead to uncomfortable blurred lines, ongoing tensions, and ruptures and schisms. In the case of the 
EDL, a rift began to develop between a more cautious, above-board and liberally-minded faction, 
well-represented in the leadership, and a rowdier group, drawn from skinhead and soccer hooligan 
subcultures, figuring more heavily among the rank-and-file. The former group supported building 
links with similar organizations in other countries and tried to strictly forbid overt biological 
racism, while the latter wanted to pursue a more nationalist path, ramp up the xenophobia, and 
relax on the non-racism. Eventually, things came to a point where the two factions were engaged 
in extensive arguments on EDL Facebook pages and were routinely calling each other ‘PC’ and 
‘Nazis’, respectively. Things were exacerbated when the EDL began to pursue tactics beyond 
                                                 
46 Joe told me, “La Meute hates female genital mutilation. We want more of it, because it shows how alien these 
people are. We support all kinds of nationalism, like Black nationalism for example, and ISIS and all that shit, 
because we’re accelerationists. We’re happy to see things crumble.” 
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street protests, such as attending city council meetings. Being forced to articulate clear policy 
proposals in settings like these exposed internal disagreements all the more clearly. Previously, 
the major paradox within the movement had been its stance on violence. A great deal of tension 
existed between espousing anti-violence as a way to appeal to the mainstream, and violence or the 
threat of violence as a major organizing symbol for the EDL. Insightfully, Busher (2016) also notes 




Cryptos and Stormers: Strategic Struggles Within the Alt-Right 
 
 Strategically, there is a clash between the position which advocates for the open and 
uncompromising dissemination of the alt-right’s actual views and the position which counsels 
restraint and obfuscation as tactics for flying below the radar and remaining undetected. Both of 
these positions have, I think, come to inflect the public’s understanding of the alt-right and have 
contributed to significant confusion surrounding the movement’s real goals. People think of crisp, 
respectable-looking, relatively well-spoken figureheads like Richard Spencer. At the same time, 
they think of swastika-ridden neo-Nazi propaganda of the most strikingly direct nature, such as 
the leaflets which alt-right hacker Weev (real name Arnold Auernheimer) caused to be 
automatically printed out of thousands of university printers in the United States. These leaflets 
read, “White man are you sick and tired of the Jews destroying your country through mass 
immigration and degeneracy? Join us in the struggle for global white supremacy at The Daily 
Stormer” (SPLC 2019). 
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 Shortly after the now infamous alt-right ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville, Virginia 
in August 2017, a post appeared on the message board site 4Chan, one of the main alt-right online 
discussion spaces. The post, which was immediately screen-captured (see Figure 7) and 
disseminated by anti-fascist activists, is a tactical analysis of the state of the alt-right. The author, 
anonymous as most 4chan posters are, admonishes the movement for falling into an “echo chamber 
where you can no longer relate to normies”. Contending that the effect of the murder of Heather 
Heyer at the Unite the Right rally was to “massively push the average white person away”, the 
author suggests that a concerted shift toward an unthreatening posture is necessary to undo this 
damage. The author makes a series of recommendations for moving forward. 
 
 




 The first recommendation is to “disavow all KKK/Nazi edgelord LARPers”. Here the 
author is essentially advising alt-right activists to coalesce around Camp A and move away from 
overt extremism. An edgelord is someone who is obsessed with shock value, and whose beliefs, 
or at least desire for real change, accordingly may not be very sincere. Alternatively, an edgelord 
could hold sincere beliefs but be strategically compromised due to a preoccupation with holding 
more and more extreme positions. The white supremacist terrorist Harrison Tarrant, who killed 
dozens of people in a massacre in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, is considered by many in 
the alt-right to have been disastrous for their cause, and Camp A types are frantically trying to 
distance themselves from him, with many even suggesting that it was a false-flag attack meant to 
initiate a crackdown on their movement. Others disagree, but blame his actions on ‘edgelords’. A 
user called barosa, a moderator on the Canadian alt-right Reddit forum r/MetaCanada, wrote of 
the terrorist, “the shooting wasn't a false flag. He was a sociopath, and the edgelords on the chans47 
encouraged him” (barosa 2019).  
 Meanwhile, LARPing, or Live Action Role Playing, is a recreational activity strongly 
associated with a fantasy nerd, Dungeons and Dragons-type subculture, in which participants gear 
up with elaborate handmade mock weapons and armour and stage large-scale live battles, 
undertaken according to complicated rules and guidelines. The term is used as a stigmatizing 
synonym for playing or pretending and has a connotation of being out of touch with reality – 
LARPers are not to be taken seriously. An ‘edgelord LARPer’, then, can be seen as someone whose 
lack of credibility is threatening to the successful claim-making of other actors in the signaling 
environment. The gist of this recommendation is to purge the movement of the kind of young men 
who might embarrass the alt-right and prevent it from garnering respect as a serious political force. 
                                                 




The implication is that anyone who would show up to an important, well-publicized rally 
brandishing a Swastika flag or shouting about gassing Jews is just trying to be shocking or is 
enjoying playing dress-up, and is not a serious or trustworthy activist. He might even be a cop. 
 The next recommendation is to limit the movement to “realistic, incremental overt goals” 
such as repealing and replacing immigration legislation. Any goals shared openly, in other words, 
should be not only achievable in the current political climate but also palatable to people who are 
not avowed racist activists. Racist discourse should be replaced, in public, with discourse critical 
of multiculturalism; this makes it easier to explain to ordinary people “how non-white countries 
produce culture that is at odds with our values”, the author explains. Other recommendations 
include trying to get respectable-looking, well-spoken alt-right figures in front of crowds and 
cameras as often as possible, as well as infiltrating “media and educational positions” in order to 
influence cultural narratives covertly. 
 The recommendation I am most interested in, however, is as follows: 
 
Keep the long-term goals covert and don't ever reveal your power level. Talking openly about [the] white ethnostate 
only leads to failure and the average public turning against you, so disavow anyone who reveals his power level. 
Leftists will recognize dog whistles and know we're crypto, but normies won't listen to them. 
 
This passage requires some more lexical unpacking. The phrase ‘don’t reveal your power level’ 
originates in the 1984-1995 Japanese manga Dragon Ball and was popularized as a meme on 
4chan. In the Dragon Ball universe, the villain’s soldiers have devices which can detect the ‘power 
level’ of combatants and can thus be used to track down and exterminate particularly powerful, 
dangerous enemies. Some fighters, however, such as the protagonist, are able to consciously lower 
their power level temporarily to evade detection. The concept was picked up as an analogy by 
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4chan users (4chan originally was devoted to Japanese anime). As an analogy, the phrase meant 
publicly pretending to have fewer ‘nerdy’ skills or interests than one really does, in order to avoid 
being outed as someone obsessed with anime or internet culture. As time went on, the phrase came 
to simply mean concealing your true motives, skills, beliefs or identity in order to avoid negative 
exposure. Dog whistles are phrases or discourses which can be defended as neutral, respectable 
statements, but which other racists will understand to be racist code, such as using ‘cosmopolitan’ 
to mean Jewish or ‘urban’ to mean Black. Crypto is short for crypto-fascist or crypto-racist, which 
is simply someone who supports fascism or racism but publicly denies this fact or keeps it a secret. 
In short: always deny that you’re a racist, distance yourself from open racists, only speak publicly 
about racist ideology in code – and even if the leftists see through your disguise, liberals will be 
fooled.  
 The other extreme of this spectrum of strategies is epitomized in the style guide used by 
the Daily Stormer, one of the most popular alt-right websites. This guide, written by Daily Stormer 
editor Andrew Anglin, was recently leaked by the Huffington Post (see Feinberg 2017). The 
rhetorical style used by the Daily Stormer is self-consciously extreme, shocking, virulently racist 
and counter to basic rules of ‘respectable’ discourse. There are three main goals involved in this 
style: to desensitize readers to extreme content, to push the Overton window48 as far to the right 
as possible, and to act as a sort of camouflage; since the content is so over the top, readers 
unfamiliar with the alt-right (such as mainstream journalists doing shallow investigations of the 
topic) may be unable to discern whether or not it is parody. It is not. 
                                                 
48 The Overton window is the ideological ‘window of tolerance’ in a given political environment, the range of 
political positions which are considered acceptable within that environment. To push it to the right is to make it 
possible for mainstream politicians or commentators to openly promote far-right ideas. 
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 As I am writing this, the top story on the Daily Stormer’s US news section is commentary 
on a Daily Mail article. The original article is about a study showing that a higher proportion of 
young African-American males in US inner cities have sex before the age of 13 than do males in 
the general population. Around half of these African-American boys who had had sex before 13 
said that they either had mixed feelings about the encounter or had not wanted it to happen. The 
Daily Mail article quotes the researchers as calling for more sex education, more education around 
consent, and more public health initiatives in inner cities. The Daily Stormer piece, by contrast, 
fixates on the ‘threat’ posed to white girls – not even that they may be raped, which is a common 
racist trope, but that they may be encouraged to be ‘promiscuous’ through proximity to black boys. 
I reproduce the text of the article here in full to give the reader an understanding of the rhetorical 
style used by the site. In the original text, paragraphs are one or two sentences long, and there are 
images interspersed generously between them: 
 
You should care about what blacks do with their dicks because chances are they’ll use those on white women.  
There’s no apartheid. These creatures are near people’s daughters on a daily basis. 
 
[Quotes from the Daily Mail article] 
 
Just being near a black boy puts white girls at imminent risk of mudsharking49. It doesn’t matter if blacks have 
their first sexual encounter with another black. The fact that these young niggers are no longer virgins already puts 
them ahead of the white competition, and puts white girls at a vulnerable position. Being around 12-year-old black 
kids who already engage in sexual acts is guaranteed to increase promiscuity in similarly-aged white girls. It also 
makes it likely that the first sexual experience of white girls will be directly or indirectly linked to black males. 
The first sexual experiences of women are known to leave a significant impression in them that influences their 
                                                 
49 A slur referring to a white woman sleeping with a black man. 
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future sexual conducts. You know the consequences of that. They’re already visible. Add to that the fact that these 
young niggers are the ones giving young women STDs, and you have a recipe for disaster. 
 
[Quotes from the US Centre for Disease Control about rates of sexually transmitted infections by race] 
 
Blacks not only have a monopoly on violent crime, but they also have a monopoly on STDs and they want our 
people to pay them “reparations” for slavery even though it’s thanks to slavery that they’re in the best country in 
the world. They should be paying reparations to us for all the trouble they cause, but they won’t because they can’t 
— blacks are incapable of generating wealth. The promiscuity of young niggers is just the cherry on top. If blacks 
want to have sex before 13 or even kick their promiscuity up another notch, they’re welcome to do so in the jungle. 
America is no place for these niggers and their nigger dicks. (Quixote 2019) 
 
 Much of the style guide (Anglin 2017) leaked by the Huffington Post is innocuous, 
recommending that writers for the site follow grammatical and formatting rules similar to those 
used by the Associated Press. It stipulates an article formula perfected by “successful liberal blogs 
such as Gawker”, which have “produced a great method to appeal to the same age demographic” 
as the one to which the alt-right wants to appeal.  It recommends writing at an 8th grade level to 
appeal to “the common man”. Text quoted from mainstream news sites should never be altered, it 
warns its writers, so that the Daily Stormer cannot be accused of being fake news. Frenetic over-
saturation with visual media is recommended, to “look exciting and appeal to the ADHD culture. 
This can’t really be overdone.” 
 The style guide goes on to specify which racial slurs should and should not be used. Slurs 
which make reference to faeces are to be avoided, as well as the term ‘mud50’, which the author of 
                                                 
50 A racist term for a person of colour. 
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the style guide, Andrew Anglin, writes reminds him too much of “SF51 boomer talk”. On the other 
hand most other offensive racial epithets are listed as “allowed and advisable”. The style guide 
also informs writers that  
 










Whenever writing about women make sure to follow the prime directive and blame Jew feminism for their 
behaviour. 
 
 In a section titled ‘Morals and Dogma’, Anglin explains that the purpose of the site is to 
“spread the message of nationalism and anti-Semitism to the masses”. The ultimate goal, he 
continues, 
 
is to continually repeat the same points, over and over and over and over again. The reader is at first drawn in by 
curiosity or the naughty humor, and is slowly awakened to reality by repeatedly reading the same points. We are 
able to keep these points fresh by applying them to current events. The basic propaganda doctrine of the site is 
based on Hitler’s doctrine of war propaganda outlined in Mein Kampf, Volume I, Chapter VI.  
                                                 




In Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler (1941) writes that propaganda is a means, not an end, and should 
always be judged by its outcomes. For this reason, anything which furthers the goal of swift 
victory, no matter how seemingly cruel or ugly, is actually humane and beautiful. Propaganda 
should be emotional in focus, rather than rational, and should always be addressed to the least 
sophisticated members of its audience. Enemies should be vilified and dehumanized more than 
mocked, to avoid the possibility of someone meeting an enemy and finding them not ridiculous 
but threatening and therefore beginning to doubt the propaganda. Propaganda should always be 
entirely subjective and devoid of nuance: 
 
The great mass of a people is not composed of diplomats […] nor even of purely reasonable individuals who are 
able to pass judgment […] The people, in an overwhelming majority, are so feminine in their nature and attitude 
that their activities and thoughts are motivated less by sober consideration than by feeling and sentiment. This 
sentiment, however, is not complicated but very simple and complete. There are not many differentiations, but 
rather a positive and a negative; love or hate, right or wrong, truth or lie; but never half this and half that, or 
partially, etc. (Hitler 1941, 236-237) 
 
Enemies must never be given the benefit of the doubt and must be presented in the most hostile 
and one-dimensional terms possible. Most importantly, writes Hitler, successful propaganda 
cannot get too complicated; it “has to confine itself to little, and repeat this eternally” (Hitler 1941, 
238). 
 Anglin, an enthusiastic student of Hitler’s thoughts on propaganda, continues: 
 




As Hitler says, people will become confused and disheartened if they feel there are multiple enemies. As such, all 
enemies should be combined into one enemy, which is the Jews. This is pretty much objectively true anyway, but 
we want to leave out any and all nuance. […] The Jews should always be the beginning and the end of every 




100% Black and White 
 
Just as we mustn’t present multiple enemies, we mustn’t leave any room for nuance in any other area. To the extent 
that it is possible, everything should be painted in completely black and white terms. The basic idea is that everyone 
on our side is 100% good and everyone who isn’t on or [sic] side is 100% evil. […] The melodramatic nature of it 
also increases entertainment value. This isn’t being dishonest. It is just acknowledging the practical reality that 







There should be a conscious agenda to dehumanize the enemy, to the point where people are ready to laugh at their 
deaths. So it isn’t clear that we are doing this – as that would be a turnoff to most normal people – we rely on 
lulz52. Again, if the article is entirely serious, it should not contain dehumanizing language. Dehumanization is 
extremely important, but it must be done within the confines of lulz. 
  




The Daily Stormer, one of the flagship websites of the alt-right, explicitly sees itself as a Nazi 
propaganda outlet. Its extreme style, which makes no pretensions to civility or respectability, is 
crafted in the image of Adolf Hitler’s propaganda machine. Jews are to be blamed for every 
conceivable problem; nuance and a commitment to any sort of objective stance is to be completely 
extinguished; and enemies of the alt-right are to be rhetorically brutalized in the most bellicose 
manner possible. This posture is related to the fact that, as Blee argues, “having a well-defined 
enemy is crucial” to racist movements because the sense of defending oneself from a terrible 
opponent offsets the fact that there are relatively few benefits to belonging to such movements for 
most members (2003, 106). An obsessive focus on Jewish conspiracy is also useful for hand-
waving away the logical gaps in racist thinking, as well as for converting socio-economic anxieties 
into a racially defined schema with explanatory power vis à vis both history and current events 
(Blee, 2003). It also allows some far-right activists to “support capitalism as a system while 
decrying the actions of [Jewish] capitalists and their corporations” (Ferber and Kimmel, 2004). 
Conspiracy theories in general are particularly useful for such purposes because they are largely 
immune to correction; their very marginalization by mainstream institutions functions to bolster 
their credibility (Barkun 2016).  Anglin goes on to tell his writers to hugely exaggerate all victories, 
no matter how spurious. The Daily Stormer is attempting to counteract what Blee calls a “politics 
of despair”, a defeatist and defensive attitude within the broader racist right which holds that 
success in its goals is unlikely (2003, 50). 
 Violence is central to white supremacist culture, writes Blee (2003). Even groups which 
publicly disavow violence struggle with its value as a symbolic identifier (Blee 2003; Busher 
2016). Anglin takes care to be as supportive of racist violence as feasible without, for legal reasons, 




It’s illegal to promote violence on the internet. At the same time, it’s totally important to normalize the acceptance 
of violence as an eventuality/inevitability. I’m extremely careful about never suggesting violence. […] However, 
whenever someone does something violent, it should be made light of, laughed at. For example, Anders Breivik53 
should be forever referred to as a heroic freedom fighter. This is great because people think you must be joking. 
But there is a part of their brain that doesn’t think that. 
 
 The style guide elaborates the site’s tactical repertoire. One section deals with mass 
trolling54, encouraging writers to link to the social media accounts of targeted individuals so that 
readers can attack them online. In another section, Anglin outlines a ruse used repeatedly by the 
alt-right: convincing mainstream media journalists of made-up alt-right beliefs and using their 
incredulous coverage as free advertising. In one such scheme, the Daily Stormer successfully 
convinced major media that the alt-right believed that pop singer Taylor Swift was a secret Nazi, 
leading to extensive coverage. Anglin reminds his writers that 
  
the people working in the media themselves have been indoctrinated with stereotypes about racists being inbred 
hillbilly retards, so you can make them believe that you believe things that you do not actually believe very easily, 
and they will promote it to try to make fun of you. 
 
In the same vein of trying to fool the uninitiated, Anglin recommends rhetoric so over the top that 
it cannot be easily differentiated from parody: 
 
                                                 
53 A Norwegian far-right terrorist who murdered 77 people in 2011. 
54 Broadly, ‘trolling’ is to act in bad faith online. There is a connotation of doing so in humorous way, as with a 
prank or trick. 
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The unindoctrinated should not be able to tell if we are joking or not. There should also be a conscious awareness 
of mocking stereotypes of hateful racists. I usually think of this as self-deprecating humor – I am a racist making 
fun of stereotype [sic] of racists, because I don’t take myself super-seriously. This is obviously a ploy and I actually 
do want to gas kikes. But that’s neither here nor there. 
 
 These two strategic approaches – crypto-racism and respectability politics versus 
exceptionally overt, ‘edgy’ Nazi propaganda – are in many ways incommensurate. The same group 
would struggle to simultaneously carry out both strategies effectively, although this would be 
possible using multiple front groups. The two strategies reflect different understandings of how 
best to influence the political landscape. The former relies on the trappings of formal institutional 
power to try to carve out a space within mainstream discourse. The latter attempts to normalize 
extreme racism so as to de facto broaden the scope of what can be considered mainstream to 
include neo-Nazi ideas. 
 
Concealing Your Power Level: Philippe on Identitarianism and 
Respectability Politics 
 
  ‘Respectability politics’ was first developed as a concept by Higginbotham (2003) to 
describe a mode of relating to the white mainstream practiced by segments of the Black community 
in the United States around the turn of the last century. She writes that relatively elite, educated 
women in the Black Baptist community at that time “felt certain that ‘respectable’ behavior in 
public would earn their people a measure of esteem from white America” and tried to instill 
“temperance, industriousness, thrift, refined manners, and Victorian sexual mores” among Black 
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workers (2003, 14). Their efforts to reform the Black masses in the image of a Christian middle 
class constituted a “politics of respectability that equated public behavior with individual self-
respect and with the advancement of African-Americans as a group” (2003, 14). Within the 
burgeoning arena of Black struggle, this approach was in conflict with more confrontational 
notions of anti-racist organizing. Higginbotham notes that while those within the Black church 
dedicated to respectability politics, with the goal of ‘uplifting’ African-Americans to equality, may 
seem to have been submissively catering to the demands of white America, they were also 
subversively refusing to acknowledge the limits which white America wanted to place on African-
Americans. They played the game they felt they had to play, and even supported it to some degree 
in the sense that they saw middle-class values as a good thing in and of themselves, but quietly 
aspired to much more than to be nominally accommodated by the racist white state.  
In a similar though inverted manner, those in the alt-right who support respectability 
politics may appear to accept many democratic norms and rhetorical niceties, but quietly reject 
some of the main premises of modern liberalism, particularly the notion of equal rights for women 
and racial minorities. They too hold up many of the values of the white middle class as inherently 
better, as methods of bettering ‘their people’, and also as tools with which to attain their political 
goals. They disapprove of visible tattoos, ‘trashy’ styles, people collecting welfare, and uncouth 
behaviour. They will happily wear nice suits, speak in a reasonable tone, refrain from slurs in 
public, and distance themselves from the cartoonish image of wild-eyed racists frothing at the 
mouth at the sight of a person of colour. Nevertheless, as alt-right adherents their ultimate goals 
are unequivocally white- and male-supremacist and their positions are in constant dialogic relation 
with the cluster of unambiguously illiberal, fascist, genocidal, apocalyptic race-war-mongering 
positions also contained within the alt-right and the far-right more generally. As the 4chan post on 
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strategy shows, respectability politics can for far-right groups be a veneer engineered to conceal 
more radical goals. This is because, as Blee (2003) argues, when racists’ goals are made clear, it 
is more difficult for them to recruit from the mainstream. 
 In the Montreal group, this wing of alt-right thought is represented most fully in Philippe, 
who, in his late thirties, is the oldest member. Philippe is in a position of considerable authority in 
the group, and is one of its main intellectuals, although he is quiet and low-profile at meetings. He 
told me that he is a member of a prominent US-based white nationalist think-tank. He appears to 
be relatively wealthy, or at least has expensive taste in drinks, and is well-spoken and well-dressed. 
Philippe is smooth – almost unctuous – and projects a sense of ease and self-assuredness, carefully 
avoiding slurs and offensive phrasing when he speaks. He presents himself as a moderate who, as 
the mature elder statesman of the group, is tolerantly amused at the antics of the younger and more 
genocidally-inclined members.  
Philippe tells me that the “most modern argument” for ending or slowing immigration to 
Canada is an economic one. As workers from different countries are brought in, he says, a 
permanent surplus of labour forms, driving down wages and serving the interests of large 
corporations. This is an argument crafted to appeal to the left-of-centre; it says nothing about race 
(he spoke to me about “immigrants from anywhere – millions of Swedes, for example”) and centres 
the economic needs of the Canadian middle class. It also relies on the listener’s ability to make a 
Marxian analysis of power and understand that immigration to Canada does serve the interests of 
powerful factions within the ruling class, or else it would not exist; maintaining a permanent pool 
of unemployed workers and a constantly expanding labour force benefits capitalists, and this is 
facilitated by having a relatively high immigration rate if the birthrate is low.  
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A larger population, and thus a larger economy, and thus a larger GDP, is also understood 
by many in the ruling class to constitute a good in and of itself. Philippe told me about a project 
called the Century Initiative, a think-tank run by Dominic Barton, former head of management 
consulting firm McKinsey & Company and chair of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s economic 
advisory board. The goal of the Century Initiative, he told me, is to facilitate the tripling of 
Canada’s population by 2100, so that the population reaches 100 million in that year. As birthrates 
of Canadians are not projected to rise, this explosive growth is to be accomplished almost 
completely through immigration. I suspected that this would turn out to be a far-right conspiracy 
theory, but Philippe’s claims about the Century Initiative turned out to be almost entirely accurate. 
At home, I fact-checked his statements and discovered that the organization really exists, and that 
its stated goals are as Philippe outlined to me.  
 The Century Initiative story is another line calculated to appeal to people in the political 
mainstream. Even for those who are deeply pro-immigration, the kinds of demographic shifts 
entailed by a tripling of the population can seem troubling. An anti-immigration activist can point 
to such a project and exclaim that while multiculturalism may be all well and good, there has to be 
a limit somewhere. Philippe did exactly this, telling me, “It’s like, ‘you like diversity, let’s agree 
we’re diverse, cool, I got it, you know, we’re diverse. Okay. We’re diverse! You won! Like how 
diverse do you wanna get?’ But at some point we have to stabilize our population.” According to 
Philippe, the massive growth of Canada’s population needs to be slowed, and certainly cannot be 
allowed to reach anything like the levels called for by the Century Initiative. Many people, upon 
being presented with these propositions, would agree. I was certainly incredulous about the 
Century Initiative upon hearing about it. Yet Philippe, while not lying to me directly, was relying 
on my unfamiliarity with population statistics to make his point. The Century Initiative wants to 
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triple the population in the next 80 years or so. While this seems like a lot, in 1940, around 80 
years ago today, the population of Canada was 11,382,000 – less than a third of today’s population 
(Statistics Canada 2015). The first census in 1867 listed the population at 3,463,000, again less 
than a third of the 1940 population. Canada’s population has been growing at such a rate since 
Confederation. Further, since 1940, the proportion of Canadians who are foreign-born has not 
changed appreciably, hovering between 15% and 20% for almost all of that time period and 
actually peaking in 1931 at 22.2% (Statistics Canada 2016). Canada’s current rate of population 
growth is ranked 141st in the world, at 0.73% growth per year (CIA 2019). There is a case to be 
made that such growth is unsustainable ecologically in the long run, but neither the growth rate 
nor the proportion of Canadian residents who are immigrants are unprecedented or even unusually 
high. What is unprecedented is the number of Canadians who are part of the group the government 
classifies as ‘visible minorities’. 
 Philippe believes that Africans and people with African ancestry are naturally criminal and 
antisocial and cannot successfully assimilate into Canadian society. He told me about an article he 
had read written by Jared Taylor in the white supremacist publication American Renaissance. In 
the article, about the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, Taylor writes, “Blacks and 
whites are different. When blacks are left entirely to their own devices, Western Civilization–any 
kind of civilization–disappears. And in a crisis, it disappears overnight” (Taylor 2005). The issues 
the city faced during that emergency were almost entirely down to the racial inferiority of its large 
black population, for Taylor. Philippe told me that the article had made an important impact on 
him: 
 
I just couldn’t wrap my head around it. You’re in a time of crisis, you’re supposed to pull together, and just help 
out however you can, it’s just… in times of chaos, that’s when the community should come together and just show 
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what they’re made of. […] [The article] really cemented for me that, damn, like, if during the Ice Storm55 we were 
like 70% Black, things would have been a lot different, you know? And I just started noticing, not individual 
behaviours specifically, but more just the trends, like, the population of Canada’s changing, you have the highest 
rate of uh, racial change in the Western World; in a hundred years, whites will be a minority in this country, 
according to Statistics Canada. […] So, I started being concerned with these questions, you know? The 
demographic makeup of our country and what that means for the future. And I think it’s not in itself an evil thing 
to wonder, you know. 
 
In keeping with the 4chan post advocating a more covert approach for the alt-right, Philippe 
stresses what he sees as the paradoxes of multiculturalism, and tends not to make arguments overtly 
based on biological racism: 
 
 In the end it comes down to – it’s a complicated question obviously – there’s the nature versus nurture debate – 
but a lot of people think that you can become acclimatized to every environment. So, if you bring in, you know, 
Somalis, to any place, they’ll become Swedish or they’ll become Norwegian [laughs] or they’ll become Canadian. 
They think that if you bring a segment of population to a different segment of population, those people will 
somehow absorb society around them and become exactly the same. Which is counter to another tenet of 
multiculturalism where we have to be different. But… we want them to be different but also to be the same… so 
it’s one of those paradoxes that exist in the multicultural worldview. We want people to come here to adapt, but 
we also want them to stay different, in a certain way, so that they can be different, and being different is good, but 
also you want them to become liberal, and to like gay marriage, and to want to recycle, and like farmer’s markets, 
and you know… It’s just this weird paradox.  
 
                                                 
55 In 1998 heavy rain followed by an extremely rapid temperature drop coated much of Ontario, Québec and New 
Brunswick in a thick layer of ice, downing trees and power lines and effectively shutting down the province of 
Québec for weeks. Millions of people were without electricity in the middle of winter and thousands of troops were 
deployed to assist with reconstruction. It is now known to many as just ‘the Ice Storm’. 
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 When I spoke to him, Philippe was involved in organizing with another group, one which 
would be based on the model provided by the Identitarian movement in Europe. Best-represented 
by the French group Génération Identitaire (Generation Identity), the Identitarian movement is 
influenced by the French Nouvelle Droite (New Right) and like some other segments of the far 
right has dropped overt biological racism in favour of the ‘ethnopluralism’ frame (Gattinara 2018). 
Ethnopluralism is a doctrine which states  
 
that in order to preserve the unique national characters of different peoples, they have to be kept separated. Mixing 
of different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction […] Contrary to the traditional conception of racism, the 
doctrine of ethnopluralism is not hierarchical: different ethnicities are not necessarily superior or inferior, only 
different and incompatible. By adopting the doctrine of ethnopluralism (even though its non-hierarchical elements 
were often disregarded by ERP [extreme right-wing populist] parties in practice), ERP parties were able to 
mobilize on xenophobic and racist public opinions without being stigmatized as racists. (Rydgren 2005) 
 
Unlike the protest-based street activism of groups like the English Defense League or La Meute, 
and like alt-right propaganda outlets such as the Daily Stormer, identitarians tend to “dismiss both 
revolutionary and parliamentary tactics to achieve change, and privilege a highly mediatised form 
of intellectual activism aimed at shaping ideas through media, expressive culture, and online 
propaganda” (Gattinara 2018, 6). This stance has been described as ‘metapolitical’ (Griffin 2017, 
Hawley 2017). If a political group has access to peaceful means of achieving its goals, it is likely 
to do so, whereas if such means are closed off to it, violent action becomes more likely (Caiani et 
al. 2012); the turn to propaganda may signify an understanding that neither violent nor electoral 
action is likely to gain them power in the near term. Unlike the editors of the Daily Stormer, 
identitarians are often careful to avoid obviously racist language. Philippe told me that the 
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identitarian group he was getting involved with in Canada would focus less on attacking others 
than on drawing attention to the interests of European-Canadians and asking questions about the 
future of European-Canadian identity. The group would cultivate a more classically liberal position 
in many areas and would allow gay members “as long as they don’t hit on normal people,” he told 
me. The group would also try to get women involved; the presence of women can make far-right 
activism appear less threatening to many people (Blee 2003). It would refrain from disruptive 
protest marches. “The people that I’m comfortable associating with don’t want to go marching in 
the streets,” Philippe said. “We want to be low-risk. Anyways, why would you want to piss people 
off? The Tamils blocked a road not long ago and it just made people angry. It was rude. Somebody 
might be late for work.” Nobody he is organizing with in the new group “is keen on going out and 
causing trouble. We’re not aggressive like the alt-left56.” As for fellow alt-right activists, Philippe 
tells me that there is a split between those who are serious about change and those who “just want 
to stay online and complain.” He maintains contacts with other groups but says he has “outgrown” 
many of them, and his new group accepts only the most “sociable and realistic”. 
 Alone among my informants, Philippe told me that he does not believe that a totally white 
‘ethnostate’ is realistic, at least for now. Killing a quarter of the population would be neither 
morally sound nor politically feasible, he told me, and at least for now, forcing all people of colour 
to ‘repatriate’ is “not sellable”, while paying them to do it would cost too much for the taxpayer. 
“People are here now,” he said, “and we need to deal with them now.” His medium-term goals, 
therefore, are to get media to cover the new identitarian angle, and to push for a significant 
slowdown in immigration to Canada. He did not tell me what ‘dealing with’ Canada’s non-white 
population would actually look like in his mind. 
                                                 
56 Some right-wing activists refer to their antifascist and antiracist opponents as the ‘alt-left’. No left-wing 
movements refer to themselves as such as far as I am aware. 
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 These positions – criticizing multiculturalism rather than espousing overt racism, drawing 
attention to demographic shifts rather than promoting fascism, positioning the movement as 
moderate, aiming for pragmatic goals such as restricting immigration, and trying for positive or at 
least neutral media coverage – resonate with the anonymous tactical analysis on 4chan described 
above. The widely accepted taboo on openly fascist programmes and Nazi symbology makes it 
relatively simple for opponents to discredit far-right activists who use such messaging; often 
simply exposing someone’s connections to a neo-Nazi organization is enough to cost them their 
job and many relationships, and the credibility of openly racist organizations is usually severely 
limited in the mainstream. It is more difficult to argue with activists who deny being motivated by 
biological racism and are able to frame their arguments in terms palatable to centrists and even 
leftists, such as economics and identity politics. As the 4chan post notes, leftists may be able to 
decipher these tactics and identify the underlying racism, but many in the mainstream will not. 
Further, by engaging in respectability politics, alt-right activists adopting the identitarian line are 
able to play into mainstream ideas of credibility. Carefully curating groups to include only those 
who are able to maintain middle- and ruling-class personas, mannerisms, and styling avoids the 
problem of being associated with skinheads, the KKK, and ‘redneck’ racism. A major element in 
the lack of mainstream credibility for these latter three groupings is their association with the 









 The approach taken by the Daily Stormer – extreme edginess, overt biological racism, a 
purposefully simplistic reduction of all problems to Jewish conspiracy, and so on – was common 
within the group but was not embraced fully by any of the men I interviewed. Men like Derek and 
Andrei are keen on pushing the envelope and presenting themselves as extremists. The group 
member who shouted ‘white sharia’ was referencing a term that has been loudly promoted by the 
Daily Stormer. Derek’s comments to me about anti-Semitism being a hook for less intellectually 
inclined recruits also appear to stem at least in part from the ideology promoted by the publication. 
This position holds that outreach should be primarily online, using memes and articles that they 
find irreverent and humorous and which they hope will appeal to young white men. For this 
segment of the group, more or less any publicity is good publicity. Since their beliefs, at least in 
their extremist forms, are already stigmatized in the mainstream, they are not trying to appeal to 
centrists and moderates. Rather, they want to reach people who are already like-minded but who 
are unaffiliated with any movement or group. For this goal, positive media coverage is more or 
less irrelevant. 
 Some members have mixed positions. Bernard, a fascist, wants to accomplish outreach 
through charity and public works projects, similar to programmes undertaken by groups like 
Golden Dawn in Greece or even the Soldiers of Odin in Canada. Soldiers of Odin has been called 
a far-right racist group by mainstream media, though like many such groups, its Canadian chapters 
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typically deny being racist or anti-immigrant and bill themselves as simply being opposed to 
Islamic extremism. Groups engage in ‘street patrols’ and several have organized fundraisers and 
engaged in community work, with one group publicly cleaning up used needles in alleyways in 
Sault St. Marie and another fundraising to send children to summer camp (Klassen 2016). 
Similarly, Golden Dawn -- a Greek fascist party -- organizes charity food handouts for Greeks 
only (AP 2013). Outreach of this sort is distinct from the identitarians’ privileging of media and 
intellectual activism, as well as from protest-based movements like La Meute or the English 
Defence League. In this way, it is similar to outreach performed by church groups, harking back 
to Higginbotham’s conception of respectability politics and meshing well with Bernard’s 
religiosity. Unlike church groups, on the other hand, far-right groups engaged in such outreach 
typically have a threatening or intimidating posture. The Soldiers of Odin wear black uniforms 
emblazoned with a logo featuring the head of a Viking warrior and a Canadian flag, arranged on 
jackets in a manner reminiscent of motorcycle gangs. They also have the word ‘Soldiers’ in their 
name, of course, as well as the name Odin – a Norse god who is the focus of neo-Pagan racist 
groups calling themselves Odinists (Gardell 2003). This is a hybrid form of respectability politics, 
which looks for media validation through charitable public actions which are difficult to repudiate, 
but retains a muscular posture. This posture is in keeping with the far right’s emphasis on 
masculine-coded strength and its sense of being under ‘attack’ from non-white migrants (Blee 
2003).    
 Other members of the group maintain stances in keeping with Camp A’s emphasis on 
respectability, pragmatism, and rationalism while flirting with much edgier corners of the alt-right. 
Roman, who described himself to me as a classical liberal and is invested in maintaining a 
respectable appearance, also told me that he has written articles published by the Daily Stormer. 
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He expresses appreciation for fascism, while arguing that Nazism was a “personality cult of 
Hitler”, that “some democracy” is needed for a healthy society, and that a regulated free market is 
the ideal economy. Joe also holds views which borrow elements from different strategic toolkits. 
He told me that he was at heart an accelerationist who supported ISIS and Black Lives Matter57 
because he believed that these groups would help usher in a crisis which could be exploited by the 
far right to gain power. He also told me that he was getting involved with the same identitarian 
group as Philippe, believing it to be the most realistic way to influence policy. Others did not 
support being totally covert or overt about their beliefs, but adopted a style, common in both the 
alt-right and the far right generally, which refers “obliquely” to racist agendas, a style “meant to 
provoke reactions that mix fear with confusion, creating incidents that create unease with little 
likelihood of drawing physical retaliation” (Blee 2003, 168-169). Examples of this style are 
severely parted undercuts (the ‘fashy’ hairstyle), MAGA hats, and in-joke memes more ambiguous 
than the internet content put out by The Daily Stormer. 
 Even the Daily Stormer, one of the more extreme alt-right publications, engages in a certain 
form of respectability politics; the carefully delineated editorial rules contained in the leaked style 
guide stipulate careful attention to spelling, grammar, layout, citation and hyperlinking. The 
editors of the publication want to imitate the formatting used by credible mainstream publications. 
Their strategy of writing things so extreme that they cannot easily be differentiated from parody is 
also a nod at the more covert posture adopted by many of their colleagues in the movement. 
 The two poles of this debate over strategy and outreach are not cut off from one another, 
nor are they forming a coherent synthesis within the alt-right. Rather, individuals and groups pick 
and choose elements from each to privilege, as the two poles remain in constant dialogue on the 
                                                 
57 Many far-right activists see Black Lives Matter, a protest movement against police brutality toward African-
Americans, as a ‘domestic terrorist organization’ or similar. 
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alt-right internet and in alt-right meetups across North America. As a movement, the alt-right is 
able to encompass both poles and use multiple strategies in a ‘diversity of tactics’ approach similar 
to that used by leftist groups. As with the left, this diversity is not without controversy. Indeed, on 
the left, some activists have begun to “question the ‘diversity of tactics’ approach and to demand 
a serious discussion of which tactics are in fact most productive in building popular support for 
the movement” (Panitch 2002, 43). This is also the case in the alt-right and the rest of the far right. 
Blee (2003) notes that engaging in acts of violence can make recruitment more difficult, and that 
social movements can most easily recruit new members when their stance overlaps significantly 
with mainstream positions. On the other hand, violence is used by racist groups to “affirm people’s 
understanding of their collective interests as racial activists” (2003, 175). Blee distinguishes 
between narrative and strategic violence, with the former being random and routine, and used to 
solidify group identity, and the latter being tactical and taking the form of terrorism and other 
targeted attacks. Insofar as rhetoric can be considered violent, publications like The Daily Stormer 
are vociferous promoters of narrative violence, building up what Blee calls a “habitus of violence” 
(2003, 177). The recent string of terrorist attacks carried out by alt-right adherents are, of course, 
strategic (whether or not terrorism is an effective strategy is beside the point). Both forms of racist 
violence are a “spectacle” (Blee 2003, 186), meant to be witnessed by others and interpreted 
symbolically. This point was rammed home spectacularly in the 2019 Christchurch attack, which 
the shooter livestreamed on Facebook as he carried them out.     
 While individuals may mix and match strategic stances in a kind of tactical bricolage, and 
well-organized groups might temporarily create front organizations in order to carry out a diversity 
of tactics, the pull of the two strategic poles is dividing the alt-right. Activists engaging in 
respectability politics have a certain tolerance for what they see as the humorous takes of pages 
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like The Daily Stormer or the edgy content on forums like 4chan, but as this rhetorical narrative 
violence gives way to terrorist attacks it becomes more and more imperative for them to distance 
themselves from overt extremism. Yet the harder they try to present themselves as moderate, the 
more they will come to resemble the mainstream social conservatives the alt-right opposes. As 
they attempt to carve out space within the mainstream of political discourse, they will be less able 
to confine themselves to anti-system propaganda and will be pushed to articulate concrete policy 
positions. When this happens they will have to contend with the “fundamental impotence of visions 
which survive solely because their essential utopianism is never exposed by the acid test of 
attempted implementation” (Griffin 2017, 22). Philippe’s walking back of the ‘ethnostate’ idea 
could be a sign that some in the alt-right are realizing that its creation would likely be a process so 
hideously violent that in the current political climate, mobilizing significant numbers of people 
around it as an overt policy would be almost impossible. Likely, people like Philippe will abandon 
this goal, at least publicly, and limit themselves to right-wing populist positions which are proving 
electorally successful throughout Europe (Carter 2017, Griffin 2017) and elsewhere, heavily 
inflected with crypto-racism articulated in differentialist terms which stress incommensurability 
over biological inferiority (Betz and Johnson 2017).   
 Like Philippe, the more pragmatic ‘respectable’ activists in Camp A will maintain contacts 
within the die-hard neo-Nazi factions, while privately sneering at them and, more and more, 
publicly disavowing them. Camp B fascists will increasingly see the putative moderates as traitors 
or liberal sellouts, and calls for unity will not be enough to heal the rift. They will be pushed in the 
opposite direction from the Camp A liberals on the ‘ethnostate’ question, as they will realize that 
even if it were possible, the project has no inherent capacity to solve any of the spiritual and 
philosophical problems they identify with late modernity, unless a massive anti-liberal sea change 
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is accomplished throughout the whole white population. This is because a white liberal state is still 
a liberal state, culturally dominated by individualism and materialism and will, in their eyes, still 
be subject to the same degenerative processes from which the West’s main problems stem in the 
first place. They will increasingly retreat into defeatism, mysticism, or both, and terrorist attacks 
will continue to be carried out by men from among their number, deeply alienating them from the 
majority of people and leading to increased state repression. Conservative and nationalist factions 
within the ruling class will see the value in supporting some right-wing populist movements, as 
with the Coalition Avenir Québec party adopting policies overlapping with La Meute’s demands, 
but will continue to consider overt fascist groups to be an unacceptable threat to market stability. 




















 White supremacism, even in its earliest manifestations, has always been associated with 
anti-communism. Perhaps the first instance of formal racial oppression within a colonial context 
was in Ireland, where English governments built a system which placed all English colonists above 
all Irish natives in the legal hierarchy (Allen 2012). As part of the English colonization project, 
native Irish collectivism was legally replaced with English propertarianism (Allen 2012). 
Centuries later, after Irish tribalism had been completely destroyed by colonization, the same 
pattern was repeating itself in the Americas. As Indigenous tribal land use was broken up by 
colonial governments,  
 
the destruction of tribal relations was polemically associated with the threat of socialism and communism. In the 
year the Second Socialist International was formed, [US Government] Indian Commissioner T. J. Morgan showed, 
more than most socialists did, an instinctual grasp of the vital link between white supremacy and anti-socialism. 
“The Indians,” Morgan said, “must conform to ‘the white man’s ways,’ peaceably if they will, forcibly if they 
must. The tribal relations should be broken up, socialism destroyed and the family and the autonomy of the 
individual substituted.” The year before, Commissioner Oberly had pointed out the great moral gulf fixed between 




Later, the fascists took up the cause of anti-communism most fervently, though the liberal capitalist 
states were also terrified of Marx’s ‘spectre haunting Europe’. Hitler railed against communism as 
a tool with which Jews meant to “enslave” the world (Hitler 1941, 875). Mussolini wrote that 
fascism was “the complete opposite of […] Marxian Socialism” (Mussolini 1932). Today, 
although some groups espouse economics with some socialist characteristics, almost all far-right 
groups are bitterly opposed to communist ideas, with the debateable exception of so-called 
‘National Bolshevik’ groups, which seek to reconcile far-right and far-left ideas, especially in 
Russia (Rogatchevski and Steinholt 2015). 
 There has also been a noted tendency toward a type of anti-capitalism within the far right. 
By no means all groups are anti-capitalist (Carter 2017), but fascism’s traditional ambivalence 
toward finance and free markets, propensity for economic interventionism, and hostility towards 
liberal conceptions of individualism have led some people to posit a ‘horse-shoe theory’ of politics 
in which the two ‘extremes’, on left and right, are almost ‘touching’. Partly as a result of this 
theory, and partly as a result of the notion popular in the United States that the deciding 
characteristic of the left is ‘big government’, it is now not uncommon to find people saying that 
fascism is or was primarily a left-wing ideology (Busher 2016; also see for example Jossey 2018). 
No one I spoke to in my research considered themselves left-wing. A commitment to liberal 
capitalism is not a prerequisite for belonging to the right. Rather, the right is characterized by a 
commitment to hierarchy (Bobbio 1996; Carter 2017; Caiani et al. 2012), a value which my 
informants stress. 
 The far right is usually clear about what it is against but is often incoherent or ambiguous 
about its stance on economics (Caiani et al. 2012). Paxton (2004) remarks that it is a mistake to 
suppose that classical fascism “pursued any rational economic goal whatever” (210). Different 
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contemporary far-right strands have various attitudes toward capitalism as a system of economic 
production. These can range from a kind of “right-wing socialism” (Caiani et al. 2012), to Third 
Positionism, which sees itself as opposing both communism and capitalism in a manner similar to 
Baathism (Griffin 2017, Caiani et al. 2012), to neoliberal positions (Carter 2017), to calls for a 
“fair market economy” (Caiani et al. 2012) not particularly different from classically liberal 
capitalist economies. 
 There are similarities between some varieties of leftism and some tendencies within the far 
right. This is because both Marxism and fascism are opposed to liberal capitalism. How they 
articulate this opposition varies greatly, as do their final goals, but by a process akin to convergent 
evolution, some of the rhetoric directed toward the ruling powers by the two can at times sound 
similar. Claims of ‘the fascist government’ or ‘the Marxists in power’ aside, in reality both 
groupings must contend with a powerful liberal state, controlled by powerful liberal elites which 
consider anti-capitalism –  from the left or the right -- to be unacceptable. Left-wing and right-
wing anti-capitalisms must both contend with ‘market fundamentalism’ (Bockman 2013), the 
blend of magical thinking and ruling-class ideology that has come to characterize the neoliberal 
economic policies of governments around the world. Marxists and fascists must also struggle with 
similar questions: outreach versus armed revolution, the readiness of the masses for a new world, 
who can be trusted, who is to blame, who is a serious comrade and who is not. They must both 
struggle to keep their movements from being influenced by the mighty gravitational pull of the 
dominant liberal paradigm, with more radical activists in both milieux finding themselves 
confronted with forms of identity politics which are essentially liberal in character. The tension 





The Incompatibility of Fascism and Liberal Capitalism 
 
For too long those who have profited most from the importation of cheap labour have gone unpunished. The 
economic elites who line their pockets with the profit received from our own ethnic replacement. These greed 
filled bastards expect to replace our people with a race of low intellect, low agency, muddled, muddied masses just 
so their own wealth and power can increase. […] KILL YOUR LOCAL ANTI-WHITE CEO […] Understand here 
and now, there is no democratic solution, any attempt to vote your way out of Ethnic replacement will be met with 
at first with derision, then contempt and finally by force. Democracy is mob rule and the mob itself is ruled by our 
own enemies. The global and corporate ran press controls them, the education system(long since fallen to the long 
march through the institutions committed by the marxists)controls them, the state(long since heavily lost to its 
corporate backers)controls them and the anti-white media machine controls them. Do not suffer under the delusion 
of a Democratic victory, prepare for war, prepare for violence and prepare for risk, loss and struggle, as it is the 
only path to Victory. VOTING IS MOB RULE AND MOB RULE IS MEDIA RULE AND MEDIA RULE IS 
CORPORATE RULE. [All sic.] 
 
-- From the manifesto of the alt-right Christchurch terrorist (Tarrant 2019). 
 
 Within the alt-right, different attitudes toward liberal capitalism are in tension. The 
movement encompasses factions within Camp A, typically more liberal in orientation, which are 
friendly to some form of liberal capitalism and factions within Camp B, typically more fascist in 
orientation, which are hostile to it. These stances tend to correspond with two different orientations 
toward class, with the former identifying with bourgeois class values and the latter, in keeping 
with its opposition to liberal capitalism and modernity more generally, with pre- or non-capitalist 
class relations. As part of its anti-modernism (Caiani et al. 2012), the fascist camp has a marked 
predilection for mysticism and religiosity, while the liberal camp privileges scientism and 
rationalism. These stances have a number of important incompatibilities with regard to each other. 
 Within the group I studied, the two most common positions were for a regulated liberal 
capitalist economy or, for fascists within the group, for a vaguely defined non-liberal economy 
which would perhaps retain elements of the capitalist economic structure but would differ from a 
liberal capitalist economy in key ways. Like many far-right activists, the informants who espoused 
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this stance are interested not so much in “altering socio-economic relations, but [in] returning to 
traditional values to oppose liberalism, democracy, and capitalism”, at least capitalism as in an 
unfettered free market (Caiani et al. 2012, 132). This stance is in keeping with common fascist 
positions which oppose, specifically, liberal capitalism as an economic-political order. Here I am 
defining liberal capitalism as an order which includes representative democracy, a system of rights 
and freedoms, a relatively ‘free’ market economy, and state protection for capitalist property 
rights. Individualism, materialism, consumerism, and secularism are associated with liberal 
capitalism. Fascism is largely incompatible with liberal capitalism on both political and economic 
grounds. The fascist claim to legitimacy differs greatly from the liberal one, and liberal ideas about 
property rights are incompatible with fascist priorities.  
  Liberalism is, at least putatively, representative, electoral, and to some extent universalist; 
fascism is by contrast symbolic, authoritarian and particularist. Liberal democracy claims 
legitimacy through the notion that politicians, as members of councils, congresses, parliaments 
and so forth, represent the population in the sense of speaking and acting on their behalf – at their 
request, as it were – in the halls of government. Through having won an election, a political 
representative in a liberal democracy is assumed to be able to represent any different combination 
of groups that might exist in a given voting constituency58. In the fascist imaginary on the other 
hand, the leader represents the populace in the sense of standing for it, of actually symbolizing it 
in his (and it is always a ‘his’) very being. In liberal democracy, political conflicts between groups 
are supposed to be more or less resolvable through a vote, and the process of the election is 
supposed to determine which person is best qualified or suited to be the representative of that 
                                                 
58 Of course, all liberal democracies exclude some people, and thus some groups, from the voting process. 
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constituency. Liberalism’s claim to universality rests on this theoretical capacity to represent any 
combination of voters.   
 By contrast, fascism typically makes no such claim to universality; quite the opposite. 
Instead it is focused on the state’s identification with the particularity of a specific populace, one 
which is not a constituency composed of disparate individuals but an organic, indivisible entity in 
the form of the nation. The fascist state, in effect, is the nation – one might say that it is a state-
nation rather than a nation-state. Therefore it could not, as with a liberal state, claim to essentially 
be able to represent any given population with only minor adjustments. The connection between 
the state and the nation is in the fascist imaginary so imbued with this national particularity and 
this organicity that the will of the leader is automatically the will of the nation, obviating the need 
for elections and representatives.  
 The second major incompatibility between fascism and liberal capitalism lies in the 
systems of property rights always found in liberal capitalism. The class which came to dominate 
under capitalism, the bourgeoisie, developed out of those segments of medieval European society, 
whether farmers, craftsmen, or shopkeepers, most engaged in what little market commerce existed 
during that period (Graeber 2007). The mores and worldviews of this class accordingly also came 
to dominate; and since this class was the most actively caught up in the world of commercial 
property relations, these types of relations spread throughout society as well, and with them, laws, 
rules and regulations conducive to the successful accumulation of capital by individual property-
owners (Graeber 2007). This property-oriented social order, which C. B. Macpherson (2011) calls 
‘possessive individualism’, is the basis of liberal conceptions of rights and freedoms. The right to 
accumulate capital in a relatively unfettered manner – liberally, in other words – is the cardinal 
freedom under liberal capitalism and is the cardinal good as well. As such, the state is expected to 
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exist mainly in order to protect capitalist property relations and make the world safe for 
accumulation.  
 Fascists are typically not interested in doing away with property. However, liberal capitalist 
property relations are – at least to a degree – incompatible with the archetypical fascist program. 
In the fascist program, nothing can be held to be more important than the needs of the fascist 
program – certainly not something as base as money. The economy should only ever serve the 
needs of the state-nation, never the other way around. As Hitler wrote, “for myself and all true 
National Socialists there is only one doctrine: people and country. […] Every thought and every 
idea, every doctrine and all knowledge, have to serve this purpose” (Hitler 1941, 288-289). The 
needs or desires of individual persons cannot supersede the will of the ruling clique and their 
interpretation of the national interest. If a needed resource is owned by an uncooperative capitalist, 
for example, it must be seized. The state – and the economic infrastructure of the country such as 
banks and strategic industries – cannot be permitted to remain in the hands of unpatriotic private 
capitalists (historically, and still, with an emphasis on Jews). The state is not opposed to the 
accumulation of capital in and of itself; trade may occur, but it occurs at the pleasure of the rulers, 
not as a revered right. Paxton writes that in Nazi Germany, the Party and the capitalists “made 
practicable bedfellows (though not inevitable ones, nor always comfortable ones)” (Paxton 2004, 
208). 
 If these tenets, such as they are, of fascist political economy are reminiscent of pre-
capitalist feudal relations, it is not a coincidence. The third area of disjuncture between fascist and 
liberal worldviews is in the class relations they propound, and in this area, fascism displays some 
decidedly pre-modern and anti-modern predilections. While liberalism is class rule by the 
bourgeoisie, fascism is an anti-bourgeois ideology (Paxton 2004; Smith 1998; Stackelberg 2009) 
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– not against individual members of that class themselves necessarily but against bourgeois class 
rule and the bourgeois class relations per se which dominate under liberal capitalism. In the liberal 
order, as informed by the ideologies and interests of the class which came to dominate it, 
everything is mediated by money (of which that class has the most). Relations between individuals 
are essentially property relations: who owns what, and who is owed how much by whom, as 
determined by the market and recognized by the state (Macpherson 2011). Public interactions are 
really interactions between the competing interests of different stocks of capital and labour-power, 
since both individuals and corporate persons can be seen as being essentially made up by their 
property or their relation to capital. Since everything is mediated by money, more or less 
everything is for sale; and since everything is for sale, everything can be converted into money 
and thereby made equivalent to anything else which can also be converted into money (Graeber 
2007).  
 The logical conclusion of this situation is that there comes to be basically no difference 
between two equally productive factories on opposite sides of the country, or in different countries 
altogether. By the same token, the main difference between individuals comes to lie in their 
differential access to capital. From the perspective of capital, one worker is interchangeable with 
another who may come from an entirely different country, as long as both can perform the same 
tasks. A worker can also, in theory, through obsessive asceticism save enough to become a 
capitalist and hire others, so the worker and the capitalist are also potentially equivalent: “The less 
you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theater, the dance hall, the public house; the 
less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save– the greater becomes your 
treasure which neither moths nor rust will devour – your capital” (Marx 1959, 51). Further, under 
liberal capitalism a bourgeois politician is thought to be able to adequately represent both the 
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worker and the capitalist. Fascist ideology, however, is fundamentally opposed to these principles, 
as it “combats the whole complex system of democratic ideology [and]  affirms the immutable, 
beneficial, and fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently leveled through the 
mere operation of a mechanical process such as universal suffrage” (Mussolini 1932). Fascism 
requires that the differences between people be a matter of substance, mediated by strength, that 
these differences be mostly immutable, and that they be protected and upheld by the state. In this, 
the social relations upheld by fascists more closely mirror feudal relations than liberal capitalist 
ones. 
 In Western European medieval society, divided between an aristocracy and a peasantry, 
there could be no potential equivalence between members of the two classes. A peasant could not 
simply accumulate a given amount of honour, prestige, or grace through diligence and hard work 
and become a member of the nobility. Nor could he buy the land his hovel stood upon; the number 
of relations mediated by money was limited, particularly because most people never had any of it 
as even if they received wages they tended not to be paid in currency (Spufford 1988).  In fact, 
when economic conditions shifted enough that commoners could accumulate enough money to do 
things like buy up titles and began to challenge feudal power economically, it spelled the end of 
the feudal order. In the medieval conception of the world (at least from the perspectives of lords 
and literates, and at least as understood by the historians who later studied them) there was a 
difference in substance between the peasants and the aristocracy. The word aristocrat means ‘rule 
by the best’. Aristocrats ruled because they were inherently stronger, more refined, better-born. 
The differences between the two groups were held to be insurmountable, ordained by God, and 
part of the divine order of things via the divine right of the monarch, who granted titles (Mączak 
2015) – a concept stretching back to “the earliest phases of medieval history” (Burgess 1992, 841). 
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Conflict between the two groups was settled through force of arms, with the aristocracy seeing 
itself as a warrior class and possessing armies and castles, and the peasants not. Power was 
legitimized through right of conquest; nobles in England and France styled themselves the 
descendants of Norman or Frankish invaders respectively (Mączak 2015). The state, insofar as 
such a thing could be said to properly exist in the medieval period, existed to maintain the 
dominance of the feudal nobility and the monarch. 
 I am, of course, generalizing for the purposes of illustration. The liberal order is heavily 
inflected by the various religious, ethnic, and mythical belief systems dominant in the societies in 
which it developed, not only by the mores of the medieval commercial classes. For example, 
though the ultimate logic of liberal capitalism might theoretically make all people potentially 
equivalent or allow for any combination of identities to be included in the representative system 
of government, in practice there have always been categories of people excluded from 
participation, both politically and economically (Griffin 2017, 23). As for feudalism, since at least 
the 1970s, historians have been questioning the validity of the term ‘feudalism’ as a model for 
describing European society in the early Middle Ages in the first place. Brown (1974) notes that 
various types of property holding and land use were practiced throughout Europe during the 
thousand years commonly referred to as the medieval period. In some times and places, vassal 
knights were paid in money, not fiefs; in some areas peasants had a great deal more autonomy than 
in others; commerce flourished in some regions and was almost non-existent in others. However, 
liberalism and feudalism are useful historiographical signposts for understanding not only different 
economic forms, if only broadly and as ideal types, but also for understanding the imaginaries 
from which people draw ideas and understandings about the world. Even if feudalism was never a 
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discrete and unified political order as early historians may have imagined, their understandings of 
feudalism have been important in shaping the way the past is imagined.  
 This last point is important because many fascists, both contemporary and early 20th 
century, display a decided class identification with the nobility, and specifically with the ‘warrior 
aristocracy’ of the medieval period – a class which does not exist now and did not exist in the 20th 
century. Members of Atalante wrote,  
 
we want to conserve nothing about this sick, decadent modern world. What we want is to create the new warrior 
aristocracy of tomorrow by encouraging our activists to practice martial arts, or to weightlift, and to read all types 
of literature. We don’t want to conserve this hierarchy with the richest at the top and the poorest at the bottom, but 
rather to bring about one based on merit, while extolling the original values of the West. By original values, we 
are in no way referring to those of the pre-decadent world of the recent past, but rather to the immemorial values 
of heroism, adventure, sacrifice, honour, and risk-taking, as well as many more. We avail ourselves of the work of 
Dominique Venner, Julius Evola, Nietszche, Ernst Jünger, de Benoist, Duprat and many other authors. We take 
inspiration from whomever we like, because we do whatever we want. (Atalante 2018b, translation mine) 
 
Scholars have noted a tendency for radical right-wing activists to identify themselves with a heroic 
élite upholding timeless values (Carter 2017, Caiani et al. 2012). This tendency, and the fascist 
identification specifically with the aristocracy, springs from the foundational position of the right, 
intensified on the far right, which is the promotion and justification of hierarchy and inequality 
(Bobbio 1996; Carter 2017; Caiani et al. 2012). It also shares direct roots with fascist thinking 
about race (Kale 2010; Arendt 1979; Benedict 1942; Allen 2012).  
 Brown (1974) writes that feudalism as a historiographical construct – with its warrior 
aristocracy and rule by force of arms – was, if not exactly invented, then codified in the 17th and 
18th centuries by antiquarians and historians keen to uncover order in the confusing welter of social 
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forms occurring during the long period between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Early 
Modern establishment of strong kingdoms in Western Europe. It was also during the 17th and 18th 
centuries that race was developing as a concept in Europe (Allen 2012; Hirschman 2004). One of 
the main architects of what Hannah Arendt calls “race-thinking” was simultaneously “the first to 
elaborate definite class-thinking” in the form of his theories about the medieval nobility (Arendt 
1979, 162). Henri de Boulainvilliers (1658-1722), a French count,  
 
interpreted the history of France as the history of two different nations of which the [Franks], of Germanic origin, 
had conquered the older inhabitants, the “Gaules”, had imposed its laws upon them, had taken their lands, and had 
settled down as the ruling class, the “peerage” whose supreme rights rested on the “right of conquest” and “the 
necessity of obedience always due to the strongest”. […] In order to regain uncontested primacy for the nobility, 
Boulainvilliers proposed that his fellow-noblemen deny a common origin with the French people, break up the 
unity of the nation, and claim an original and therefore eternal distinction. (Arendt 1979, 162) 
 
Arendt introduces a near-contemporary of de Boulainvilliers, another French aristocrat named 
Louis-Gabriel du Buat-Nançay (1732-1787), who proposed an international organization for the 
promotion of the interests of the “aristocracy of barbarian [i.e., Germanic] origin” (Arendt 1979, 
163) – an organization which apparently was eventually actually founded by aristocrats in exile 
from the French revolution, “in order to stave off the revolt of those they considered to be a foreign 
enslaved people” (Arendt 1979, 164). The idea that the French commoners were a mongrel race 
descended from slaves while their betters were a mighty race of conquerors was apparently 
relatively common among members of the French upper crust, and gave rise to the curious fact 
that “Frenchmen were to insist earlier than Germans or Englishmen on this idée fixe of Germanic 
superiority” (Arendt 1979, 165).  
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 These notions were to culminate in the notorious work of yet another French count, Joseph 
de Gobineau (1816-1882), in the form of his masterwork An Essay on the Inequality of Human 
Races (Arendt 1979; Benedict 1942; Kale 2010). This book, while still proposing the innate 
superiority of the aristocratic master race, argued that the French nobility had embarked on a long, 
slow decline, beginning with the very first miscegenation between the conquering ‘Aryan’ nobility 
and the indigenous Gallo-Roman leadership class, and coming to a head in the democratic and 
nationalist revolutions of the early modern period (Kale, 2010). Kale cautions that the role of 
Gobineau in shaping later race-based thought is frequently overstated by scholars, as his 
aristocratic elitism and his pessimistic theories about the decline and decadence of France were 
not greeted enthusiastically by his contemporary compatriots. Nevertheless, he concludes that it 
was indeed Gobineau who was “the first to theorize that race was the deciding factor in history” 
(Kale 2010, 60). This idea, that history is primarily an epic struggle between different racial stocks 
and that this racial aspect is the key to understanding its unfolding, is of profound importance to 
contemporary organized racism, even if Gobineau’s specific ideas on the ethnic composition of 
the early modern French class hierarchy are no longer in vogue.  
 This aristocratic race-based anti-nationalism – which was at the time the conservative 
position, opposed to the revolutionary ideas of emerging French nationalism (Arendt 1979; 
Benedict 1942; Kale 2010) – is seemingly at odds with the putatively populist ultranationalism 
(Griffin 2017) espoused by modern fascists, while containing the seeds of many of their ideas. It 
illuminates a paradox in far-right thinking which activists must struggle to resolve: namely, how 
to reconcile nationalism with racism, and populism with elitism, all of which are key components 










 My informant Simon, a recent graduate from a business-oriented university program in his 
early twenties, was the person who first encouraged me to look into the work of Julius Evola (1898-
1974), a favourite author and one of the influences cited in the Atalante tract above. In his work 
we find strong echoes of the pessimism and elitism of Gobineau as well as some of the origins of 
Atalante’s ‘warrior aristocracy’. Evola, an Italian theorist and aristocrat interested in radical 
elitism, esoteric paganism, ‘spiritual racism’ and Roman revivalism, never joined the Fascist party 
and was not particularly influential in pre-War Italy (though he was apparently popular among the 
more right-wing and esoteric elements of the Nazi party). Nevertheless, “after the war he became 
the intellectual leader of the most extreme radical right” elements in Europe (Payne 1995, 503).  
 In what follows, I expand at length on Evola because his positions have greatly influenced 
not only some of my informants but also post-War far-right thought more generally. In his ideas I 
see great potential for analytical traction. By delineating a sort of ideal type of Evola-influenced 
far-right thought, it is possible to gain insight into the seemingly paradoxical far-right positions on 
nationalism, racism, populism and elitism and how they might be resolved or addressed. This 
allows me to further expand on the topic of fascist attitudes toward class. Evola also functions well 
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as a case study of the mystical, esoteric, and spiritualist trends within the far right as well as its 
anti-modernism and non-Marxist resistance to liberal capitalism. 
 Evola saw history as “totally cyclical” and believed that “the modern world was headed for 
ultimate crisis and extinction”, since political power had passed through the ages “from priests to 
warriors to merchants and finally to slaves”; the slaves’ “egalitarianism would result in 
catastrophe, but also an opportunity to restore true values” by means of a “ruthless elitism” (Payne 
1995, 503). In other words, the warrior leaders of the feudal period had been supplanted by 
bourgeois capitalism, the decadence of which had given rise to communism, or rule by the race of 
slaves; what was needed to renew things was, as Atalante would put it, ‘the new warrior aristocracy 
of the future’. In his book Pagan Imperialism, Evola writes: 
 
Are liberation and renewal still possible in this world in its twilight? […] This is not a matter of compromises or 
adaptations. The power of a new Middle Ages is needed. A change, interior as well as exterior, of barbaric purity 
is required. Philosophy, “culture”, everyday politics: no more of all that. It is not a matter of shifting to the other 
side of this bed of agony. It is a matter of finally waking up, and standing on one’s feet. Here and there, men still 
exist, mindful of ancient nobility, who now, as individuals, notice the intolerable discomfort and feel driven to 
react, sometimes in one cultural domain, sometimes in another. Before it is too late, the way to the peaks must be 
brought back into the consciousness of these scattered men, beyond all the limits and private interests which 
currently wear away their strength. Unrelenting action must ensure that their purest strength manages to disclose 
itself, as something invisible, ready to shatter the foul crust of rhetoric, sentimentalism, moralism, and hypocritical 
religiosity with which the West has covered and humanised everything. (2017, 7) 
 
This take, scarcely distinguishable from that of Atalante and myriad other skinhead gangs and 
neofascist organizations, has been enormously influential on the post-War far right. In it we get a 
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taste of how Evola, who was fascinated by Indian religious and mystical traditions, integrated the 
concept of caste into his thinking, a concept which was integral to his views on race.  
 Evola’s views on race go some way to addressing the contradiction in far-right thinking 
which I mentioned above, that of the tensions between nationalism, racism, populism and elitism 
– though it must be said that Evola was no populist, and subsequent figures who integrated 
populism into Evola-influenced lines of thinking did so to some extent in spite of his work, not 
because of it. Evola accepts the 18th and 19th century pseudoscientific racial categories as relatively 
unproblematic (Furlong 2011), but for him, biological inheritance is only a component of race, and 
not even the most important component (Evola 1995). More important is the ‘race of the spirit’, 
also referred to as spiritual race. Further, race and caste are essentially two components of the same 
hierarchical (and spiritual) principle, with race properly denoting hierarchical differences between 
civilizations and caste denoting hierarchical differences within them (Furlong 2011, 117).  
 Furlong (2011) writes that for Evola, the decay of a civilization’s race and of its caste 
structure are intertwined and interdependent. Degradation for both occurs when the leadership 
caste loses its spiritual connection to a higher plane of existence (2011, 118). For Evola, the lower 
castes of people (merchants and workers), even within a ‘higher’ race, did not in the past have 
direct access to this spiritual connection. Rather, echoing the doctrine of the divine right of kings, 
for them the “sacred authority” of their leaders allowed them to “participate in a limited way in 
the supernatural force of their community through the hierarchy that joined them to the elite, even 
though they did not have full understanding of the interior life that gave the elite form and 
direction” (Furlong 2011, 118). The member of the lower caste, “through his devotion and active 
subordination to a higher caste”, could express “a faithfulness and a devotion […] to a higher form 
of being that the inferior could not directly and organically live out as his own nature (svadharma)” 
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(Evola 1995, 98). Hierarchy affords spiritual wholeness and the correct expression of one’s 
transcendental destiny. The ancients, according to Evola, understood that to be born into a 
particular caste and to embrace their place within it allowed them to attain “a condition that really 
corresponded to their own nature and to their deepest attitudes” (Evola 1995, 92). Once the proper 
hierarchy disintegrates and the spiritual connection is lost however, the eventual downfall of the 
race is ensured.  
 Here the question of biological inheritance arises; for Evola, the final collapse could be 
delayed, perhaps even for a long time, by protecting what is left of the blood of the master caste, 
for this blood “atavistically” still retains elements of its superiority (Furlong 2011, 199). This being 
said, Evola cautions that those who concentrate on the purely biological, hereditary, and therefore 
material aspects of ‘race’ lose sight of the more important spiritual component. It is worth quoting 
Evola at length here: 
 
The unity and the purity of blood are believed by some to be the foundation of life and the strength of a civilization; 
therefore, the mixing and the ensuing ‘poisoning’ of the blood are considered the initial cause of a civilization’s 
decline. This too is an illusion, which among other things, lowers the notion of civilization to a naturalistic and 
biological plane, since this is the plane on which race is thought of in our day and age. Race, blood, hereditary 
purity of blood: these are merely ‘material’ factors. A civilization in the true, traditional sense of the word arises 
only when a supernatural and nonhuman force of a higher order […] acts upon these factors. […] The adulteration 
and decline of civilizations is [also] caused by [a divine event], though it acts in the opposite, degenerative sense. 
When a race has lost contact with the only thing that has and can provide stability, namely, with the world of 
‘Being’; [and also loses] the inner race and the race of the spirit […] then the collective organisms that a race has 
generated, no matter how great and powerful, are destined to descend into the world of contingency; they are at 
the mercy of what is irrational, becoming, and ‘historical’, and of what is shaped ‘from below’ and from the 




 To sum up this position, the differences between races, and the differences between social 
strata within races, are of the same quality and are characterized by hierarchy. Hierarchy is not 
only natural but desirable, and not only desirable but necessary on a deep spiritual level. Biological 
race is a reality on a material level, and racism is a proper expression of the natural hierarchy, but 
as a program of action, biological racism is hopelessly fettered without a correct understanding of 
the most important component of race and caste, the spiritual. The spiritual connection of the elite 
to the divine has been broken, which has disrupted the proper hierarchy; Europeans are therefore 
living in the twilight of their race. Interestingly Evola seems to argue not that the basis of Marxian 
historical materialism is nonexistent, but that it becomes a reality only once the divine connection 
is broken – and therefore it could be abolished through correct spiritual action. The only hope for 
salvation, if there is any hope at all, is through the disciplined actions of a spiritually fit vanguard 
who will reimpose ancient values and thereby re-establish the proper, timeless order of things. 
 If this is so, then a racist activist can begin to resolve some of the tensions between elitism 
and populism. He can hold up the superiority of the white race as a whole while also considering 
himself to be part of an even more superior elite, corresponding to the erstwhile warrior 
aristocracy, by virtue of his understanding of and adherence to the correct principles. In this vision, 
all whites are the heirs of a mighty civilization, membership of which confers greatness, or at least 
should; but most of those whites, who eschew correct principles, can be considered degenerates. 
This is in keeping with a noted tendency of the far right to “[identify] itself with the people […], 
but, at the same time, within an elitist vision of society, [present] the people as rather ‘stupid’ and 
in need of a guide (explicitly indicated as the right itself)” (Caiani et al. 2012, 57). The white 
masses are technically members of the superior race but are so alienated from the divine that they 
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are scarcely better than potential whites. They are a caste in need of proper masters, aimlessly 
filling their meaningless lives with decadent consumption and depravity. However, this is not 
really their fault. They may be degenerates, but they are our degenerates. They are alienated 
because of the lack of proper hierarchy to give them structure and the lack of a spiritually fit 
leadership caste to give their lives spiritual worth. Their current masters, the bourgeois capitalists, 
who are totally disconnected from the divine and controlled by Semitic influences and greed, do 
not deserve their mastery. Whites require control by the true leadership caste, the warrior 
aristocracy, who will put them to their proper use in elevating the race as a whole and making their 
nations great again. As Caiani et al. put it, “If the corruption of the political class is the diagnosis, 
the prognosis is not to return the power to the people, but to reassign it to an exclusive (more or 
less heroic) elite” (2012, 203). 
 Along these lines, a policy to reverse the decline of the white race would protect the blood, 
yes. But perhaps even more importantly it would stamp out decadent behaviour; regain the correct 
spiritual footing; reimpose the ironclad hierarchy of the imagined past; and rally the lower strata 
behind their rightful leaders. Through hierarchy, the degenerates would once again have indirect 
access to the betterness of their betters, which is the thing they most lack, even if they do not know 
it. This would allow them to discover their true nature, which essentially is to be happily obedient. 
Such a policy would establish rule by the best, that is to say, aristocracy; and it would do away 
with the economic power of the merchant caste, that is, liberal capitalism – and, where applicable, 
the political power of the slave caste, that is, Marxism. 
 There is no doubt that Evola was a committed racist. However, at issue for Evola, and for 
others on the far right as well, is the question of whether one’s racism should primarily be based 
on materialist arguments drawn from the realm of IQ testing, classical racist anthropology, and 
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contemporary fields like evolutionary psychology and sociobiology; or, whether it should be 
primarily based on a spiritual or mystical understanding of organic community, ethnicity, and 
racial ecumenicity. Another question is whether racism is in itself enough to unite and sustain a 
movement and ultimately a new world order, or if it is only a necessary part of a wider holistic 
structure, each component of which must be ideologically consistent. My informants have a 
number of different positions on these questions. 
 
 




 Evola’s positions are often echoed in the rhetoric of my fascist informants, and to a lesser 
degree sometimes in my more liberal informants. Bernard, a fascist and a science graduate in his 
mid-twenties, explained to me in our second interview why he had moved away from more 
‘identitarian’ initiatives being spearheaded by the group’s leadership, and in which Philippe and 
Joe were getting involved. He had moved toward a more spiritual understanding of racism 
informed by his newfound interest in ultra-conservative Christianity. When I met him, he was the 
most explicitly religious or mystical member of the group. In that sense, he is closest to Evola’s 
views on race and spirituality. He told me, 
 




Jay: You quit? 
 
B: Yeah, it wasn’t for me. But I think it’s good, what they’re doing. 
 
J: Can you tell me why it wasn’t for you? 
 
B: Because they over-focus on identity, and they make everything about race. And the thing is, I agree with the 
identitarian arguments, because it is important, and identity is linked to race. But race alone is necessary but not 
sufficient to having a proper culture. So, we’ve had ethnostates in the past, and it doesn’t solve it if you don’t have 
other things in check as well. 
 
J: Like what? 
 
B: Like if you don’t have a proper moral, political, theological structure basically. So you see this in places like  
Sweden for example. It was basically just an ethnostate  until very recently. But they lost their traditions from the 
past. They lost their religion, which is traditionally Christian, and because of that they started allowing non-, like, 
these foreign ideas to come in, and it destroyed their society, basically. Now look where they are. They’re almost 
on civil war because of this. So, ethnostates alone, it’s like, that’s my argument with [the identitarians]. I was 
arguing that we should be doing more, like, um… [long pause] Like, charity works, to show to the public, similar 
to kind of what Golden Dawn is doing in Greece, where no matter that every single media is against Golden Dawn, 
anyone who lives there actually knows that they’re good people. Because for example they’ll come and shovel 
your snow or something, or… they’ll go to old ladies, shovel their snow, get their groceries, and basic stuff like 
this, and you know, hand stuff out. 
 
J: Community work. 
 
B: Community work, and helping the homeless and stuff, so. This is the stuff that I thought we should be focusing 
on, primarily, because it shows the public that, obviously we’re not monsters, no matter what the media might say, 
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and people are gonna start using their own judgement and saying, ‘oh, well, the media says the exact opposite from 
what I think,’ so maybe that will introduce more distrust in the media, which is good; and, you can also at the same 
time focus on your community and bring that identitarian aspect which we’re missing right now in the West. So 
it’s good. We have uh, you have like three things at the same time which you’re doing. But they wanna focus only 
on the ethnic aspect. They wanna focus only on the identitarian aspect. Putting up posters and doing signs and stuff 
like this, which I just thought was insufficient, and I don’t disagree with them but I don’t think that they’re taking 
the best approach and I had to quit at a certain point, early on I quit. Like after like a month. [sigh] So.  
 
For Bernard, racial consciousness and biological racism are not enough. A “proper moral, political, 
theological structure” is required in order for far-right activists to have any hope of achieving their 
goals. Even a society from which all non-whites and undesirables have been purged would find 
itself degenerating without a strong, ultra-traditionalist Christian state – that is, a spiritual elite 
operating according, to some extent, to pre-Enlightenment principles.  
 Of particular concern for Bernard is the influence of Satan on the affairs of whites. Without 
the help of Christ, they are likely to fall victim to his tricks. This is evocative of Evola’s claim, 
quoted above, that races which become spiritually degenerate fall victim to the ‘contingent’ and 
the ‘historical’ (that is, become weakened, impacted by mundane material factors, and susceptible 
to collapse). Bernard tells me that he was an atheist for most of his life, until a series of realizations 
changed his mind. He explains his newfound faith with reference to the philosophical and 
theological term logos, a Greek word meaning among other things ‘word’, ‘order’, ‘reason’ and 
‘knowledge’. He tells me that 
 
Logos-based societies are what Western civilization is built on. Even before Christ, we had logic, which was made 
by Aristotle. Formalized by Aristotle because that’s the logos. In terms of pure deductive logic, there is a logic 
there and that is the logos. […] And then I saw that logos-based religions were literally true. So, in following logic 
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and realizing that – you know, it’s this image of Satan, Jordan Peterson talks about this all the time; Satan is 
sophisticated. He’s not an idiot. So Satan, he’s always depicted in mythology as hyper-rational. He’s sophisticated, 
and he will play games with you to get what he wants. He’ll make deals with you, right? And so Satan is something 
which is like, you have the power to overcome it. Especially if you have Christ. Because Christ is the rejection of 
Satan. So you reject sin. And in doing that you align yourself with the natural order. And this is what fascism is, 
that’s why Christianity is essentially – traditional Christianity is essentially [pause] … fascism. It’s the same thing 
applied in a political way. 
 
Satan mocks logos – which is at once divine reason, the principle of order, and Christ himself – 
by interacting with people in what appears to be a hyper-rational way. However, if people have 
access to logos they can use faith and/or deductive reasoning to resist his tricks. Just as an 
individual needs Christ, a society needs Christian rulership, again in line with the medieval 
doctrine of the divine right of the Christian nobility to rule. Otherwise Satan will triumph, resulting 
in a society which may seem rational but actually goes entirely against reason, order, and the laws 
of God and nature. 
 For Bernard, Christianity is strongly identified with reason and order; and since fascism 
for Bernard means government according to the natural order, Christianity is fundamentally 
fascist. He continues, 
 
That’s why the church and the state worked so well together for so long. And it’s not against – again, if you reject 
natural orders, and you think that all people are equal, you’re gonna say that “oh, well it’s oppression!” No. People 
are happier when they’re in their own milieu. When they can actually thrive in their own milieu. [pause] Right 
now they can’t. Because you have a bunch of low-IQ Africans trying to compete with high-IQ whites, Asians and 
Jews. […]59 
                                                 




J: So, do you consider yourself a fascist? 
 
B: Hundred percent. 
 
J: Yeah.  
 
B: Hundred percent. Yeah I’m a fascist in the best sense of the word. Like I’m a fascist in the sense that I want to 
thrive, I want all peoples to thrive. I don’t like seeing blacks suffer. It makes me sad. Like, when I see a pack of 
gorillas raping… [pause] uh, like uh, chimpanzees for example rape each other. It’s horrible. It’s base desires. It’s 
violence. I don’t like to see that. Because Africa, in the past, has a rich tradition on its own. Before it was invaded 
by Islam, and by uh, foreign people coming in, Africa had thousands of years, even tens of thousands of years, of 
societies which functioned well for them. They didn’t have crime. […] Okay? So that’s an accusation which I 
don’t take. Because you can’t just call me racist. You can’t just call people racist. I want blacks to thrive. But, like 
I saw when I went to high school, races prefer to self-segregate. So don’t force against that. That’s Satanic, that’s 
Jewish. That’s towards chaos, not order. Because you’re not aligning yourself with the natural order. So the life of 
a Christian, the whole life, is fundamentally trying to assess that natural order, as best as you can, trying to be 
honest, determine what that natural order is and how to better align yourself with it, and once you do that you start 
sorting yourself out. That’s the whole Jordan Peterson meme. ‘Clean your room.’ That’s why he got so popular. 
 
In a manner somewhat similar to Evola and other mystical race theorists, Bernard employs 
scientistic claims about race when it is suitable for his argument, but ultimately appeals to a higher 
authority: ‘nature’ and the divine. Bernard comes from a poor, rural background, and told me that 
he had barely encountered Jews or people of colour before moving to a large city for high school. 
His first exposure to multiracial populations was a setting in which different groups seemed to 
stick together in a way which to him appeared natural. For Bernard, differences and hierarchies 
between different kinds of people are self-evident and divinely ordained; enforcing them cannot 
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therefore be seen as oppression because it is simply an expression of the natural order, no more 
oppressive than recognizing the fact that some people are short and some tall. To be a good 
Christian, and a good fascist, is to identify these natural hierarchies and differences, identify one’s 
place within their structure, and fall in line. To push back against them is not only futile, but 
Satanic.  
 Bernard wishes to distance himself from the stigmatizing connotations of the word ‘racist’, 
a desire shared by other right-wing activists (Busher 2016); even in the fascist wing of the alt-
right, a movement which openly aims to establish a white supremacist state, this urge to appear 
“not-racist” (Busher 2016, 97) is in evidence. Busher, citing McCauley (2006), calls this a form of 
‘jujitsu politics’, in which criticism is turned around and used as a way to attack the critic. Busher’s 
EDL informants, like Bernard, argued that calling them racists is simply the lashing out of someone 
who has already lost the argument. Regardless, for Bernard, Satan has helpers, and more than 
anyone else, Jews are to be held responsible for the decline and degeneration of the white race and 
the perversion of the natural order.  
 Bernard believes that a “Jewish, Satanic, pedophilic” conspiracy runs the United States 
government and other governments around the world. He believes that top politicians such as the 
Clintons are in thrall to these corrupt forces and help operate Satanic child-abuse rings. In part, 
Jews run these wicked conspiracies because “Judaism rejects this culture, these Christian values. 
That’s why so many porn producers are Jewish. That’s why Jews invert Christ, and they admit it. 
If you go to Jewish sources, they admit it.” Bernard tells me, “we have a Jewish-controlled media 
and culture. So, our culture right now is suppressed. I can barely have this conversation.” As part 
of their plot, Jews created Marxism, and using it they have succeeded in instituting a draconian 
regime of hate-speech laws, both de jure and de facto, in order to repress any discussion of the 
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natural order and divinely ordained hierarchy. As an example, he tells me that if you are fired from 
your job for speaking up about the mental inferiority of women, it is because of Marxist Jewish 
influence, saying, “it’s the same threat of Marxism that you see throughout your whole life. That’s 
why Orwell wrote 1984. When he saw all of this coming, Marxist Jewish infiltration, right. Can’t 
even say it. Or you get arrested for hate crimes, right.” 
 For Bernard, anti-Semitic populism provides a non-Marxist, racialized understanding of 
class relations and political power (Berlet and Lyons 2000). The machinations of an invisible and 
seemingly all-powerful ruling class can be explained with the simple expedient of assigning 
Satanic motives to an alien cabal united in its hatred of productive whites. Crucially, this fascist 
version of populism is anti-elitist only in the limited sense of being opposed to the current elite, 
and even then, is restricted in its understanding of the ruling elite by its insistence on understanding 
them simply as congenital evildoers – and Jews –  rather than as an economic class with intelligible 
motives. As a Christian fascist, Bernard is of course not actually opposed to a society ruled by an 
ideologically and religiously united, racialized elite class which sees itself as self-evidently 
superior to the common citizen and ruthlessly crushes all attempts at escaping the resulting rigid 
hierarchy. He is just opposed to the one which he imagines currently rules the Western world.  
 Because of Bernard’s “distorted class/less analysis” (Berlet 2004, 34), typical of right-wing 
conspiracist theories of government, he has little overt identification with the working class from 
which he comes. In addition, extremely wealthy people in positions of great political power, such 
as Donald Trump, are not considered members of the targeted ‘elite’ so long as they are sufficiently 
nationalist or racist. Of Trump, Bernard told me that “thousands of pedophiles” had been arrested 
since he took office, pointing to his suitability for power. He continued, 
 




J: Not anymore? 
 
B: I think he’s doing pretty good. I think he’s doing okay. 
 
J: Did you hear the news today? 
 
B: What news? 
 
J: He just fired [Steve] Bannon. 
 
B: Yeah I saw that. But you see the thing is with Trump, it’s not always him doing it. You know, there’s a Deep 
State, and certain people want Bannon gone. And there’s certain ways of achieving things, which is, even though 
he will fire people, or, [pause] it’s you know, like with [Jeff] Sessions, and everything, it’s almost like they’re on 
a different level like, the 4-D Chess Theory, like… It’s stupid, but… to a certain degree there is uh, a meta-game 
going on, and that’s what international politics is, he’s very good at playing it. […] He got out of TPP, he made a 
million new jobs, still highest DOW in history, uh, all these companies are coming back, reducing immigration, 
he banned transgenders [sic] in the military, he’s still working on border control and kicking out illegal immigrants 
and driving them out of the country, he’s um, banning people from terrorist-prone countries, k, he’s not doing 
anything crazy. He’s doing normal stuff, but he needs to play, because the media is psychopathic. Because we 
have a Jewish-controlled media and culture. 
 
This dynamic, of reckoning the existing ‘elite’ not in terms of an exploitative economically-
defined class which enjoys hegemony over bourgeois states but in terms of a cabal alien to the 
holistic national community, is in keeping with the fascist ideal of a cross-class alliance between 
fascist workers and fascist employers, ruled over by a fascist elite, with the whole benefiting from 




The National Socialist State knows no ‘classes’, but in political respect only citizens with fully equal rights and 
accordingly, also equal general duties, and on the other hand State subjects who, however, are completely without 
rights with regard to State politics. The trade union in the National Socialist sense has not the task of transforming, 
by integration, certain people within a national body into a class, in order to take up with it the fight against another 
similarly organized formation inside the national community. […] The National Socialist worker must know that 
the flowering of national economy means his own material fortune. The National Socialist employer must know 
that the fortune and the satisfaction of his employees are the premise for the existence and the development of his 
own economic importance. […] The great measure of personal freedom which is hereby granted to them in their 
activity [must prevent] the process of natural selection, which is to promote the most efficient, the most able, and 
the most industrious, from being cut short.  For the National Socialist union, therefore, a strike is a measure which 
can and must be applied only as long as there exists no National Socialist folkish State. The latter, however, has 
to take over instead of the mass struggle of the two great groups – employers and employees […] The economic 
chambers will have to entrusted with the obligation of keeping the national economy going […] What today is 
fought out by a struggle of millions must one day find its settlement in estate chambers and in the central economic 
parliament. Thus the employers and workers will no longer rage against one another in [wage battles], but they 
will solve these problems in common in a higher instance which above all has forever to have before its eyes, in 
brilliant letters, the welfare of the national community and of the State. Here, too, as everywhere, the iron-like 
principle has to hold that the fatherland comes first (Hitler 1941, 874-876). 
 
For Hitler, class struggle should be abolished in favour of national struggle against Jews, who were 
trying to use Marxism “for the smashing of the economic basis of the free, independent national 
states […] and finally, for the enslavement of free nations in the service of the international world 
finance Judaism” (Hitler 1941, 874-875). Internal to the nation, the class power of both the workers 
and the bourgeoisie, which Evola would call the power of the slaves and of the merchants, should 
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be totally subordinated to the state, ruled by its fascist elite. This elite would rule by virtue of its 
“aristocratic” superiority: 
 
The parliamentary principle of decision by majority, by denying the authority of the person and placing in its stead 
the number of the crowd in question, sins against the aristocratic basic idea of Nature, whose opinion of aristocracy, 
however, need in no way be represented by the present-day decadence of our Upper Ten Thousand. The reader of 
Jewish newspapers can hardly imagine the devastation which results from this institution of modern democratic 
parliamentary rule (Hitler 1941,103) 
 
Of these modern parliamentarians, representatives of liberal capitalism, Hitler has, of course, 
nothing but contempt: “the representatives of the majority, that is, of stupidity, hate nothing more 
ardently than a superior mind” (Hitler 1941, 104). 
 
 
“Red-Pilled on the JQ”: Roman’s Bourgeois Liberal Racism 
 
 Although there are far-right movements which are not anti-Semitic (Carter 2017), anti-
Semitism is very common on the far right. In the alt-right group, it is ubiquitous; all members I 
spoke with were anti-Semitic. Theories involving Jewish domination of media and government 
unite different branches of the group. However, this anti-Semitism, as well as the broader white 
supremacism which defines the group, takes a variety of forms and proceeds from several different 
assumptions about the world. Julius Evola’s views on race diverged from those of many of the 
mainstream fascists in the interwar period who saw things in more biological terms. Likewise, the 
racist views of different members of the alt-right group diverge. 
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 My informant Roman’s position on white supremacy is essentially the opposite of 
Bernard’s in the sense that Roman presents himself as entirely rational, non-mystical, and 
pragmatic. He has no desire to be seen as a wild-eyed ideologue. He is uncomfortable with the 
label ‘fascist’ and describes himself in his own words as a “liberal democrat”. In the 2016 US 
election, he says he supported Bernie Sanders until Hillary Clinton won the nomination, at which 
point he switched allegiance to Donald Trump. He is an avowed atheist and is significantly less 
socially conservative than other members of the group on many non-racial topics such as drug 
policy or tolerance of gay men. 
 Roman describes a turning point for his racism as “getting red-pilled on the JQ”. To be red-
pilled is the far-right version of getting ‘woke’; it means to become aware of a hidden truth about 
society. The JQ is the Jewish Question, a term historically used to describe the ‘question’ of the 
place of Jews in North Atlantic society. At a certain point, Roman tells me, he was made aware of 
the ‘truth’ about Jewish influence on society, though he assures me that he is less “irrational” on 
the topic than many of his fellow group members.  
 For Roman, there is no Satanic conspiracy. Indeed there is not even really a conspiracy, at 
least not in the sense of a consciously carried-out plot to take over the world. Instead, Roman 
supports a position which he sees as more rational than conspiracy theories. He believes that Jews 
have become over-represented in the leadership positions of what he calls ‘strategic industries’, 
particularly media, through “group evolutionary strategy”. This is a concept developed by retired 
psychology professor Kevin MacDonald, editor of the white supremacist magazine the Occidental 
Observer. MacDonald, who is influential on the North American far right, maintains that through 
selective pressure, Jews have evolved traits to help them maintain group cohesion and successfully 
compete for resources with gentiles (Crippen, 1997). According to this theory, the evolutionary 
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mechanism of ‘group selection’60 has resulted in Jewish dominance by selecting for cunning, 
nepotism and commercial aptitude.61  
 Roman tells me, “I’ve always been pretty racist. […] I’m racist on a strategic level. I’m not 
a hysterical racist.” He believes in the superiority of whites for straight-forward biological reasons, 
and there is no spiritual dimension to his white supremacism. He simply sees the world in terms 
of fairly discrete racial groupings and believes that for strategic geopolitical reasons whites must 
maintain racial supremacy in Europe and its settler colonies, which in turn will allow these 
countries to maintain their supremacy on a global level. For Roman, if the demography of these 
countries leads to the end of de facto white supremacy and the shift of cultural and institutional 
models away from the classically European, other ‘racial’ regions will be well positioned to 
exercise undue influence on Western countries both through international soft power and via their 
diasporas. 
 Roman became interested in demographic and ethnic issues through participation in 
‘infidel’ forums, a set of internet sites whose users position themselves as enlightened atheists 
radically opposed to Islamic fundamentalism. The common thread tends to be that Muslim 
migrants are culturally incapable of integrating in Western societies due to the incommensurate 
natures of Islamic and Western values. He gives the example of his parents as successfully 
integrated migrants; they gave his younger sibling a common North American anglophone name. 
Muslim migrants, Roman says, typically do not give their children names from their host countries, 
indicating in his view an unwillingness to acculturate. Western chauvinism based in a desire to 
                                                 
60 A theoretical framework abandoned by most evolutionary scientists (Crippens, 1997; Coyne, 2011). 
 
61 Interestingly, Bernard, whose worldview is much more conspiratorial, also mentioned Kevin MacDonald to me, 
citing him as “an academic who’s done the work”. Racist academics like MacDonald occupy a privileged place on 
the far right as symbols of intellectual legitimacy. 
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defend liberal Enlightenment values was for Roman a natural response to the ‘threat’ of Muslim 
migrants. His path into organized white supremacy proceeded from this liberal Western chauvinist 
ideological position in conjunction with his pre-existing racism.  
 These positions on race – Roman’s and Bernard’s – occupy different terrain 
philosophically, spiritually, politically and even aesthetically. Bernard is fundamentally a mystic, 
as well as an overt fascist. He is animated by an apparently sincere religiosity which at times comes 
across as fervor. He has no difficulty giving credence to elaborate right-wing conspiracy theories, 
both anti-Semitic ones and the less overtly racist, Infowars variety such as PizzaGate62. He is not 
particularly concerned with the politics of respectability (though he values community work as a 
propaganda tool), and he derisively calls much of the mainstream alt-right “racist liberals”. He 
sees contemporary North America as a spiritually sick culture hopelessly out of touch with the 
timeless racial values which created it, poisoned by greed and decadence, a society in collapse 
which requires forceful religious fascism to reverse the fall.  
 Roman meanwhile is an avowed atheist who dismisses people like Bernard as “hysterical 
racists”. Unlike Bernard, Roman has had extensive experience with powerful, wealthy people 
because of his class background and cosmopolitan upbringing, and does not believe that they are 
controlled by Jewish Satanists. He is embarrassed by the term ‘fascist’ and openly calls himself a 
‘racist liberal’. For Roman, the politics of respectability are critical; as he told me, “we can 
accomplish all of our goals with smart policy. Once you’ve started building ovens63, you’ve lost”. 
He advances an authoritarian and racially conscious form of liberal capitalism, which sees the 
existing world order as basically acceptable, if perhaps run by the wrong people. He holds some 
                                                 
62 ‘Pizzagate’ is the name given to a hoax popular among some right-leaning internet users, claiming to connect 
high-ranking Democratic Party officials to a child sex-trafficking ring alleged to have been run out of a Washington, 
D.C. pizzeria. One poll found that 9% of registered voters believed Hillary Clinton to be involved (CITE Salon) 
63 As in crematoria for disposing of the bodies of opponents. 
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more or less ‘progressive’ views on the rights of gay men and on drug policy. While he describes 
himself as “not pro-corporate”, he supports a regulated free market economy, capitalist property 
rights, representative democratic governance and other liberal staples. As a political liberal and a 
member of a wealthy transnational finance family, his class identification is with the bourgeoisie, 
and the positions he holds which coincide with the US Democrats reflect the Democrats’ status as 
the economically centrist wing of American pro-business interests.  
 Roman’s major differences with the traditional white supremacist scene – the KKK, 
various National Socialist parties, the Republican far right, skinheads and so forth – stem partly 
from the fact that some of his views are relatively centrist and partly from cosmetic concerns. He 
described the traditional right to me as “religious, old, bureaucratic and dusty”. He was drawn to 
the alt-right because of its overt racism, as racism is a major component of his worldview, but 
importantly because the alt-right is young, largely non-denominational, decentralized and brands 
itself as new and dynamic. His major point of consonance with the more fascist wing of the alt-
right group is much less through agreement on issues such as economic systems, cultural concerns, 











8. ‘Leukocratic’ Liberalism, Pathological 
Normalcy, and the Future of the Alt-Right 
Pathological Normalcy  
  
 Traditional scholarship about the far-right has seen it as a statistically uncommon, but 
always somewhat present, form of pathology, provoked by social crises (Mudde 2010). Mudde 
explains that in this view, economic stress or social breakdown push a small proportion of the 
otherwise reasonable population toward the abnormal and pathological ‘politics of hate’ or 
‘politics of fear’. The focus is on the ‘demand-side’ – modernity is confusing and crisis-prone, 
therefore there is a demand for easy solutions, therefore irrational far-right politics are taken up by 
people who cannot handle the modern world. This is called the ‘normal pathology’ model, in which 
far-right politics are pathological, but to be expected. 
 This is the model many of us are familiar with: organized racists are cast as stupid, crazy, 
or maladjusted, and organized racism as a kind of political disease which sometimes afflicts hard 
up white workers who are too dim to reskill -- or read Marx -- and so are locked into bitter, pointless 
hatred. Or else it may be written about as a sort of vice or obsession fallen into by the irredeemably 
antisocial. In this model, there is typically little more attempt to understand the motivations of 
racists than there is to understand the motivations of psychopaths. Organized racism is seen as so 
horrifying that it could only really stem from delusion and psychological torment. Consider the 
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following passage from an essay called ‘The Oppressor’s Pathology’, by Pedro Tabensky, a 
philosopher and ethicist at Rhodes University in South Africa: 
 
Paradigmatically, racist subjects are guided by psychic forces that are largely out of their sights and out of their 
control, meaning that their agency is compromised. They are, for this reason, slaves of passions, guided largely by 
protective mechanisms that block them from being able properly to understand the distorting protective function 
of their racist beliefs. This shift in the nature of belief is what accounts for the uncanny sense that one gets when 
talking to a paradigmatic racist — similar to the feeling one gets when talking to religious fundamentalists or 
the paranoid delusional — that there is nobody there doing the talking. It is as if they were emitting sounds, 
gesturing — generally parroting rational behaviour — but not actually primarily communicating in the sphere of 
the rational where beliefs face the tribunal of evidence. (2010, 81) 
 
In this passage, the ‘paradigmatic racist subject’ is explicitly pathologized: stripped of agency, 
enslaved by their racist vice, blank-minded, completely irrational, an uncanny puppet pretending 
to be a real person. 
 More recent scholarship has stressed that many radical right-wing orientations derive from 
racist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes which, far from being alien to mainstream values, are 
actually widespread in the general population. Blee (2003) notes that racism is in many ways a 
mainstream rather than fringe phenomenon. Ferber (2004) likewise argues that “the white 
supremacist movement draws upon historically mainstream views about race and gender” (9), 
while Berlet (2004) claims that far-right groups exploit rather than cause bigotry. Perry (2004) 
notes that the masculinist politics of racist groups often do not differ substantially from attitudes 
held by people who are not involved with organized right-wing activity. For Mudde the presence 
of such politics is not a ‘normal pathology’ but instead evidence of a ‘pathological normalcy’ – 
the result of a mainstream political culture in which, for example, the majority of Western 
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Europeans self-report racism when asked in polls (Mudde 2010). Widely held mainstream values 
also include significant authoritarian elements, notes Mudde (2010), seen in the abundance of ‘law 
and order’ platforms, support for draconian ‘anti-terrorism’ legislation, and the fetishization of the 
military common in state and media discourses. Nativist and nationalist ideas, the acceptance of 
rigid social and economic hierarchies, belief in the necessity of punitive and undemocratic state 
structures, and so on, are all sentiments which are tacitly or explicitly promoted in the Western 
liberal democracies and enjoy widespread popular support. People who consider themselves 
perfectly regular democrats support the use of force by armed agents of the state to, for example, 
round up individuals too traumatized or simply too destitute to rent an apartment. ‘Progressive’ 
liberals cheerlead ‘humanitarian’ NATO adventures abroad. Every morning during high school, 
we were made to stand for the anthem played over the loudspeakers. For Mudde, the radical right-
wing populist parties currently enjoying unprecedented success in Western Europe derive their 
politics from these popular sentiments, and not from some sort of dark zone of internal spiritual 
anguish. 
 It can certainly be comforting to think of racism as rare and deviant, but it minimizes the 
extent of racist sentiment in the general population and the existence of mainstream, systemic 
racism. Further, racist right-wing beliefs may be ‘pathological’, but if so, they are part of a 
‘pathological normalcy’ (Mudde 2010) which is participated in by hundreds of millions of 
otherwise quite ordinary people. This normalcy also includes other political ideals that many 
would be uncomfortable categorizing as pathological, such as nationalism, statism, and 
hierarchism. My goal is not to argue that racism should be thought of as an ethically acceptable 
form of political thought; emphatically, it is not. Rather, I am suggesting that a view which sees it 
as fundamentally rare and a function of the maladjustment of individuals is at best short-sighted 
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and at worst obscurantist. Still less helpful is the view that most racists simply enjoy being evil. 
As Busher notes, “most people wish to see themselves as moral actors” (2016, 97) and my 
informants are, for the most part, no exception here. 
  This pathologizing approach to the radical right is unhelpful and inaccurate. It also 
dramatically downplays the capacity and the will of these groups to generate fairly compelling 
intellectual content with the goal of influencing power and politics. Consider the following quote 
taken from a piece called ‘Counter-Democracy’, by Pierre Rosanvallon, Chair of Political History 
at the Collège de France.  Of right-wing populists, he writes: 
 
In recent years these negative masses seem to have turned exclusively inward. No longer do they pour energy into 
some promised improvement or future paradise. No moral force spurs them to dignified resistance or purposeful 
action. To these silent masses – disillusioned, disoriented, and disgusted – populism fails even to supply a 
language. Yet it knows how to stoke anger and stir protest […]. Populism […] is a force radically bereft of ideas, 
incapable of active criticism, and reduced to the expression of resigned violence. (P. 271) 
 
 While this is all very lofty, pretending that far-right groups do not have real ideas is not a useful 
way to engage with the phenomenon. My ethnographic data indicates that the alt-right in North 
America can be thoughtful and strategic, and excels at packaging ideas for internet consumption. 
In Europe, right-wing populists are using ideas which appeal to millions of people to successfully 
contest elections, because they actively seek power, not just ‘resigned violence’. 
 Roger Griffin (2017) argues that these populist ideas have, in Europe, “contaminated 
[liberalism] from within”, leading to a hybrid form which “enthusiastically embraces the liberal 
system, but considers only one ethnic group full members of civil society” (23). Far-right activists 
understand that the realities of modern Europe mean that this format is the only one in which their 
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ideas are likely to achieve real power. As Joe put it, “fascism is not a realistic platform right now 
if you want to recruit people.” Liberalism enjoys such hegemony over the political landscape that 
fully illiberal, revolutionary stances such as classical fascism or Bolshevism have essentially no 
chance of challenging the status quo unless dramatic crisis conditions destabilize European states 
to their breaking points.  
 Hybrid formats, then, offer a way to propel broadly illiberal ideas into the ‘legitimate’ 
political arena. The hybrid format being used to great effect by populist parties in Western Europe 
accepts democracy to a fair degree, but, writes Griffin, “exploits the profound ambiguity of the 
term demos” (2017, 24), Greek for ‘people’ and the basis of the word ‘democracy’. The hybrid 
format proposes to extend the demos only to a narrow range of ethnically-defined citizens, 
excluding ethnic outsiders and undesirables. It borrows freely from the Nouvelle Droite’s playbook 
of differentialism and ethnopluralism, writes Griffin, lending it an air of sophistication often 
lacking in straight-ahead fascists. With regard to other policy issues, parties belonging to this trend 
often fall along conventional centrist lines: more or less pro-business or pro-worker, more or less 
pro-patriarchy or pro-women's rights, but not differing significantly in these respects from the 
various Christian Democrat or Labour parties with which they compete. Griffin (2017) calls this 
hybrid ‘ethnocratic liberalism’. To remind the reader, ‘liberalism’ here, as throughout this thesis, 
is understood as referring to the political order associated with liberal capitalism, not to leftism, 








 As I sat one day in a Lebanese chain restaurant in Montreal, watching Joe eat a manakish, 
he told me about the new Montreal identitarian group which both him and Philippe as well as 
others in the alt-right group’s Camp A were getting involved with. Both of them were hopeful 
about the prospects of the new group as a front with which to spread their ideas. In my interviews 
with Philippe, he had presented himself as being very much in line with the moderate thinking the 
new group would try to project. Joe made it clear to me that the air of moderation would be a ruse 
calculated to boost recruitment and provide an aura of respectability. 
 When the new group had been set up, it was as a chapter of a European parent organization, 
a large identitarian group. This parent organization is usually careful to frame its focus as being 
on ethnicity, not specifically race, and, as part of the European trend toward ‘ethnocratic 
liberalism’ among right-wing populists, exhibits some acceptance of gay and bisexual people and 
tends to pay lip service to a conservative form of feminism or gender egalitarianism. Attractive 
young women participating in demonstrations or speaking earnestly into the camera feature in their 
ad videos. They also avoid overt anti-Semitism and, like the alt-right, have dropped the aggressive 
skinhead look associated with the far right in favour of a more fashionable and palatable hipster 
aesthetic. Their ads avoid discussion of what exactly their ideal future state would look like, instead 
focusing heavily on their demonstrations and banner-drops – the classic activism of liberal 
democracies – and on questions of identity, ethnic self-determination, and national autonomy. 
Identitarian material uses occasionally aggressive language toward the ‘treasonous’ multicultural 
state, but identitarian groups are not revolutionary or terrorist organizations, at least publicly, as 
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Joe explained. Their talking points remain firmly within the realm of a classic liberal social 
movement. 
 In the case of the European parent group, it is unclear how much of this moderation is 
authentic and how much is intended to get around stringent European hate-speech laws or attract 
more moderate followers. The group includes many white supremacists, Joe told me, including in 
the leadership, but its activists frame their struggle in terms of national identity, ethnicity, and 
‘European values’ rather than explicitly in terms of white racial supremacy. Meanwhile, the new 
identitarian group in Montreal was staffed almost entirely by members of the alt-right group, and 
the alt-right in North America has always been firmly committed to white nationalism, not to any 
particular ethnic identities. It is largely very homophobic and contemptuous of feminism. The ways 
in which the Montreal group has navigated these differences with the European identitarians are 
instructive. 
 Joe told me the new group would be coming out with a range of talking points designed to 
get women to join, a first for him. Women were almost entirely absent from the alt-right meetings 
I attended. As Joe put it, the new group was “not going to say ‘women belong in the household’ 
or anything like that, for optics. Having women in the group is good for optics. So it’s a soft goal 
to attract more women.” He told me the group was also debating the use of a don’t-ask-don’t-tell 
policy when it came to gay or bisexual members – sure to be controversial or even a deal-breaker 
for some, but supported by senior members as a method of appearing moderate. In addition, he 
said, the new identitarian group would relax the strident anti-Semitism which characterized the alt-
right group. Montreal organizers had been told by the European leadership that anti-Semitism was 
bad for branding and should preferably be dropped. “No more gas chamber memes,” he said. Of 
course, he assured me, his own views, and those of senior leadership figures, would not change, 
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but would simply be down-played for the time being, for the ultimate goal of building up a hip 
Canadian response to the European identitarian youth movement. As he put it, “We want to be a 
young urbanite movement. […] Fascism is not a realistic platform right now if you want to unite 
people. […] So going forward, we’re going to look more refined.” 
 When it came to the issue of race versus ethnicity, though, there was a problem, he 
explained. The identitarians in Europe tried to have one chapter of their organization per European 
ethnonational grouping; but which ethnic grouping would the Canadian chapter be fighting for? 
The Europeans, he said, did not consider ‘Canadian’ to be, properly, a European ethnicity. Even 
though Montreal organizers had tried to explain to them that the Canadian chapter would be 
fighting for white Euro-Canadians, a group in their own right in Joe’s view, the European top brass 
was unconvinced. The French or the Germans, they said, were an ethnicity. The mongrel white 
population in Canada was not.  
 As a result, Joe told me, the Montreal identitarian group was to split with the European 
leadership, while maintaining the look, feel, and many of the talking points of the European 
identitarians. The main difference would be that instead of taking an approach based primarily in 
Griffin’s (2017) ethnocratic liberalism, their approach would be what I am calling leukocratic 
liberalism, from leukos, meaning ‘white’. In other words, instead of trying to build up a form of 
exclusionary liberal politics based on restricting the demos to a single ethnic group, their goal is to 
restrict it to single racial group, whites. This is in line with the alt-right’s stated goal of a ‘white 
ethnostate’ in North America, and reflects Camp A’s liberal version of this political platform rather 
than Camp B’s revolutionary or fascist one.  
 In some ways, the vision of leukocratic liberalism – a white supremacist, capitalist 
representative democracy – cannot really be considered revolutionary or radical. It is of course 
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extreme, and its implementation would involve violence on a horrific scale, but it does not really 
propose anything unprecedented. In fact, leukocratic, or white supremacist liberalism, underlies 
the founding mythos of Canada and of the British Empire’s settler colonialism more generally. It 
is one of the traditional stances of Canadian politics: forging a new country from settlers of all 
nations, provided those nations were in Europe. Leukocratic liberalism is a deeply reactionary 
stance, intent on turning the clock back 50 or 100 years, but nevertheless it is a prototypically 
Canadian stance. Unlike European ethnocratic liberalism, which loathes immigration, the 
Canadian stance does not necessitate any opposition whatsoever to immigration in and of itself, 
because Canada as a colonial project is intimately tied to mass immigration. In addition, if the 
Canadian alt-right restricted its membership to those descended only from British and French 
settlers, it would exclude not only most of the country’s population, but also some of its most 
fervent supporters and even leaders. 
  
Canada and Immigration 
  
 Ambrose and Mudde (2015) have claimed that the radical right has never been able to gain 
a strong foothold in Canada largely because Canadians, unlike Europeans, have bought into 
multiculturalism so thoroughly: polls show that Canadians are the least likely of any Western 
population to oppose large-scale immigration. All major Canadian federal political parties firmly 
support immigration and multiculturalism, though to different degrees, argue Ambrose and Mudde 
(2015). This is taken to mean that Canadians are the least racist population among rich countries, 
and Ambrose and Mudde propose a number of reasons for this, including effective government 
propaganda and repressive hate speech laws. I argue that by treating Canada as a country 
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essentially interchangeable politically with Western European states, this view leaves out Canada’s 
particular history related to immigration. As well, or perhaps as a result, it is also curiously content 
to treat tolerance toward immigration as a measure for racism. 
 First, it must be noted that unlike with the significant rise in immigration levels seen by 
Western European countries since the 1980s, the era of large numbers of foreign-born people 
arriving in Canada to settle did not begin then, or with Liberal governments in the 60s and 70s 
which opened immigration up to non-European countries. In fact, the highest number of landed 
immigrants to Canada ever recorded (as a total number, not as a proportion of the population) was 
in 1913, when over 400,000 people immigrated legally to Canada (Statistics Canada 2016). The 
proportion of foreign-born Canadians has been between 15% and 20% for virtually all of Canada’s 
history as a state (Statistics Canada 2016). Mass immigration from a significant number of 
overseas countries has always been integral to the Canadian project.  
 Second, and related, it is perfectly possible to support high levels of immigration while 
also being a dedicated white supremacist, and many would argue that this was precisely the 
position of the Canadian state for most of its history (Backhouse 1999; Ward 2005; Montgomery 
2005; Stanley 2011; Stanley 2014; Coleman 2014; Maynard 2017). The racist right, therefore, has 
as one of its range of options a racist pro-immigration stance which embraces large population 
transfers into Canada but wishes to restrict the populations in question to those coming from ‘white 
countries’. 
 If Mudde is right that racist right-wing movements are taking their ideological direction 
from existing mainstream sentiments, then we would expect to see their movements in various 
places exhibiting regionally-specific characteristics. And, indeed, this is precisely what we find in 
the Canadian situation. The mainstream conservative right -- when it was in power under Stephen 
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Harper -- supported immigration primarily from a neo-conservative economic standpoint, while 
also pandering to some immigrant electorates and expressing some of the Islamophobic sentiment 
common in the population. It could not oppose immigration tout court – a nonsensical position 
when campaigning to an electorate consisting mostly of immigrants and their descendants – and 
could not espouse open racism, which is currently a political taboo and which is not an integral 
part of an economy-oriented neo-conservative position. Such a position sees the advantages of 
having large supplies of cheap labour available for Canadian corporations and from which they 
can extract value. Betz and Johnson (2017) note that right-wing populists in New Zealand are not 
at all opposed to immigration from European countries but oppose immigration from Asia and 
Africa. As I have shown, the Canadian alt-right—like other ultra-reactionary movements--is often 
happy to break the taboos around open racism while at the same time including members with a 
racist pro-immigration stance.  
 At one meet-up I attended, I was introduced to people who had immigrated, or whose 
parents had immigrated, from Italy, Russia, Iran (“he did a DNA test and he’s mostly white”), 
Serbia, and a number of other countries in Latin America and Europe. In fact, of all the men I 
managed to interview, only two had no immigrants among their parents or grandparents. There 
were a number of settler-descended Canadians in the group, but most of the men I talked to had at 
least some immigrant background. Even one of the leaders of the group came here as a small child 
and still has a subtle accent. I was reminded of the first time I had seen most of these men; it was 
at an event at which an academic was speaking about his theories on the destruction of Canada 
through mass immigration. The speaker, Dr. Ricardo Duchesne of the University of New 
Brunswick, was born in Puerto Rico and has a thick Spanish accent. 
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 The ideas of this group of men cannot rationally include pure anti-immigrant nativism 
because many, if not the majority, of them are not ‘native’ in any meaningful sense of the word. 
Nor could they include a narrow ethnic identity because they do not share one. For all this group’s 
opposition to multiculturalism, they are nevertheless a product of Canadian immigration and of 
Montreal’s cosmopolitan environment: people who come from a large number of different 
countries, with different mother tongues, almost all bilingual and many trilingual, performing a 
common identity. This common identity is based not on shared ethnicity, as with the European 
identitarian groups, or on the ‘colour-blind’ civic patriotism promoted by the modern Canadian 
state, but rather on the activists’ perceived shared race. Race, then, instead of rigidly defined 
ethnicity, has to be the central component of the Canadian alt-right – just as it was a central 
component of historical Canadian (and before that, British colonial) government and settlement. 
 
Dual Positions  
  
 An aspect of far-right racist thinking which can be confusing to outsiders is that many racist 
activists do not have just one position on a given topic. This is for the simple reason that, as racists 
who reject universalism, they do not believe that different groups of people should be subject to 
the same policies. Most Canadians support immigration and immigrants because most Canadians 
are descended from immigrants; but many Canadians harbor racist sentiments to a lesser or greater 
degree, and the Canadian state was founded on white supremacist ideals (Backhouse 1999; Ward 
2005; Montgomery 2005; Stanley 2011; Stanley 2014; Coleman 2014; Maynard 2017). Though it 
is “important to disaggregate those groups and individuals [that were] white supremacist in a 
general sense – that is, that is, they accepted the views on race that were common at the time – 
  
218 
from those that treated race as their primary concern” (Hawley 2017, 23), these deep-seated 
cultural beliefs about race in Canada are the ideas from which the Canadian alt-right takes its 
direction. Their recent turn towards a form of identitarian-influenced leukocratic liberalism 
occurred for the same reasons that European right-wing populists have turned toward ethnocratic 
liberalism. Locating their politics within a continuum of liberal ideas allows them to echo the 
important, if now subdued, political tradition of overt racism in Canada, while retaining moderate 
non-racial political positions which enjoy overwhelming support in the population, and therefore 
maximize their chances of appealing to their target audiences. With this in view, I leave the reader 
with an excerpt from Griffin, well worth the length: 
 
The fact that ethnocratic liberalism is a hybrid of ideological extremism and democratic constitutionalism, of 
radical right and centre (making the term ‘radical right populism’ misleading), and is a paradox rather than an 
oxymoron, also makes it more dangerous. It is perfectly attuned to a post-war world hostile to unadulterated 
fascism, one where the clerks now enthusiastically help man the ideological Maginot Line which has been 
constructed to stop an openly revolutionary brand of illiberalism ever again achieving credibility. It speaks a 
language of ‘rights’ – rights of ethnic peoples, rights to a culture – which addresses deep-seated and understandable 
fears about the erosion of identity and tradition by the globalizing (but only partially homogenizing) forces of high 
modernity. It is a discourse which has grown in sophistication thanks to the theorists of communitarianism,39 
ethnopluralism, and differentialism, and in legitimacy in the context of justified concerns over cultural 
globalization. The ground for its widespread acceptance as a familiar and genuine (if unwelcome) member of the 
liberal ideological family rather than the offspring of a highly fecund anti-liberal cuckoo, has been well prepared 
by liberalism’s long history of contamination by prejudices which have denied entire groups access to the rights it 
upholds as ‘sacred’: women, the poor, children, the handicapped, the nomad, the allophone, the aboriginal, the 
‘primitive’. If the battle cry of liberalism in theory is Rousseau’s ‘All [human beings] are born equal and 
everywhere they live in chains’ then its slogan in practice has been Orwell’s ‘All men are equal but some are more 




9. Motivations, Time Travel and the End of 
the World  
  
 “I want to show you something.” 
 “Sure.” 
 A meet-up attendee named Jake and I stand looking out at the city. Behind us, other 
members of the group are arrayed in small groups, chatting, smoking cigarettes and drinking beer 
and vodka. Jake gestures at the building on the corner.  
 “Look at that,” he says. “This is what it’s all about.” He is pointing at a seven- or eight-
storey greyish cube that looms blankly over the street, housing the offices of some anonymous 
acronym. It is interchangeable with a hundred other uninspired buildings in the city, unremarkable 
except maybe for the fact that it is uglier than most. I frown and nod. 
 “That building,” Jake says, “is this country now.” The building is not just ugly, he explains, 
but a disaster. It is an imposition. It is rootless, without provenance, with no care put into it. It only 
looks that way because that is the cheapest way for it to look. To him it is emblematic, or maybe 
symptomatic, of the deep moral and spiritual malaise in which he finds his country.  
 “Hmm,” I reply, and nod vaguely again, a response which is quickly becoming my go-to 
reaction for most of the things people are saying to me tonight. 
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 “Now look over here,” he says, directing my attention to another building we can make out 
in the dusk. It is imposing, over a hundred years old, built in a Palladian neo-classical style like 
many of Montreal’s Victorian buildings. High, sloped copper roofs top neat stonework and 
wrought iron. The narrow windows and many wings and courtyards give a castle-like impression. 
A couple of slowly oxidizing religious-looking statues perch among the eaves. “That’s what we 
used to be. We used to have a culture. That building is beautiful, man. Craftsmen made that, and 
you can tell. They wanted it to look beautiful.” He looks at me expectantly. He is pleased with this 
comparison. 
 It is not the first time tonight that I have been invited to consider a symbolic contrast writ 
large over the city. Earlier in the evening, a man had pointed to the huge illuminated cross glowing 
faintly on top of Mount Royal, before directing my attention to a mural of Leonard Cohen going 
up on a building elsewhere. That juxtaposition was supposed to require no explanation – Christian 
heritage in aging steel rivets on one side, shadowy Jewish influence rising over the neighbourhood 
on the other. I had dutifully scribbled down the interaction in my notebook, but otherwise had not 
considered it very important. This group of men exhibit the most strident anti-Semitism I have 
encountered, so it is unsurprising that they would have a problem with a gigantic painting of 
Montreal’s most famous Jew. 
 But Jake’s comparison is different. It hits me in an uncomfortable way. It is the first time 
in my fieldwork that I have had a moment of real empathy with one of my informants. The fact is 
that I bike past this street all the time, and I have often looked at this same pair of buildings and 
felt the same kind of disgust that I hear in Jake’s voice now. I am running up against one of the 
points of convergence with some of my informants that will at first sicken and confuse me, then 
provide me with valuable traction in my bid to understand this group of men. The fact is that no 
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matter what most of us might like to think, these are not primarily crazy, stupid, or otherwise 
particularly unusual people in most ways. At least some of them have motivations I can relate to, 
sometimes profoundly. Architecture might be an unusual thing to agree on with a neo-Nazi, but it 
is as good a place as any to start. 
 I have always had a strong emotional reaction to architecture. So much of it in North 
America fills me with a deep, dark aversion that on a bad day can be bordering on panic. When I 
think of those drab concrete cubes, I think of words like soulless; meaningless; bleak; brutal; 
desolate. The kinds of box stores and corporate campuses you find on the outskirts of cities are 
even worse. Those huge beige slabs littering the sides of the miles and miles of highways – spaces 
intervening violently between places, abstracting the land and remaking it in the image of a map – 
fill me with a visceral sense that something is very wrong. The feeling they evoke in me is like the 
feeling of being lost in the bitter cold with nowhere to go.   
 In fact, I remember one freezing night as a teenager, walking home on the side of the 
highway from a party in a different part of town, slowly realizing that we might literally die of 
exposure long before getting anywhere near where we lived. We found plastic bottles in garbage 
cans, filled them with hot water from a gas station bathroom, put them in our clothes, and huddled 
together in a bus stop until dawn. The gas station attendant wouldn’t let us stay in the store. The 
emptiness of it all, at that moment, felt like an attack. All around was concrete, steel, parked cars, 
housing developments, lawns, fences, patches of trees planted to separate properties, all bought 
and built by people – but no people anywhere, no shelter, no transit, not a single building that could 
be said to be public, everything locked, cold, silent and empty. Total isolation, surrounded by the 
products of industrial capitalism. 
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 Buildings and infrastructure are politically and spiritually evocative. They are huge, 
expensive, solid, long-lasting reflections of the goals and aspirations of the people and groups that 
have them built. They are physical extensions of the wills of these people and groups, which we 
as individuals must literally navigate in and around whether we want to or not. As such, they are 
a powerfully material manifestation of the systems of power and ideology which animate our 
culture, interventions into the world which we cannot avoid interacting with. The base interjecting 
into the superstructure, as Marx would have it. 
 Buildings say something to us. A dense network of three-floor walk-ups, taking up a whole 
neighbourhood, on narrow one-way streets, interspersed with parks, squares and pedestrian 
crossings – take the Plateau in Montreal, for example – says, ‘People live here. This is a place for 
people. We are people and you are a person, and this is a place for us.’ That kind of a place is 
person-sized. It is not really car-sized, because parking is a nightmare and the one-way streets 
make it infuriating to drive in. It is not corporation-sized, because you cannot smack a corporate 
campus down in the middle of the Plateau as there is nowhere for it to go. Commerce and retail do 
exist – and they are squeezed into the person-sized spaces available on the bottom floors of the 
low apartment buildings. There is graffiti everywhere and parking lots nowhere. The living, 
breathing human on foot is welcomed in such a place. 
 A palatial building like the one Jake pointed out to me speaks in a different way. It 
interpellates you, forcing you by its existence to be one half of an interaction with it and defining 
you through that interaction. You cannot ignore it and it is meant not to be ignored. The will of its 
builders reaches out through time and space and touches you, saying, ‘You are small. You make 
space for us; we do not make space for you. We are rich and we are strong; your agency is 
meaningless to us. What we have made is careful and beautiful and nothing you do on your own 
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will ever be as careful and beautiful as this.’ It is not person-sized. It is superior, authoritative, on 
a higher level. It channels the Church and the State and the King and the Owner and tries to make 
you into a subject of a bygone ideology. 
 Even a building like that, though, at least says something to you, and it really is invested 
in some sort of meaningful aesthetic. The other building Jake pointed out to me is silent. It does 
not even bother to call the passerby a peasant. It says nothing to you because you do not matter. It 
exists because of logics into which you do not even figure. The place it sits is as good a place as 
any other for it to sit and the way it looks is totally secondary to its function as productive capital. 
In navigating buildings like these, “we navigate a world of corporate agents that do not respond or 
act as people do” (Warner 2014, 69). A box store thrown up beside a highway interchange is an 
extension of a corporate will so mindlessly ravenous, so alien to person-sized human sentiments 
that it cannot communicate with you any more than you can communicate with a bug. You can be 
ignored or you can be crushed or you can exist tinily in the shadows of that gigantic will, but you 
cannot ever matter to it.  
 Or at least that is how I feel, and I think I am not alone. I am not trying, here, to elaborate 
a universal theory of the subject-forming potentials of different types of architecture. Nor am I 
under the illusion that all architecture before the 20th century was beautiful and careful and 
‘cultural’ while somehow culture has been stripped from the buildings we build now. Probably 
given a few more decades the kind of corporate neo-brutalism I am disparaging will have a certain 
retro charm. Rather, I am trying to use architecture to articulate an emotional framework within 
which I experience things, and within which I believe many others experience things as well.  
 Many people – most people – who live in this country don’t necessarily consider office 
buildings or box stores to be the source of intolerable psychic pain. But these buildings and the 
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infrastructure around them are representative of a set of relations the effects of which many people 
find quietly unbearable. This is a set of relations in which individuals are disconnected completely 
from the product of their work; from their communities, in the sense of their physical 
neighbourhoods; from family, as the extended family gives way to the nuclear which gives way to 
the atomized working single parent; and from authentic-feeling practice, as all cultural material is 
gradually (or instantaneously as the case may be) subsumed by the market. This set of relations 
strips people’s lives of sources of meaning and authenticity. I recently saw a statistic claiming that 
clinical depression is now 10 times more common than it was a century ago (Twenge 2014). One 
of the symptoms of depression can be a type of existential despair related to a sense of 
meaninglessness in one’s life. For myself and many others, it is impossible to ignore the 
implication that alienation, in the Marxist sense of brutal estrangement from the essence of what 
it means to be human, is hurting people very much. 
 It is a trope, in the Millennial leftist circles I have spent time in, that to be well-adjusted to 
life under late capitalism is itself a sign of being mentally unwell. People in my generation have 
lived their whole lives with a new news story every week about the impending environmental 
collapse. At the same time the formal political process has remained abstruse and out of reach 
while the stranglehold of the dozen or so corporations which dominate the global economy has 
gotten tighter and tighter64, so we cannot even envision being able to do anything about it. As 
Gaillard-Starzmann puts it, “for the majority of voters the right and left govern identically, whilst 
admitting that in fact the world economy is governing, not them, and in these circumstances, to be 
in government can only mean serving oneself” (2006, 185). Wildlife populations have plummeted 
by more than half since 1970 (WWF 2018) and a million species are at risk of extermination within 
                                                 
64 The value of the top 10 corporations was $285tn (£215tn), beating the $280tn worth of the bottom 180 countries, 
which include Ireland, Indonesia, Israel, Colombia, Greece, South Africa, Iraq and Vietnam (Inman 2016). 
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decades (Watts 2019). People I know are organizing grief circles for the environment, in which 
they mourn together for the dying ecosystem they have inherited and try to come to terms with 
their sense of total powerlessness and their mangled ability to even react emotionally to disaster 
anymore. Every one of my friends with whom I have talked about the subject of having children 
has expressed that they are afraid of bringing a child into a world that may cease to meaningfully 
exist within that child’s lifetime. Rent relentlessly claws its way ever higher, with housing crises 
in major cities locking young people into cycles of poverty, debt and overwork. Most of us my age 
cannot even imagine having enough money to own a house, even though the real GDP per capita 
has almost tripled since the year my parents were born (World Bank 2019). Stable jobs are rare, 
wages have lagged far behind inflation, and virtually all the gains made in the economy have gone 
to owners, not workers. Even many of the relatively privileged among us are in a state of constant 
economic precarity, in a world which we are continually reminded is teetering on the edge of 
ecological catastrophe anyway – in an economy on the verge of mass automation, an eventuality 
which no one in power seems to be planning for. It is a frightening and confusing time to be a 
young adult. 
 On top of the creeping immiseration and environmental disintegration being perpetrated 
around us, we live in a period during which the total triumph of market forces seems imminent. 
Commodification, the assignment of market value or prices to things that were previously seen as 
being outside the realm of the market (Constable, 2009), has penetrated seemingly every corner of 
existence.  Virtually every item, service, experience or identity can be or has been commodified – 
including interpersonal relationships and reproductive labour (Constable, 2009), sexual labour 
(Bernstein, 2007), intimacy (Constable, 2009), care (Constable, 2009), culture and ethnicity 
(Shepherd, 2002), gender (Lindholm, 2008) and authenticity itself (Lindholm, 2008). The 
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authentic is an important “master schema for imagining a good life” for Westerners and others 
(Hyang, 2011, p. 279), and the production and consumption of ostensibly authentic content is a 
huge business globally. Yet in many people's minds, the very definition of something authentic is 
that it cannot be bought and sold, it cannot be mass-produced, and it cannot be a facsimile 
(Shepherd, 2002). People crave authenticity in a world they see as having been “rendered [...] 
artificial [by capitalism]” (Bernstein, 2007), yet find themselves with no access to authenticity 
except through the market. 
 The ugly office building Jake pointed out to me is inauthentic. It is a facsimile, it is mass-
produced. The highway box-store is inauthentic. It is an artificial copy of a real human 
environment. Many of our identities seem inauthentic because they are based primarily on choices 
to consume or not consume specific culturally marked products, the quantity and variety of which 
have reached an apex under late capitalism (Lindholm, 2008). Our work is inauthentic, since we 
increasingly perform tasks that do not matter and are not productive (Graeber 2019), or tasks that 
could easily be performed by robots. Even entertainment has shifted from platforms which at least 
had a comforting (in retrospect?) physicality to them – VHSs, CDs, books – to fleeting online and 
digital modes which are so thoroughly copies that they do not even seem to have or need an 
original. All this generates tremendous anxiety. 
 Capitalism has so thoroughly dominated culture that even rebellion against capitalism is 
commodified. Within that fleeting digital Netflix mediascape we are even frequently sold anti-
capitalism as a capitalist product (Fisher 2009; Graeber 2016). Fisher notes that ‘alternative’ styles, 
such as grunge in the 1990s, are easily and instantly appropriated by capitalism, commodified and 
repackaged as “settled […] cultural zones, which endlessly repeat older gestures of rebellion and 
contestation as if for the first time” (2009, 9). Under this regime of commodification, “‘alternative’ 
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and ‘independent’ don’t designate something outside mainstream culture; rather, they are styles, 
in fact the dominant styles, within the mainstream” (2009, 9).  
 In such a context, for many people a deep-seated, antidepressant-proof malaise is 
inescapable. We are on some level aware that there is something about the world that is crushing 
us relentlessly, but even if we are able to attribute this problem to the economic circumstances in 
which we exist, we find that they are entirely inescapable. Fisher (2009) calls this state of affairs 
‘capitalist realism’, “the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and 
economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it” 
(2). We are all transformed into “the consumer-spectator, trudging through the ruins and relics” of 
an earlier time when meaning existed and we had access to the authentic (4). 
 Anthropologists need to be careful about giving too much credence to models which posit 
a general state of culturelessness or meaninglessness in the late capitalist West. On one level, it is 
impossible for anything that humans do to be truly stripped of culture, meaning or authenticity. In 
a very real way, by definition anything that people do is ‘cultural’, and sitting at home, alone, 
silently scrolling on a phone while eating re-heated packaged food is just as ‘cultural’ and just as 
marked with points of meaning as participating in a commensal feast, a potlatch, or a traditional 
field cookout featuring freshly hunted game. It is just that in the culture I am from, many things 
rare elsewhere in time and space are common, such as living alone, rarely preparing or sharing 
food, and doing almost nothing in one’s leisure time other than consuming visual media. Earlier I 
mentioned an ‘artificial copy of a real human environment’. In reality there is no such thing, as all 
environments inhabited by humans are real human environments. 
 On the other hand, there is something unique about the specific cultural forms of late 
capitalism that spring from the economic layout of states like Canada. This unique element is the 
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near-total dominance of the market and the state within the territory of the post-industrial capitalist 
core countries. Nowhere else and never before has so much of every person’s life been mediated 
entirely through commercial and bureaucratic transactions.  
 There is a widespread sense that the contemporary world is one of rootlessness, where 
traditions are threatened, meaning is in collapse, and powerful forces are intent on undermining 
the things that make a good life possible. This springs from a profound form of alienation being 
perfected under late capitalism, and can crystalize emotionally around certain symbolic fields – I 
have been using architecture as an example. At the same time, economic precarity and 
environmental instability paired with political stagnation produce anxiety about the future and 
cynicism about the status quo. Taken all together, disillusionment with the dominant liberal order 
is a major component of the cultural landscape in which both my informants and I exist. I have 
been arguing this as part of an exploration of how it is that I found myself, at times, sharing 
outlooks or motivations with political activists who espouse values which seem to be close to the 
precise opposite of the ones I hold.  
  
Alienation and the Alt-Right 
 
 This sense of rootlessness and meaninglessness is pervasive and affects people located all 
over the political spectrum. However, the perceived causes vary from group to group as do the 
solutions deemed acceptable. Conservatives often feel that the things which are being threatened 
are best seen as moral or civilizational traditions, such as Christmas, the nuclear family, or 
heterosexual marriage. The attacker, when articulated, is thus often presented as some force or 
body which is opposed on principle to the civilizational values of ‘the West’, or else is being duped 
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by political correctness into being opposed to these values. Social democrats often feel that the 
things which are under attack are best seen as popular social values, such as community, labour 
rights, or democracy, which they feel have been fought for in the past and are now threatened by 
big business or other reactionary forces. Anarchists and communists typically understand the 
situation to be caused by liberal capitalism reaching a kind of apogee in which workers are so 
alienated and capital so triumphant that what is under attack is the very essence of what it means 
to be human. The attacker is seen as an economic system bigger than any one clique or group, 
though ultimately it is being steered and upheld by a particular class.  
 Far-right white supremacists see things in racial terms. They often also see things in terms 
inflected with economics, but for them, what is under attack is the essence of what it means to be 
white. An ad put out by Richard Spencer, a leading figure in the alt-right and president of the white 
supremacist think-tank the National Policy Institute, sums it up this way: 
 
A nation based on freedom is just another place to go shopping. It’s a country for everyone and thus a country for 
no one. It’s a country in which we ourselves have become strangers. Man doesn’t live and man doesn’t die for 
abstractions like freedom. Man lives and dies for a homeland, for a people and its freedom, for beauty, for the 
power of being part of something bigger than oneself. Who are we? We aren’t just white. White is a checkbox on 
the census form. We are part of a people’s history. (Spencer 201765) 
 
Spencer here is attempting to articulate an emotional opposition to runaway individualism. The bit 
is clumsy, arguing that people do not connect emotionally with abstractions like freedom, then 
proposing a list of other abstractions (including freedom) instead. However, it captures a sense of 
                                                 
65 This video is frequently removed from hosting services and may be difficult to track down in the future. 
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anger about alienation that is appealing to white people for whom race is an acceptable organizing 
principle.  
 Far-right activists also often see things in spiritual terms, especially fascists. Race, culture, 
civilization and spirit are seen as interlinked, with the accomplishments of thousands of years of 
European history from all corners of Europe claimed for the white race and attributed to a unique 
racial essence. If the members of that race, the holders of that essence, are currently in a 
demoralized and alienated state, their dominant political system despised by millions, their 
traditional cultures collapsing as they are gobbled up by the market, and the ecological integrity of 
the lands they inhabit in free-fall, something must be wrong spiritually and racially.  
 Human beings, as social animals, instinctually crave a sense of connection and community 
(Maté 2009). That is why putting someone in solitary confinement is considered one of the most 
severe punishments possible. The alienation of late modernity is devastating to our sense of 
connection. Far-right white supremacists in Canada, both of the fascist and liberal variety, imagine 
that this malaise can be remedied by racial means. Through a racial lens, alienation is experienced 
as a deracination (I use the term advisedly), and the lack of connection is experienced as a lack of 
racial cohesion. If the problem is deracination and a lack of racial cohesion, a solution presents 
itself: the spiritual renewal of the white race and the re-establishment of the imagined white 
ecumene, a kind of racial ummah of the Europeans.  
 An enemy also presents itself. Largely lacking a coherent economic analysis, the far right 
-- and its activists are not alone here -- is often limited to conspiracy theories, mysticism and 
identity politics. Unable to find common cause with non-white working people, and attributing 
their lack of connection with those people to racial incommensurability, far-right activists are often 
unable to discern the economic processes which are dismantling authenticity and connection for 
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all workers in Canada. Witnessing the cultural distinctiveness of new immigrant groups and 
overestimating their difference, they imagine that immigrant populations enjoy a racial cohesion 
that they lack. They experience the sense that something is being done to whites, but not to others; 
something racial in character and destructive in purpose. Jews have been, and continue to be, the 
favourite scapegoat (Caiani et al. 2012), and non-white immigrants are their tool, driving a wedge 
into the white population in order to divide and conquer. Bernard believes that their motivations 
are Satanic; Roman believes that Jews are genetically predisposed to economic parasitism. 
Everyone in the group believes that ‘elites’ are succeeding in a bid to replace the white population 
of Canada with non-white immigrants.  
 The alt-right sees itself as being locked in a bitter struggle with the left. The increasing 
interconnectedness of the global economy and disappearance of borders for capital – the product 
of decades of right-wing neoliberalism – is identified with migration, called ‘globalism’, and 
attributed to the left. The large uptick in Arab refugees to Western countries as a result of the 
Syrian Civil War – a conflict mainly between authoritarian Islamists and proxy armies funded by 
the military establishments of the US and Russia – is seen as a demographic tool to destroy Europe 
and is attributed to the left. The content of mass media, perceived to be vapid and shallow, is 
associated with Hollywood, and thus with Jews, and is attributed to the left. The increasing 
surveillance of far-right groups by intelligence agencies and police is attributed to the left as is the 
occasional censoring of ‘hate speech’ by massive media corporations like Facebook. Even 
individualism, the paramount neoliberal value, is attributed to the left. 
 In reality, all of these phenomena are the direct result of the policies of the capitalist ruling 
class, a class by definition implacably opposed to the ownership of the means of production by 
workers, to economic democracy, to social programs funded with their taxes, and to environmental 
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policies which would conserve the biosphere at the expense of profits – in short, to leftism. 
Different factions of the ruling class are happy to pander to liberal identity politics of different 
kinds – allowing transgender drone pilots or railing against ‘illegal immigration’ – because these 
sideshows are largely irrelevant to their project of class domination. Racism has been an invaluable 
tool for capitalism in that it offered a ‘moral’ justification for inequality (as well as historically 
serving as a warning to poor whites and providing an oppressed reserve army of labour) (Allen 
2012). The ruling class, however, is proving itself more than capable of inventing new 
justifications for its rule, while also playing to latent white chauvinist sentiment when useful. 
Individuals within the ruling establishment may have various personal motivations but as a class, 
they are engaged in a struggle with intelligible economic motivations: maintaining and expanding 
control over as much of the world’s economic output and political authority as is feasible.  
 Crucially, this project is under no obligation to be a conscious conspiracy66, though factions 
of the ruling class certainly collude purposefully (Guerin 2014). A commitment to Satanism or the 
genocide of the white race is not required to participate in this project. Self-interest, a large stake 
in the continuance of the status quo, and inculcation in dominant ideologies justifying capitalist 
exploitation are sufficient. The economic processes of late capitalism are helped along by the 
policies of liberal states structurally incapable of opposing them in meaningful ways. The logical 
result of these processes is reflected in the world we live in. All things are commodified; alienation 
is endemic; workers are locked into precarity; the biosphere is irreversibly damaged. The inherent 
meaninglessness of capitalist accumulation, its fundamental moral and philosophical emptiness, is 
on display for everyone to see; and that meaninglessness is a wound carried in our hearts. 
                                                 
66 The neoreactionaries are closest to understanding this, with their concept of the Cathedral as a distributed system 
not under the control of any one guiding group. However, their solution is to ramp up capitalist domination to its 






 The far right is often seen as a reaction to economic downturns, the purview of the insane, 
or the politics of lower-class brutes too stupid and violent to know any better. The project of the 
far right is actually the desire to travel back in time, inflected by the white chauvinist and 
authoritarian ideas common throughout the population, and spurred not by economic anomalies 
but by the normal functioning of liberal capitalism. Like many in my generation, people in the alt-
right are tired of living in the ‘end of history’, watching it turn out to be not so much Fukuyama’s 
(1989) triumph of rational markets and prosperity for all, and more the slow-motion collapse of 
everything that matters to us. Anarchists and communists want to fast-forward through this 
miserable and lonely era and arrive in an imagined future, where what they see as sane and moral 
policies prevail, the ideal of human equality is realized, and workers, liberated from the burden of 
grinding, meaningless wage labour, done in the name of perpetual GDP growth, producing things 
that no one wants or needs, are free to do what humans do best and generate new forms of culture 
for the new world.  
 The far right by contrast wants to travel back to an imagined past, but also, like the 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s court, to hold on to their technological infrastructure. They 
want to arrive, assault rifles in hand, in a past world wherein the bulwarks of traditional authority 
still hold strong against the faceless, alien processes of late capitalism, indeed a world wherein, to 
borrow from Evola, things have not yet become subject to the contingent and the material, where 
belief and right thinking determine the state of things rather than the other way around. This is a 
world wherein the patriarchal family unit is triumphant, where no one eats dinner alone in front of 
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the TV because a woman has prepared the meal, where Christianity provides a sense of moral 
certainty and where a deserving aristocracy rules instead of scheming ‘elites’. This is a Canada 
wherein a ‘homogenous’ white population stretches from sea to sea, through the magic of their 
shared racial essence forming a single cultural community, united and prosperous, alienation 
banished to a nightmare future. Rather than floating listlessly through an undifferentiated mass of 
atomized consumers, the individual in this imagined past knows his or her place. It is ordained and 
settled. The white men who make up the alt-right have in this imagined Canada a place at the head 
of families, with obedient and loving wives and no competition from men of colour (or queer 
women – or dildos – or meaningful lives for women outside of marriage). They are no longer 
cuckolded by ‘elites’ but instead take their rightful places as captains of wholesome nationalist 
industry. In this alt-right future-past, a white man can be proud simply by existing, secure in the 
knowledge that the entire social order exists to uphold his race and gender. Even the liberals among 
the alt-right long for this world, like the liberals more to the left imagining that capitalism can be 
reformed and mitigated if only the ‘right people’ were in charge. 
 This is a fantasy. We cannot go back. The means and thus the relations of production have 
evolved and will not be forgotten unless through cataclysm, and the relations of production, not 
the conniving of an imagined cabal of Jews, determine social relations. It being a fantasy does not 
mean that it is necessarily irrational. Right-wing collectivism, white racial collectivism, is a kind 
of rebellion against alienation, and any rebellion against alienation makes sense. The rage that 
springs from a meaningless existence spent selling your life an hour at a time to a capitalist is a 
rational rage. The despair that comes from seeing all the things you consider meaningful be 
devoured by the relentless hunger of the market is a rational despair. Even more rational, from a 
self-interested point of view, is joining a movement that says, like Atalante’s favourite slogan, les 
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notres avant les autres, ‘ours before the others’ (Gaillard-Starzmann 2006). The alt-right, vile and 
violent or not, is among other things identity politics for white men (Hawley 2017). It is no surprise 
that some white men are interested in it.  
 Fantasy it may be, but the time-traveling project of the alt-right, the dream of the ethnostate 
and the vanquishing of feminism, can be attempted. The centre, far from being a site of moderation 
and restraint, is a site of enormous tension, cracking under the stress of trying to hold together 
contradictory Western cultural ideals of hierarchy and equality, freedom and authority, capitalism 
and human dignity, not to mention endless GDP growth and a finite planet. As it cracks more and 
more, its inadequacies on display and its inability to adapt becoming more and more apparent, 
rebellions against it will proliferate. The far-right, and thus the alt-right, represent one such 
rebellion.  
  The far-right rebellion must never be permitted to proceed. There is no way to time-travel 
to the imagined past without the systematic murder and brutalization of millions of people living 
in the present, and no way to stay there without the systematic murder and brutalization that 
maintained the real white supremacist Canada of the real past. Joe told me that he does not want 
to murder all the people of colour in Canada, only to exclude them, as if this was a reasonable and 
moderate proposition. Even the most moderate among the alt-right want the new white supremacist 
police of a new white supremacist police state to aim guns at the heads of our friends and loved 
ones, to round them up and humiliate them and tag them and dispossess them, or put them in camps 
and deport them, to repress the demonstrators and jail the traitors. There is no other way to 
‘exclude’ a fifth of the population. There is no way to abolish ‘degenerate’ sexualities without 
abolishing the ‘degenerates’. There is no way to end women’s participation in public life without 
violently cutting short the dreams and aspirations of half the country. There is also no way to create 
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the white homeland without exterminating the original Indigenous inhabitants of this land, a people 
so dismissed by the alt-right that they were never mentioned to me for the entire duration of my 
fieldwork. 
 This being said, the rise of Trump, Bolsanaro, and right-wing populists elsewhere shows 
that rage against the contradictions of global liberal capitalism and against the political centre’s 
inability to resolve them can be easily transmuted by factions of the ruling class into a straight-
forward path to further power. The Richard Spencers of the world will likely not lead the masses 
in any far-right revolutions to establish a dystopian white utopia. Rather, if white supremacist and 
hierarchist social movements gain power, they will be used by capitalists to cement convenient 
lurches toward authoritarianism, with racism being deployed, if determined to be useful, to 
maintain support among a segment of the white population and to justify the repression of workers 
of colour. Right-wing populist rhetoric will be used to offer reassurance in the form of a “firm 
hand” (Gingrich and Banks 2006, 16). Far from whites being returned in a racist time machine to 
an idyllic pure pre-capitalist European past, we will all of us be dropped off in a techno-Dickensian 
alternate reality, there to toil at our meaningless tasks while gargantuan corporations produce 











10.  Conclusions 
 Just before I completed my fieldwork, I sat in the apartment of one of the leaders of the alt-
right group, watching him get drunk and rail about other far-right organizations. For him, everyone 
was either LARPing, weak-willed or small-minded. Some were marching around in ridiculous 
uniforms, alienating people with their obsession with the WWII-era fascist aesthetic. Populist 
groups like La Meute were pathetic boomers afraid to say what they really thought about 
minorities. Skinheads were white trash. The so-called ‘alt-light’ was full of “homosexuals and 
Zionists”. The identitarians over in Europe wanted the continent to become a “theme park of 
ethnicities”, he said, with no vision for the white race as a whole and no will to articulate one. 
They had invited him to a big conference to talk about plans for starting a chapter in Canada, but 
had gotten cold feet at the last minute, and he had ended up flying over only to find that the 
‘conference’ had turned into a single meeting in Switzerland, at which he was told he couldn’t use 
the European identitarian group’s brand, logo or material. People in his own alt-right group were 
constantly drinking too much which made it hard to organize them. He frequently had to kick 
people out. He told me about one man who had been ejected:  
 
He was normalizing pedophilia. He said that Québec was strongest when it was controlled by the Catholic Church, 
and he said that that was because the priests encouraged big families, and for people to fuck kids to make big 




Bernard, too, had been cut down to size: “He was being too intense about Christianity on the 
Facebook group.” He explained that Christianity was all well and good, but that predicating the 
movement on “a common Christian identity, like Jordan Peterson wants” was largely “seen as a 
failure” by the alt-right. As for himself, he was leaving activism entirely, he said, to focus on his 
family and personal life. His wife was getting worried about the possibility of reprisals from 
antifascists. “Anyway,” he said, “I don’t think I have the talent to run this kind of group. Maybe 
I’ll keep an eye on things, but from afar.” 
 Far-left movements are famously schismatic, putting one in mind of the classic scene in 
Monty Python’s Life of Brian, in which the Judean People’s Front splinters into the People’s Front 
of Judea, the Judean Popular People’s Front and the Popular Front of Judea, the last consisting of 
one individual. Indeed, Wikipedia lists at least nine extant, autonomous communist parties in 
Canada including the Communist League, the Communist Party of Canada, the Communist Party 
of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), the Parti communiste du Québec, the Parti marxiste–léniniste du 
Québec, the Red Youth Front, the Revolutionary Communist Party, Socialist Action, and the 
United Jewish People’s Order. Movements on the far right are no different (Hawley 2017), and if 
the alt-right is anything, it is divided. Seen from a distance, the various subgroupings of white 
supremacism can all seem pretty much the same: they want white supremacy! But on closer 
examination, the permutations of far-right white supremacist ideology are innumerable, and 
interpersonal conflicts abound. Anthropology and the ethnographic method are well placed to 
discern and explore the resulting sites of tension. 
  The alt-right is susceptible to conflict stemming from competition over masculinities. 
While it positions itself as the defender of white masculinity against “the twin threats of 
miscegenation and emasculation” (Berlet 2004, 30), adherents seem hard pressed to reign in 
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attacks on other white men, both inside and outside the movement. A de jure disavowal of the 
concept of multiple masculinities or a gender spectrum clashes with a de facto understanding of 
men as divided into different gendered classes based on proximity to a masculine ideal. Further, 
the exact parameters of this masculine ideal are a subject of conflict, as different members have 
very different ideas of what it means to ‘be a man’. The alt-right predilection for juvenile shock 
humour, self-conscious exaggeration, venomous, generalized misogyny and elaborate internet-
based inside jokes exists in tension with conservative visions of white masculinity involving 
tradition, Christianity, wholesome hard work and family values. In addition, the masculinities that 
members embodied prior to their conversion to the alt-right were often at odds with far-right 
masculine ideals in various ways. Another problem adherents ran into was that a perfect masculine 
ideal is, of course, an ideal, which cannot be realized by most or all men. One method members 
used to overcome these points of dissonance was to present themselves as having transitioned from 
one type of socially desirable, but ultimately misguided, masculinity to a more conservative form. 
This way, they were able to ‘cover all their bases’ with regard to a masculine ideal, a newfound 
commitment to religion and family values, for example, existing alongside a previous identity as 
a hard-drinking hedonist who had lots of sex.  
 Masculinity is a profoundly important element of what it means to be alt-right. Clashes 
over the proper ways to embody masculinity, or which masculinity should be embodied, are an 
area in which the alt-right is vulnerable to schism. In many ways the various visions of masculinity 
valorized in the alt-right are irreconcilable and are currently held together mainly by shared 
adherence to other ideological points – and by the alt-right’s heavy emphasis on internet activism 
which prevents many adherents from ever meeting. When they do meet, they are often disgusted 
with each other, as when Joe met the podcasters behind This Hour Has 88 Minutes and dismissed 
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them as “short, fat nerds”. In addition to clashes over masculinity, disagreements over the proper 
type and degree of misogyny are a source of great tension. Calls for ‘White Sharia’, whether 
‘ironic’ or not, have polarized the alt-right. Religious and more classically fascist figures like Ben 
are appalled at rampant misogyny, preferring a more traditional sexism which valorizes women as 
mothers and wives. Calls by some for more women in the movement are resisted fiercely by others.  
 The alt-right’s relationship with male-supremacist internet subcultures is a phenomenon 
which warrants further study. These subcultures have acted as a pipeline to alt-right groups and it 
is possible that this process can be disrupted. Not all members of these subcultures agree with the 
most stridently misogynist and conspiracist viewpoints espoused in their literature. Some men 
affiliated with ‘pick-up artist’ scenes presumably simply want to have sex and have views no more 
misogynist than the ambient norm; certainly not all of them are committed racists. Finding ways 
to siphon such men away from the pipeline could deprive the alt-right of potential converts. How 
this can be accomplished is up for question, but anecdotally, testimonials on Reddit by former 
adherents to Red Pill philosophy indicate that many men simply join out of sense of loneliness, 
bolstered by generalized anger which becomes directed toward women. An article in The New 
Statesman by Amelia Tait (2017), interviewing men who have renounced the Red Pill, depicts men 
finding male-supremacist views comforting because they can explain men’s negative experiences 
with individual women, or because the ‘pick-up artist’ element promises to alleviate intense 
loneliness. Several refer to the Red Pill as a cult, indicating that techniques used to extricate people 
from abusive New Religious Movements could be effective in the case of the Red Pill.  
 The large number of tensions within the alt-right which do not have to do with gender will 
be difficult for the movement to continue to encompass as many of them are irreconcilable. As 
different camps solidify under various would-be leaders, splits and schisms will accumulate. 
  
241 
Revolutionist and reformist elements within the movement will face extreme difficulty in co-
existing. Continuing terrorist attacks by men affiliated with the alt-right will push pragmatic 
adherents more and more to the liberal, reformist camp. Reformists will find it almost impossible 
to distance themselves from the violent actions of the terrorist elements within the alt-right and 
will go ‘crypto’, resorting to obfuscation and prevarication to hide their affiliations. Their front 
groups will be identified as arms of the alt-right by scholars and antifascists; whether or not this 
will impede their organizing significantly is not yet clear, although most of my interviewees 
expressed concern about resistance by antifascist groups, with Joe telling me that “Antifa in 
Montreal is fucking huge” and Felix saying, “They have the numbers in Montreal. We can’t fight 
them in the streets.”  
 Christianity constitutes a major ideological conundrum for the alt-right, with many 
adherents advocating more religious influence and others remaining steadfastly secular. Leaders 
of the alt-right group in Montreal seem content to allow vague Christian identity politics but draw 
the line at proselytism and perspectives which place Christianity above racism. With all 
mainstream denominations of Christianity denouncing racism and US Orthodox bishops recently 
reiterating that it constitutes a formal heresy (Assembly of Bishops Communications 2017), 
sincere Christian faith can profoundly challenge the alt-right project. 
 Disagreements over outreach strategy will hamper offline organizing. If alt-right groups 
begin to practice charity outreach along the lines of church groups or NGOs, they will discover 
both that organizing street initiatives is costly in time and energy (Busher 2016) and that, at least 
in cities like Montreal, it will make them vulnerable to clashes with antifascist groups. On the other 
hand, sticking to nighttime poster campaigns and internet propaganda will be seen as milquetoast 
by some within the movement who will advocate more strident efforts. In addition, a violent 
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element dedicated to propaganda by the deed will simmer in the background, exploding 
sporadically and each time constituting a setback for those attempting to appear palatable to the 
public. Lacking central leadership, the alt-right will never be able to contain these terrorist 
episodes. Taken all together, these grave ideological and strategic differences will result in 
factionalism and infighting within the movement and will impede the realization of its goals. 
 One of the deepest divisions within the alt-right group I studied was the fascist/liberal split. 
Fascist opposition to liberal capitalism is at odds with the white supremacist liberalism espoused 
by many, including the group’s leadership. Bernard’s fear that a racist liberal state would simply 
reproduce the status quo in non-racial respects, and result in a culture which he would find just as 
degenerate as the current one, is shared by a significant portion of far-right activists. Anti-
liberalism is one of the mainstays of far-right extremism – Carter (2017) even uses it as her 
definition of ‘extremism’. As a whole the alt-right is elitist and wants to replace the current ruling 
class with a different one while maintaining social hierarchy. Who would constitute the new ruling 
class, however, is not something on which everyone agrees. Men in the business and finance fields 
are disproportionately represented in the group’s leadership and senior membership, and such men 
may not be accepted as appropriate candidates for a new elite class by classically fascist members 
already suspicious of capitalist elites. The question of what an alt-right economic policy would 
look like is almost entirely ignored by adherents, other than through vague anti-corporatism and 
anti-globalization rhetoric. If elements within the alt-right are ever forced to concretely articulate 
an economic vision it could very well split the movement even further. 
 The economic vision most likely to gain any traction in the mainstream is, however, the 
racist or ‘leukocratic’ liberal vision, as a version of this stance has been electorally successful in 
Europe whereas revolutionist fascism and right-wing anti-capitalism have not. It is also the alt-
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right stance most likely to gain support or at least acceptance from factions within the prevailing 
liberal power structure. Under conditions of extreme pressure from the populist right, factions 
within the Canadian ruling class could co-opt a watered-down version of this stance for political 
gain. Arguably, Donald Trump, a billionaire life-long capitalist privileged from birth ruling on a 
populist, nativist platform, represents this having already happened in the United States. 
Importantly, this type of racism is not a new format but rather a return to liberal norms of 50 to 
100 years ago.  
 Ultimately, a major emotional driver of the alt-right is rage against late modernity and the 
failings of the political centre, transmuted into raced and gendered right-wing reaction. The 
alienation engendered by late capitalism has reached a fever pitch. The final crisis of capitalism 
predicted by Marx may come less in the form of the Depression To End All Depressions than in 
the form of the total collapse of meaning and authenticity – if the total collapse of the biosphere 
does not come first. In either case, I argue that the alt-right project in general represents the desire 
to travel backward in time to a pre-liberal age where meaning and authenticity are self-evident, 
and where, conveniently for the white men making up the movement, racial and gender hierarchies 
are steadfastly established. I argue that the resistance to the meaning-destroying processes of late 
capitalism is completely rational, and that the desire to be part of a superior ruling caste is, if 
ethically untenable, itself also at least rational. 
 The project of the alt-right – the establishment of a white- and male-supremacist state in 
North America – is, clearly, a violent and ethically unacceptable fantasy which must be resisted 
by all individuals and groups who are invested in human dignity and basic egalitarianism. This is 
not to say that the liberal centre must be defended. Rather, real alternatives to the economic and 
political system currently threatening the existence of complex life on earth must be articulated 
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and implemented, and they must be alternatives which offer all groups dignity and respect. Unjust 
systems of hierarchy allowing tiny groups of people to dominate the economic activity of much of 
the globe must be abolished and economic democracy established, modifying the economic base. 
Identitarian ideologies of any political stripe must be combatted by articulating philosophies which 
allow for solidarity across identity categories. Forms of cultural identity which transcend race and 
unconvincing civic nationalism are sorely needed. A spirit which stoutly rejects the desiccating 
individualism of late capitalism and which demands unremitting accountability from anyone in a 
position of power must be adopted. A concern for the planet’s rapidly disappearing biosphere must 
be elevated to the top of every policy agenda. A new world is not only possible, but deeply 
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